Guest Editors’ Introduction

*Special Issue on Militarization of the Mariana Islands*

Tiara R. Na’puti, University of California Irvine
Kenneth Gofigan Kuper, University of Guam

This 31st volume of the *Micronesian Educator*, published through the School of Education at the University of Guam, provides an important and timely focus on the topic of militarism in the Mariana Islands archipelago. As guest editors, we worked to ensure that this volume provides contemporary research, information, and stories about the multifaceted dimensions of militarization in the region. The contributors in this volume have extensive experience and expertise including Indigenous and critical perspectives that highlight the cultural, economic, educational, environmental, legal, political, psychological, and/or theoretical elements of militarization. This special issue emerges in the context of the Covid-19 global pandemic and global environmental threats from human induced climate change. The local and global connections among militarization and climate change further highlight the urgency of critical approaches that bring critique to bear on the ideological and power-laden context of contemporary colonization.

Educators, practitioners, and scholars from various disciplines merge together in this special issue to address the relevant issues associated with the topic of militarization in the Marianas, revealing the need for decolonization. The papers provide the reader with a survey of militarization issues and the connected elements of the U.S. empire that sustain these colonial conditions in the Marianas. From historical and contemporary perspectives, from economic to political foci, and from the geographical starting points of the Northern Mariana Islands to Guåhan, these essays privilege Indigenous understandings to explore militarization as a crosscurrent connecting the archipelago.

**Section One: Research Papers**

This volume contains seven research papers that examine militarization across broad themes of decolonization, environment/health, politics, and resistance. Crosscutting among each of these papers is the preponderance of evidence that supports addressing the complex challenges of militarization in and outside of the classroom setting.

In the first paper, Carlyle G. Corbin’s “Military Activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories as an Impediment to Decolonization” covers the geostrategic context of militarization in the Pacific and the role of the United Nations and international law. His work addresses the political implications of militarism while offering educators and the local community an understanding of international law and protocols for decolonization.

Following this broad overview of the issues of militarization in relation to non-self-governing territories, like Guåhan/Guam, the second paper by LisaLinda S. Natividad offers a poignant and necessary examination of the economic impacts of the U.S. military. Her paper, “An Assessment of the Military Economy on Guåhan (Guam),” addresses the military build-up by considering the economic aspects as well as environmental and social costs to the island. Utilizing case studies
that range from Okinawa to the Philippines and North Carolina, this paper provides evidence that challenges the mantra that military bases offer economic development within communities. Furthermore, this paper situates the issue of genuine security as a pedagogical tool for educators to engage students in critical discussions around military economies and base occupation.

Next, Liza V. Baza surveys the issues of militarization from World War II to the twenty-first century employment of the Patriot Act in times of “national security.” Her research paper, “The Psychological Impact of Militarization on CHamorus,” calls for more critical investigation into the psychological effects of militarization for Guåhan and the CHamoru population in particular. Further examining the health implications, Baza also notes how the impacts of war and military violence remain under-reported or unreported altogether. This essay directs attention to the lasting and intergenerational effects of such colonial trauma. Providing various levels of analysis, Baza articulates how local media and military industries naturalize “security” ideology that perpetuates the militarization of Guåhan. This essay is also a reminder that war and its devastating consequences not only wreak havoc on the psychological level but also at the physical level by damaging the environment.

Considering the impact of militarization in another area of everyday life, the fourth paper by Tricia A. Lizama articulates the cultural and political struggles to maintain traditional healing practices in Guåhan. Her work, “Access to åmot Chamoru Behind Guåhan’s Military Fences,” poignantly argues against U.S. military control of areas such as, Andersen Air Force Base (AFB) and Guam National Wildlife Refuge, Ritidan Unit, where colonial command continues to limit and deny access to åmot (medicinal plants). Lizama reminds us that traditional healing is powerful and expansive as it encompasses the physical, spiritual, and mental levels of health and well-being.

Kisha Borja-Quichocho-Calvo brings cogent critiques to bear on the normalization of U.S. military presence in secondary education in Guåhan. Her paper, “Counter Military Recruitment Efforts in Guåhan’s Public High Schools: The Case of Na’matatanga I Manhoben” articulates the urgent need for questioning everyday militarization, particularly within the Guam Department of Education’s school system. This research demonstrates the significance of counter-recruitment that provides more robust and life-affirming educational opportunities for students. Borja-Quichocho-Calvo’s work articulates the urgent need to continue to challenge the influence that the U.S. military has on our school systems. Indeed, this paper is particularly salient in 2021, at a time when militarization of police is being more heavily scrutinized with calls to defund and end connections between the military and the academy (Drezner, 2019; Jaffee 2018; Lampen 2020; Levin 2020; Nguyen 2017).

While the preceding four papers engaged in-depth research around particular aspects of militarization in Guåhan, the final two papers of this section provide a focus on the case of militarization in the Northern Mariana Islands and throughout the Marianas archipelago. In the sixth research paper, Theresa (Isa) Arriola further explains the significance of the U.S. military’s legacy of environmental destruction and contamination in, “Securing Nature: Militarization and the Environment in the Northern Mariana Islands.” She offers a nuanced critique of the way the military employs conceptualizations of “nature” and “the environment” in order to justify its training and testing in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). Focusing
specifically on the Mariana Islands Training and Testing (MITT) Study Area, Arriola uses ethnographic data to show how Indigenous struggles for environmental justice must contend with the Department of the Navy’s paradoxical claims of conservation, protection, and stewardship. This work lays bare the inextricable connections between the military and environmental destruction, and the military’s discursive strategy of greenwashing that continuously defers accountability for the environmental consequences of its operations.

In the seventh and final research paper of this section, “Conducting Women-Centered (Re)search as Resistance in the Marianas Archipelago,” Sylvia C. Frain builds upon a framework for non-Indigenous scholars (like herself) to advance ways to center the stories and work of Indigenous women in the Marianas who have long been engaging in nonviolent resistance to militarization. Her essay provides an overview of a qualitative research design that prioritizes the creative and theoretical dimensions of Indigenous women’s work and calls for open and public scholarship to circulate these stories on their own terms. In doing so, Frain points out how research itself can and does function as resistance, particularly in the context of expansive militarization and its devastating impacts. This essay offers insight about the sexist politics of militarization as well as the possibilities afforded by digital and new media platforms to articulate demands and forge transnational solidarity toward a demilitarized Pacific.

Section 2: Testimonies and Pedagogies
We are delighted that this special issue includes perspectives that can further educate the community about the U.S. militarization of the Mariana Islands and its wider impacts within Oceania. In section two, we provide the full-text testimonies and pedagogical reflections of two community members who have been petitioners at the United Nations Decolonization proceedings on the Question of Guam. These shorter papers offer an examination of the positionality and geography of the Marianas in the context of the larger Pacific region and its efforts for decolonization.

First, highlighting the important role of testimony, former Guam Senator Hope Alvarez Cristobal offers her 2017 remarks in opposition to Legislative Resolution No. 294-24 (COR), introduced by then Senator Michael San Nicolas. Her testimony provides peer-reviewed studies and evidence of the U.S. military’s chemical footprint and the Department of Defense’s abysmal track record of cleaning up its contamination in Guåhan. Her remarks reflect additional evidence that the U.S. military is the single-most polluting entity in the world, with an ongoing track record of generating massive amounts of hazardous waste for its routine operations and destroying environments particularly around bases (Crawford, 2019; Harris 2015; Martini, 2015; Marzec, 2015; Vine, 2015). This testimony narrates the significant health and environmental impacts that the U.S. military buildup poses for the island—making clear that “more militarization” will undeniably result in “more contamination.” Cristobal concludes with a plea that continues to resonate beyond the halls of the Guam Legislature,

I ask you on behalf of our people’s health, on behalf of our community, please take your responsibilities seriously—to protect our people from further military contaminations. We do not need any more militarization; we already have a military that is too big for Guam.
Her words speak to the complexity of militarism and the necessity of a holistic approach to educate students about the imperative of decolonization. We anticipate that educators will consider the complex issues that Cristobal has brought to bear in her testimony and hope that they might incorporate this text into their curriculum as an example for their students. Testimony, such as this one, can help students identify the connections between militarization and colonization while also applying strong skills of critical analysis.

Second, Melvin Won Pat Borja’s paper offers his poem as a presented petitioner statement at the United Nations Special Political and Decolonization Committee (4th Committee) to help educators apply the value of testimony and poetry as a pedagogical tool for youth in Guåhan. He reflects on his poem with an accompanying excerpt about teaching poetry to youth and the promises of creative curricula that engage students on complex issues of activism, colonization, politics, and resistance. Borja’s powerful stanzas offer a practical application of poetic techniques in the classroom that have profound impact beyond a lesson plan, activity, or unit. His testimony offers words, experience, and hope to students and educators alike--ensuring that theory and practice collide to address the confluence of the most pressing global issues of our time, such as climate change, global health, systemic conflict, and decolonization.

Section Three: Book Reviews
In Section Three there are two book reviews that provide timely insight into book publications that examine significant historical and contemporary elements of militarization in the region. The first is a review of Keith L. Camacho’s 2019 book, Sacred Men: Law, Torture, and Retribution in Guam. Reviewer LeeAna Acfalle considers the significance of Camacho’s historical inquiry into the post-World War II period (1944-1949) focusing on the U.S. Navy war crimes tribunal that used and justified torture and imprisonment of the accused Japanese and Chamorro war criminals. This review points out how the colonial logics of the U.S. imposed upon the Marianas continue to justify torture and detention of enemy combatants as part of the American carceral state in the twenty-first century.

Continuing the consideration of contemporary impacts of militarization, Jesi Lujan Bennett provides a review of Sasha Davis’ 2015 book, The Empire’s Edge: Militarization, Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific. This book addresses the devastating effects of militarization on both environments and peoples of the Pacific—from islands like Guåhan, Bikini Atoll, Hawai‘i—and throughout the larger region, to include islands like Okinawa.

Tiara R. Na’puti, PhD, Assistant Professor of Global Indigenous Studies, University of California, Irvine
Kenneth Gofigan Kuper, PhD, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Guam

Guest Editors

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Production Editor of Volume 31
Yukiko Inoue-Smith, PhD
School of Education, University of Guam
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Section One

Research Papers
Military Activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories as an Impediment to Decolonisation

Carlyle G. Corbin, International Advisor on Governance and Senior Fellow, Global Dependency Studies Project

The Geo-Strategic Context

By the second quarter of 2020, United States (US) Naval presence in the Asia/Pacific region (recently dubbed “Indo-Pacific”) has been significantly increased with the “rare deployment of three aircraft carriers to the region in apparent response to increasing expansion of Chinese influence in the area, and developments affecting Hong Kong among other matters” (Beattie, et al, 2020, p. 1). Together with the joint defence agreement between Australia and India including the Indian offshore areas of Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Australian territories of Christmas Island and Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the importance of island dependencies to the geo-strategic positioning of States is apparent, and the role of Guam in this context is evident.

These most recent developments follow on from the heightening/lowering of tensions between the U.S. and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the fall of 2017 characterized by rhetoric between the leaders of the two countries which generated an intense international geo-strategic climate. Verbal threats from U.S. President Donald Trump to "totally destroy the depraved regime in North Korea" (Trump, 2017). were answered by DPRK leader Kim Jong Un who questioned Trump's "fitness to hold the prerogative of supreme command of a country." (Pennington, 2017). Apart from the rhetoric, the DPRK's substantive position on its nuclear programme was expressed at various times as a “legitimate exercise of the right to self-defence” (UN, 2017a, p. 2), "a nuclear war deterrent" (UN, 2017b, p. 2), and "the only way to defend oneself and safeguard the dignity of the nation in the present hostile world where the law of the jungle prevails" (UN, 2017b, p. 3).

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe weighed in on the regional tensions asserting that the DPRK nuclear issue, as well as the ongoing maritime dispute with China in the East China Sea, were factors in his government's increase in defense spending, and reflective of his efforts to remove restrictions in the post-World War II constitution limiting armed force activity to purely defensive purposes (Xingjie, 2017, p. 13). The Japanese ambassador had called on the U.N. Security Council to impose tougher economic sanctions in light of the 2017 DPRK nuclear test (Bessho, 2017), whilst the Republic of Korea (ROK) at a September 2017 U.N. Security Council session had encouraged measures "strong and robust enough to compel the DPRK to seriously engage in dialogue" (Cho, 2017). The two Koreas remain technically at war with the cessation of hostilities reliant on the Armistice Agreement of 1953.

In October 2017, President Vladimir Putin lent the Russian Federation's perspective, recalling that past foreign interventions in Iraq and Libya, and the subsequent overthrow/assassinations of their respective leaders (Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Qaddafi), may have convinced the DPRK that a nuclear deterrence was needed to avoid a similar fate (McCurry & Phillips, 2017). Putin called for "an end to the bellicose and offensive rhetoric" on both sides (Delk, 2017), and commented that that the people of the DPRK “will eat grass but will not stop their (nuclear) programme as long as they do not feel safe" (McCurry & Phillips, 2017).
Largely overlooked in the mix was the longstanding ‘dual suspension’ proposal put forth by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to ease the crisis through a reciprocal ‘time-out’ of the joint U.S. - ROC ‘defensive’ military exercises/war games on the one hand, to be coupled with a corresponding halt in the DPRK nuclear programme on the other hand (Xingjie, 2017, p. 16). The PRC proposal argued for the resumption of the six party-talks within the multilateral framework which had begun in 2003 with China, Japan, DPRK, the Russian Federation, ROC, and the U.S. at the table. (Arms, 2017). Absent this multilateral embrace, President Trump's five nation tour of Asia in November 2017 was accompanied by a massive show of naval force with the nuclear powered aircraft carriers of the USS Ronald Reagan, USS Nimitz and USS Theodore Roosevelt conducting simulated air strikes, maritime surveillance, sea supply, coordinated fenced maneuvers and other exercises. U.S. military installations in the territory of Guam figured prominently in these activities.

Amid the show of U.S. military might, Trump's comments during his Asian visit signaled a glimmer of hope that a diplomatic solution to the standoff might yet be achievable - indication of the 'Trumpesque' international strategy of belligerent rhetoric followed by calls for negotiation. Thus, he subsequently urged the DPRK to 'come to the table' and 'make a deal' during a press conference with ROK President Moon Jae-in (Lemire & Colvin, 2017), and agreed to postpone joint military maneuvers with the ROK in deference to the February 2018 Winter Olympics in PyeongChang (ROK).

Constructive engagement during the Winter Olympics between the ROC President and a DPRK high-level delegation headed by President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Mr. Kim Yong-nam, and the Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Workers' Party Ms. Kim Yo-jong, (the sister of DPRK leader Kim Jong-un), were signs of cautious optimism for continued talks in the post-Winter Olympics period even as U.S. skepticism persisted in some quarters regarding a sustainable inter-Korean dialogue towards the thawing of relations. What followed was the unexpected rapprochement between Kim and Trump resulting in the historic Summit meeting in Singapore between the two leaders where a Joint Statement was signed on 12th June 2018 "commit(ing) to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity."

This unlikely turn of events allowed the rest of the world to breathe a sigh of relief, albeit temporarily, as renewed tensions began to emerge in the Middle East with the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. Nevertheless, the highly charged geo-political atmosphere created by the Korean-related developments had exposed certain issues bubbling just below the surface with the exposure of significant democratic deficiencies in the political status of non independent countries (NICs) in the Asia/Pacific region (Guam, the Northern Marianas and others) whose lack of genuine self-government serves to limit their authority to influence geo-strategic developments that have direct implications for their indigenous peoples whose inalienable right to self-determination and consequent decolonisation may be significantly impeded.
Advancing Militarisation in the Asia/Pacific region

In the voice of Bob Marley, "until that day, the dream of lasting peace... remains but a fleeting illusion." (Selassie I, 1963). The resultant 'rumours of war' which had surrounded the 'Korean question' remain very much in evidence by the persistent advance of militarism in the region, having systematically progressed under former U.S. President George W. Bush, and having further accelerated by former U.S. President Barack Obama through the much heralded 'Obama pivot' to the Asia/Pacific 'theatre.' This acceleration included the U.S. re-positioning of force in the region through measures such as the deployment of the controversial High Altitude Areas Defense anti-missile system (THAAD) in Guam and in the ROK - perceived by China and Russia as threatening to their respective security interests. Also on the horizon were multibillion dollar increases in U.S. defence expenditures specific to the region's defense (Sun, 2017) - perceived by many as exacerbating tensions, rather than stabilising security, with important implications for U.S. administered dependencies in the area.

Geo-economic interests are also factored into the strategic calculus as noted by the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford in a statement that the "future economic prosperity (of the U.S.) is inextricably linked to our security and political relationships in the region" (Copp, 2017). Indeed, the Obama effort to consummate the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) with a specific set of Asia/Pacific states - excluding China - was intended to generate such 'economic prosperity' in order to "increase U.S. access to the growing markets of Asia, help stimulate the growth in U.S. exports, (and) generate export-related jobs..." (CRS, 2012, p. 22). The Trump withdrawal from the TPP changed that calculus.

It is within this geo-strategic framework that Letman, writing in The Diplomat, surmised that Guam is "a central component of America’s growing military presence in Asia-Pacific, (and) an integral part of U.S. efforts to bolster its position" (Letman, 2016). He pointed to a statement by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter who termed Asia/Pacific as the defining region for the future of the U.S., and who regarded Guam as "providing strategic global strike capability...ensuring consistency with force posture requirements" and critical to the U.S. military's forward deployed presence in the Pacific befitting the moniker of the 'tip of the spear.'

Guam human rights attorney Julian Aguon noted that the current scenario has "culminated...in increasingly specific threats to the island and people of Guam, "observing that "if U.S.-North Korea relations be complex, this be simple: When you live in a colony, you’re easy meat" (Aguon, 2017, p.1). As a non self-governing territory (NSGT) administered by the United States, Guam is, indeed, 'easy meat.' The territory is the object of unilateral imposition of myriad military activities/behavior on its shores, and in its skies and waters, spanning the range of base installations with ever increasing military personnel, and live fire training exercises on land, sea and air, with hi-tech surveillance activities such as THAAD. The resultant environmental contamination of such activities is an inconvenient byproduct as regularly cited by civil society groups. Yet, the territory's authority to influence the extent and nature of military activities affecting it is minimal in the absence of actual power within the U.S. political system, or in the exercise of sovereign power where such external military activities could be regulated by bilateral treaty.
This untenable position places Guam in the crosshairs of the geo-strategic rivalries in Asia. During the earlier belligerency phase, the DPRK in August 2017 had threatened to fire missiles in the territory's waters in response to U.S. military exercises off Korean shores (Lendon & Berlinger, 2017), and it was reported in October 2017 that China had been "testing U.S. air defense identification zones around Guam" (Copp, 2017). Vine of the American Empire Project pointed out that such military operations are underway to varying degrees in nearly a thousand such locations worldwide where the U.S. still stations its troops some two decades after the end of the Cold War. Vine counts some 113 facilities in Japan, and 83 in the ROK, but drew particular attention to the special character of such installations in colonial territories:

Today, the disproportionate presence of bases in places that lack full democratic rights within the United States, such as Guam and Puerto Rico, helps perpetuate a twenty-first century form of colonialism, tarnishing our country’s (U.S.) ability to be a model for democracy (Vine, 2015).

The military has frequently used this freedom (of operation) to behave with casual disregard for people in the U.S. colonies, acting in ways that would be unimaginable in the 50 (U.S.) states or in a foreign country. After World War II the military disposed of hundreds of thousands of pounds of ordnance in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands through detonation, burning or dumping at sea. A dumpsite near Anderson Air Force base has leached dangerous and toxic compounds, and the base itself is on the (U.S.) Environmental Protection Agency's list of the nation's (U.S.) worst environmental contamination sites” (Vine, 2017).

Evolution of Militarisation in Dependent Territories

Amid such advancing militarisation, with implications for the dependent territories in the region, it is to be recalled that such activity has its genesis in the historical progression of 'discovery' and conquest in the Pacific by several European naval powers dating from at least the 15th Century, and for the U.S. military at the end of the Spanish-American War as the 19th Century drew to a close. In a 2013 United Nations (U.N.) study on decolonization of the Pacific, Toki recalled that such military activity was characterised in the 1800s by "competition among countries to seize Pacific island states for political, military and financial interests (with) that problem... (having) lingered until the current day." In contemporary terms, the study noted that:

Articles 10 (of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples prohibiting the forcible removal of lands of the indigenous peoples) and (Article) 30 (prohibiting military activities in indigenous lands) are both violated in the name of the current global security situation. Guam experiences military build-up that can destroy the cultural fabric of the indigenous Chamorro people, and Hawaii has sacred sites serving as live military training facilities (Toki, 2013, pp. 6-7).

The historic territorial acquisitions by European naval powers, and later by the U.S., often came as the 'spoils of war', and was consummated through agreements amongst the respective militaries. This was evidenced at the end of the 19th Century through pacts involving the naval powers of Germany, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the U.S. with the consequent division of the Samoan Islands; and in the annexation of Guam and the Philippines (along with Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean) pursuant to the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the U.S. Shortly thereafter, the Danish West Indies in the Caribbean was purchased from Denmark by the
U.S. in 1917 for military strategic purposes related to German naval activity during World War I. Similar military annexations took place in greater Polynesia following agreements between Tahitian indigenous leaders of the period and the French military which subsequently set aside the agreed terms, precipitating the Franco-Tahitian War (1844-46) and the War in the Leeward Islands (1888-97) before the French 'acquisition' was secured (Corbin, 2015, pp. 5-6). Similar military acquisitions followed through into the 20th century:

...the northern part of the Marianas (along with the Caroline Islands and the Marshall Islands) after the Spanish-American War were sold to Germany which governed the area for 15 years until the German defeat in World War I. Japan subsequently seized the islands through initial civilian colonial governance, and was subsequently given a League of Nations Mandate to run all of Micronesia for over thirty years. After the Japanese defeat in World War II in 1945, the status of Micronesia was unclear until the establishment of the 1948 U.N. Trusteeship mandate which confirmed U.S. authority over the islands as a strategic trust which facilitated continued and expanded military activity. (Cruz, 2010, pp. 92-99)

Accordingly, military strategic considerations in furtherance of cosmopole geo-economic interests have always been a dominant incentive for European and U.S. acquisition of island territories in the Pacific (and in the Caribbean, Indian Ocean and elsewhere). Acquisition was usually followed by a significant period of military governance before being replaced by cosmopole-appointed civilian dependency governance. This was generally succeeded by an open-ended period of elected dependency governance with limited authority - circumstances in which the dependent territories find themselves in 2020. In some instances, a process of self-determination was initiated by the people of a territory leading to decolonisation (UN, 1960a), resulting in independence or free association with an independent state (UN, 1960b). In other cases, territories were voluntarily/involuntarily integrated as in the former Kingdom of Hawai'i which was annexed by the U.S. after the 1893 overthrow of the constitutional monarchy, subsequently ruled through a system of dependency governance, and formally integrated in 1959 as the fiftieth U.S. constituent state. But in those cases where elected dependency governance was maintained, as in the U.S. and French administered dependencies in the Pacific (and in the British, French and U.S. territories in the Caribbean), various incremental reforms were instituted with limited (and reversible) delegation of power to lend an air of legitimacy to modernised colonial arrangements.

In this regard, American Samoa was transferred to civilian dependency governance in 1951 after more than a half-century of U.S. military governance, before electing its own governor in 1978. Meanwhile, in 1950, Guam was transferred from military to cosmopole-appointed civilian dependency governance before progressing to elected dependency governance courtesy of U.S. Congressional legislation in 1968. The transition in the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI) was more complex and reflective of the military strategic positioning of the territory during the events of World War I. Following a period of German caretaker governance after that war, the NMI was occupied by Japan in 1914 initiating a period of Japanese military dependency governance which was later formalised through a thirty year-long League of Nations mandate as Japan "exercised economic and military hegemony as part of its quest to expand its overseas empire in the Pacific" (Cruz, 2010, p. 97).
Subsequent U.S. military governance began with the capture of the NMI in 1944 to advance U.S. military interests during World War II. With the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, NMI as part of the broader Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) continued under U.S. military governance, formalised by the strategic trust provisions of the U.N. Charter (UN, 1945). Various transfers from military administration to civilian control were made until 1962 when cosmopolitan-appointed civilian dependency governance was initiated in earnest even as the territory remained under the military strategic trust umbrella of the TTPI until 1986. The NMI elected its first governor in 1978 under a territorial 'commonwealth' political status formula.

**Contemporary Militarisation in Island Dependencies**

By the beginning of the 1990s, the contemporary Pacific was increasing seen as critical to geopolitical projections in the immediate post-Cold War period with the fall of the Soviet Union and the steady emergence of China as an economic and military power. Amid these developments, the use of the Pacific dependencies for military purposes became increasingly important for cosmopolises such as the U.S. in relation to Guam and the NMI. Other cosmopolises more directly enhanced their use of Pacific colonies. In recent years, France has utilised its dependencies of New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna and Clipperton Island, to varying degrees, for military purposes in an effort to project itself as "fully a country of the Pacific" (Fisher, 2015). Because of their 'offshore holdings', France is considered the "world's second largest maritime domain (Le Corre & O'Hanlon, 2016)," and the world's second largest exclusive economic zone after the U.S. whilst maintaining an estimated force (as of 2016) of 2,800 troops between New Caledonia and French Polynesia, with an impressive accompanying naval fleet. (Scimia, 2016). According to Pascal:

> For some of France’s post-Second World War leaders, fixated as they were with the spectre of a nuclear conflict in Cold War Europe, the remoteness of the overseas territories represented a potential safe zone where leadership could retreat, and regroup. Charles de Gaulle’s concept of a ‘dispersed France’ viewed the ‘French territories in the furthest oceans’ as being crucial for the survival of the state should ‘European’ France be devastated, or become indefensible. While France decolonized other possessions, the ones in the Pacific were held on to very tightly indeed (Pascal, 2017).

Although the actual decolonisation of the 'other possessions' may have proven to be more in form than in substance (ex: Mayotte, French Guiana), the French geo-strategic positioning in the Pacific has been further advanced through multilateral agreements with Australia and New Zealand - countries founded upon European settlement and the concomitant indigenous displacement and marginalisation. Illustrative are the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group (QUAD) among U.S., Australia, New Zealand and France "which coordinates security efforts in the Pacific (LeCorre & O'Hanlon, 2016), and the France-Australian-New Zealand (FRANZ) security agreement (Wyeth, 2017). Certainly, the most egregious activity perpetuated on the Pacific dependencies was their use as the staging ground for atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons testing with enormous humanitarian and environmental damage to the people and their environment. Maclellan indicates that "in the fifty years from 1946-1996, the U.S., the United Kingdom (U.K.) and France conducted over 350 nuclear tests in the Pacific islands. "These included 67 atomic and hydrogen bomb tests at the islands of Bikini and Enewetak in the Marshall Islands between 1946 and 1958. In the 1960s, 25 tests were conducted on Christmas
(Kiritimati) Island with an additional nine tests at Johnston (Kalama) Atoll. As Maclellan recounted:

Britain tested nuclear weapons in Oceania between 1952-58, with 12 tests at the Monte Bello Islands, Maralinga and Emu Field in Australia (1952-57). These were followed by nine hydrogen bomb tests at Christmas (Kiritimati) Island and Malden Island in the central Pacific (1957-58). After conducting 17 nuclear tests in Algeria at Reganne and In Eker between 1960-66, France moved its test sites to the South Pacific. From July 1966 to January 1996, France conducted 193 atmospheric and underground tests at Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls in French Polynesia (Maclellan, 2015, p. 1).

The U.S. nuclear tests in the Pacific were conducted within the framework of the U.N. agreements governing the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), whilst others were carried out in dependent territories under the control of various cosmopolites, as in the case of the hydrogen bomb tests undertaken in the British colony of Gilbert and Ellice Islands (now the independent state of Kiribati) between 1956-62. Whilst escaping the nuclear testing nightmare, the Caribbean was subject to the lethal practice of chemical warfare testing in the immediate years after WWII. Accordingly, the U.S. moved its chemical warfare testing programme from the Panama Canal Zone to the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1947—ironically only two years after the signing of the U.N. Charter. Testing was conducted on the islands of Saint Thomas and Water Island through 1950 with significant chemical warfare material dating to 1948 left behind after the programme ended with the remaining chemical warfare material buried and fenced off. Examination of the sites by the U.S. military in 1990-91 concluded that "unless potential chemical burial areas are disturbed by excavation, no threat to human health and safety (was) anticipated" (Government of the U.S. Virgin Islands, 1992). Earlier remedial measures following the uncovering of multiple chemical and mustard-filled bombs, and numerous containers of nerve gas, included burial of the material on land, or the dumping of the material in the sea.

Similarly, Puerto Rico as the larger of the two U.S. administered territories in the Caribbean is indicative of a much larger acquired dependency utilised for military strategic interests defined in the period. Puerto Rico political scientist Juan Passalacqua wrote that "in the vespers of World War I, the U.S. military decided to protect itself from a German invasion of the Puerto Rican archipelago, potentially claiming an identical right of conquest as the U.S. had claimed in 1898... (Passalacqua, 2002, p. 2)." The primacy of Puerto Rico as a key naval base in the Caribbean extended through World War II. As Passalacqua elaborated:

The Navy's effort to transform Puerto Rico under the guideline 'the island is the base' began with a secret memorandum issued in 1943 and again in 1945 on the Navy’s 'general reservations on the grant of any independence. In that memorandum, the military proposed the creation of a commonwealth of Puerto Rico under the full authority of the U.S. (Passalacqua, 2002, p. 3)

This 'commonwealth' status would, in fact, be given effect through the 1952 Constitution. Passalacqua discussed the evolution of self-determination and sovereignty interests among Puerto Ricans that were considered adverse to U.S. military interests in advance of the consummation of the commonwealth status. Military objections to any change in the territory's political status continued if it meant U.S. relinquishment of Puerto Rico's offshore islands of Culebra and Vieques, with the "newly found predominance of the America military...after the
triumph of Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1959” (Passalacqua, 2002, p. 4). The subsequent Cuban missile crisis in 1962 precipitated interference in the territory's politics with the destabilisation of the elected autonomous-oriented Puerto Rico government in favour of its ultimate electoral defeat in 1968. By 1984, questions were raised as to whether nuclear weapons had been stored on the island, whilst the use of the inhabited offshore islands of Culebra and Vieques for military training purposes intensified.

Large tracks of land were converted on Culebra and Vieques for military training purposes, and activities were transferred to Vieques in 1975 following protests from human rights defenders. A 2003 U.S. Congressional report provided detailed background on the extent of the operations in Vieques (CRS, 2003, pp. 1-2). A "Petition Alleging Violations Of The Human Rights Of Various Residents Of Vieques, Puerto Rico By The United States Of America" was presented to the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 2003 recounting the effects of the military operations:

For sixty years, the United States Navy occupied most of the small island of Vieques, Puerto Rico, using the island as a practice ground for military warfare. The Navy routinely bombed the island—including dropping 500-pound bombs from aircraft—and used known deadly chemicals and toxins such as napalm, Agent Orange, depleted uranium (DU), white phosphorous, arsenic, lead, mercury, cadmium, copper, magnesium, lithium, cobalt, nickel, perchlorate, TNT, PCBs, solvents, pesticides, high explosives and minute particles of 'chaff.' Simulated live warfare was conducted several miles from where thousands of civilians live. The environmental impact left by the Navy includes high concentrations on land and sea of lead, mercury, cadmium, uranium, cobalt, manganese, aluminum and ‘toxic cancer causing substances [...leaked] into the ocean endangering sea life’ (OAS, 2003).

The Navy used the Vieques training range about 180 days per year until 1999, including 120 days for integrated (i.e., combined land-sea-air) live-fire exercises by U.S. Atlantic Fleet aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups. This activity was in preparation for regular six-month-long deployments to the Mediterranean Sea or Persian Gulf. In an argument that would ring familiar to Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. Navy asserted that "there was no site other than Vieques where Atlantic Fleet naval forces could conduct integrated live-fire training operations, and that such training operations are critical to fully preparing U.S. naval forces for deployment" (CRS, 2003, p. 2). The report revealed specific reasons for "Puerto Rican dissatisfaction regarding military training activities on Vieques, preceding similar concerns expressed in U.S. administered Pacific dependencies which by 2017 were faced with ever expanding militarization”:

1. lost potential for economic development due to lack of access to most of the island’s land, interruptions to local fishing operations, and the effect of DoN’s (Department of the Navy) activities on reducing the potential for developing the island as a tourist destination;
2. the inadequacy of DoN economic development efforts intended to compensate the Vieques community for this economic loss;
3. damage to the island’s environment, ecology, natural resources, historic resources, and archaeological sites caused by DoN training activities;
4. concern that the incidence of cancer or other diseases might be increased by pollutants released into the local environment by DoN training operations;
5. noise, especially from nearby ship-to-shore gunfire;
(the risk of an off-range accident), and (7) perceived DoN insensitivity in conducting its relations with the Vieques community (CRS, 2003, p. 2).

The training operations at Vieques ended in February 2003, and the firing range was closed several months later (U.S. Committee on Armed Services, 1981). The main military facilities of Roosevelt Roads on mainland Puerto Rico were closed the same year. The Congressional report ended with several "potential issues" for Congress with interesting parallels with the Pacific dependencies including:

How might the decision to end training at Vieques affect the U.S. ability to maintain access to overseas training ranges where there is local opposition to U.S. operations, such as Okinawa or South Korea? Does the decision set a precedent for managing disputes over ranges? Will it encourage other local populations to step up their opposition to U.S. training activities? (CRS, 2003, p. 6).

From the centuries-old acquisition of territories governed by various cosmopoles through to present day; and the progressive utilisation of these dependencies for military-strategic purposes of war preparation, weapons testing, nuclear experimentation, and resultant toxic chemical contamination as indicated earlier; it is evident that the cosmopoles have always perceived this activity as consistent with an 'acquired right'. Guam historian/activist Michael Bevacqua made the organic link between the steadily heightened militarisation of that territory, and its increasing vulnerability as a target, in referencing the placement of the THAAD and other enhanced military capacity which he noted was in response to developments in North Korea, and rivalries with Russia and China. He emphasised the geo-strategic positioning of Guam and its consequent use by the U.S. as the ‘front line’ against perceived potential threats. In this connection, Bevacqua recalled that China had named a version of one of its missiles as ‘Guam Killers’ precisely because of the U.S. military presence in Guam, and not because of any threat posed by the people of the territory. He pointed out that the people "are told that (U.S. military presence) makes us safe, but we are at the ‘tip of the spear’...and it's hard for the tip of the spear to feel safe" (Bevacqua, 2017).

Letman recognised "growing voices on Guam that demand a permanent and just resolution to what is seen as injustice" amid the tenuous circumstances of Guam's geo-strategic location. Also observed was "a tendency (in the U.S.) to view Guam from the military (perspective) but not... giving consideration to the fact that there might be people there who have a different opinion (regarding) their political aspirations and their right to self-determination (Corbin, 2016)." Chair of Guåhan (Guam) Coalition for Peace and Justice Dr. Lisa Natividad pointed out that the territory "has been on the United Nations list of Non Self-Governing Territories (NSGTs) since the inception of the list in 1945, (but indicated that) while other colonies of the world have been given the opportunity to decolonize and assert their independence, Guahan has been denied this most sacred human right..." (Letman, 2016). In a 2017 international press interview, Natividad observed:

"The people of Guahan are becoming more and more aware of the impacts of our current political reality of colonization (with) this past decade... result(ing) in a ground-swelling of activism in the island's youth who are becoming intolerant of our current status and who are committing themselves to resolving this issue and being able to exercise their sacred right to self-determination” (Letman, 2016).
In reiteration, the contemporary dilemma faced by the people of dependencies in coping with military activities is a function of a continuum of cosmopole unilateral activity dating to the original geo-strategic acquisition of these territories. Changes in the governance structures from direct military through cosmopole civilian governance to elected dependency governance has not altered the cosmopole's perceived entitlement to use the dependencies for military activities. Thus, when elected dependency governance was permitted, a role for the dependency's elected leadership in their own defence and security was never envisaged save some periodic courtesy consultation. Hence, the instruments of unilateral authority (constitutions, organic acts/laws, covenants et al) rarely, if ever, reflected a substantive role for the elected dependency government in how their territory might be used for military purposes.

It should be pointed out at this juncture that cosmopole unilateral control over military/defence matters can also be a feature of autonomous country governance as distinguished from dependency governance. In the case of the associated states in free association with the U.S., security and defence is effectively ceded to the U.S. by agreement in Title III of the respective Compact(s) of Free Association between the U.S. and the three Pacific compact countries (Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau) with attendant limitations on the capacity to conduct foreign affairs, and in particular, that which is related to defence. The 2003 revised agreement between the U.S. and the Marshall Islands is illustrative:

In recognition of the authority and responsibility of the Government of the United States under Title Three (Security and Defence), the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands shall consult, in the conduct of its foreign affairs, with the Government of the United States... (Marshall Islands, 2004, Section 123a)

The Government of the United States has full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to the Republic of the Marshall Islands (Marshall Islands, 2004, Section 311).

In the constitution of the Pacific associated state of the Cook Islands, it is considered that control of defence lies with New Zealand, but provides for some consultation (Cook Islands, 1964, p. 5). On the other hand, control of defence in Caribbean autonomous country models such as the Netherlands arrangements in that region (Aruba, Curacao, and Sint Maarten) maintain the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as the primary Instrument of Unilateral Authority (IUA), extending to the Kingdom the sole power for the maintenance of defence with no role for the autonomous countries (Article 3, 1954).

Further elaboration on the extent of autonomous country role in defence is outside the scope of the present paper which is focused on the dependencies recognised by the U.N. General Assembly as non-self-governing (NSGTs) under its self-determination and decolonisation mandates where norms are set through customary international law codified in decades of resolutions and decisions. A major feature of this international policy is the protection of the people of the NSGTs from unilateral military activities which might impede their right to self-determination. The 2017 U.N. decolonisation review process re-inserted important references to this effect following a decade and a half of U.N. silence on the issue. With respect to Guam, the U.N. General Assembly noted in its annual resolution on the territory "the concerns raised by the Territory before the Fourth Committee at the seventy-second session of the General Assembly
about the involuntary placement of the Territory in the midst of regional tensions” (UN, 2017c). Global policy on the issue is examined later in the present paper.

In this context, reference should be made also to dependencies under sovereignty dispute which pose a particular challenge in relation to their use for military strategic purposes by far distant cosmopoles. This is seen in the British insistence of its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) which is listed by the U.N. as an NSGT but claimed by neighboring Argentina, and over which a war between the two states was fought in 1982. The recognition of the British settler's right to self-determination is rejected by Argentina in favour of resolving the matter as a sovereignty dispute - an argument dismissed by the U.K. British military activities in the waters of the islands are routinely contested by Argentina which continues to file official complaints with the U.N. as illustrated in a 2016 letter to the U.N. Secretary General:

As you are aware, the Argentine Republic has repeatedly expressed to the international community its concern regarding British military deployments in the Malvinas Islands. This situation is creating unnecessary and unjustified tension in the South Atlantic, which has been declared a zone of peace by the legitimate littoral States of this ocean. The conduct of these military exercises in Argentine territory unlawfully occupied by the United Kingdom is contrary to numerous United Nations resolutions that urge the two countries to resume negotiations, in order to find a peaceful and definitive solution to this protracted sovereignty dispute.

The persistence of the United Kingdom in carrying out military manoeuvres in the South Atlantic is in violation, especially, of General Assembly resolution 31/49...and runs counter to the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, unanimously supported by the countries of the region and reflected in the rejection of such military activity, as highlighted in the declarations of the States members of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)...”. (UN, 2016)

The British also make similar claims with respect to the peripheral dependency of the 'British Indian Ocean Territory' (BIOT)—not listed by the U.N. as an NSGT. In advance of the independence of Mauritius in 1968, the Chagos Archipelago was excised by the U.K. from Mauritius in violation of several U.N. General Assembly resolutions, in particular Resolution 2066 (XX) of 1965 which "note(d) with deep concern that any step taken by the administering power to detach certain lands from the territory of Mauritius for the purpose of establishing a military base would be in contravention of the Declaration (on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Mauritius, 1965)." The relevant provision of the Declaration relates to the prohibition on the dismemberment of any colonial territory prior to independence as "incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations” (UN, 1960a).

Notwithstanding, the U.K. proceeded to expel the indigenous population to Mauritius and Seychelles between 1968 and 1973 and leased the island to the U.S. (to present day) to construct and operate a naval facility on the Chagos Island of Diego Garcia. The U.S. Navy indicates that the base "provides logistic support to operational forces forward deployed to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas of responsibility in support of national policy objectives...occupy(ing) a critical part on the tip of the spear” for U.S. military forces by supporting a multitude of unique
and challenging mission requirements." The U.S. Navy heralds Diego Garcia’s "strategic location and full range of facilities... (making) the island the last link in the long logistics chain; supporting vital U.S. and British Naval presence in the Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea” (U.S. Navy, 2017). Following decades of attempts by Mauritius to regain control of Chagos, the U.N. General Assembly in June 2017 by resolution supported the Mauritius proposal to refer the sovereignty dispute between Mauritius and the U.K. to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion (UN, 2017d). The ICJ subsequently rendered a decision that the decolonization of Mauritius was incomplete, and called for the return of Chagos to Mauritius.

Military Activities in dependencies and Customary International Law
Overall, the practice of unilateral cosmopole control over defence and security matters in territories under their administration, with the attendant conduct of myriad military activities, continues to prevail into 2020. In the period preceding the adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945, there were few standards governing such practices. But after 1945, customary international law on questions of self-determination and decolonisation began to crystallise with reference to the impact of military activities in NSGTs and their effects on the self-determination process. International recognition of the fundamental right to self-determination emerged from the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations Article 22, which applied to the "colonies and territories" the principle that "the well-being and development of such (colonised) peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant" (Covenant, 1919). This standard was subsequently contained in the 1941 Atlantic Charter which preceded the 1945 U.N. Charter in which the principle was further developed in Chapters I and IX on the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples, Chapter XI on NSGTs, and Chapter XII on trust territories (Corbin, 2016, pp. 133-135).

Cop and Eymirlioglu referred to the evolution of self-determination as "first conceived as a political principle, (and its transformation) to a peremptory legal norm, i.e. jus cogens" (2005, pp. 115-123). In this light, specific attention is drawn to the 1976 entry into force of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), respectively, representing the most important legal norm ever on the question of self-determination" with references to rulings of the International Court of Justice (ICOJ) in cases confirming the self-determination of the peoples of Namibia, Western Sahara and East Timor (Timor Leste).

Earlier reference is made to self-determination as a fundamental right in international law in the 1960 Decolonisation Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Decolonisation Declaration), and yet earlier in Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which recognised self-determination as a right in international law. Binder concludes that "self-determination is now generally accepted as a legal right of peoples," and that right pertains to 'peoples' rather than 'populations'” (Binder, 1992-93, pp. 223-225). This is consistent with the external right to independence versus an internal right to self-determination of individuals within an existing state. The 1970 U.N. Declaration on Principles of international Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations further defined the right to self-determination as an authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter (Binder, 1992-1993, p. 236). Accordingly, the 1970 Declaration expressed the conviction that "the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples constitutes a significant contribution to contemporary international law, and that its effective application is of paramount importance...” (United Nations, 1970).

Aguon concludes that "self-determination is well established in both the legal literature and actual practice of countries, and is an exalted normative domain in the contemporary international legal system" (Aguon, 2011). In this respect, he also emphasises the importance of U.N. General Assembly resolutions which "...illuminate and record the position of the international community on any given subject, (and) they may be, and are frequently invoked as, evidence of the practice of states, which is a source of customary international law." Aguon further highlighted that:

(wh)ere General Assembly resolutions concern general norms of international law, their acceptance by a majority vote both constitutes evidence of the opinions of governments on any given subject and provides a basis for the progressive development of the law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1975 advisory opinion in the Western Sahara case adopted this perspective when it relied heavily on General Assembly resolutions to establish basic legal principles concerning the right of peoples to self-determination...

Resolution 2625 (the Declaration on Principles of international Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States) is considered a datum of customary international law binding on all countries. Today, the right to self-determination is generally accepted as a *jus cogens* or peremptory norm from which no deviation is allowed. That is to say the self-determination right is, in theory, unbreachable. (Aguon, 2011)

Yet, in the absence of requisite accountability, that which is "unbreachable" can be systematically set aside, as in the case of military activities in territories such as Guam and others similarly situated. Such actions have proceeded without sufficient international scrutiny under customary international law, raising the inconvenient question as to whether contemporary colonialism serves to advance the right to self-determination in its originally intended preparatory purpose, or whether it has actually evolved as a condition to impede that right. The military-NSGT issue had been effectively rendered dormant from 2003 until its re-introduction in the 2017 U.N. deliberations on decolonization through 2020. The revival of the discussion highlighted longstanding flaws in U.N. accountability for the implementation of the global self-determination and decolonisation mandates.

**United Nations Consideration of Military Activities**

*Island Dependencies*

U.N. policy on military activities in NSGTs has been included in annual resolutions intended for all NSGTs on the implementation of the 1960 Decolonisation Declaration, and in annual consolidated resolutions on individual territories. A review of relevant U.N. resolutions in this regard is instructive. The first recommendations concerning military bases in NSGTs were considered in 1964 in several subcommittees of the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonisation (C-24) with particular focus on American Samoa and Guam, as well as on Mauritius, the Seychelles, St. Helena, Tristan de Cunha and Asencion Island. In this context, military bases
were seen as "not only an impediment to the establishment and strengthening of the independence of developing countries but also a serious obstacle to the liberation of people still under colonial domination and a grave threat to the future development of the territories."

Specific concern was also expressed over an inordinate "dependence of the Guamanian economy on the military and other activities of the United States government" (UN, 1959-66, p. 84).

At the 20th session of the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) in 1965, a draft consolidated resolution on NSGTs administered by New Zealand, UK and the U.S. was submitted to the U.N. Fourth Committee including provisions asserting that "the existence or establishment of military bases constituted an obstacle to the freedom and independence of those territories" and requested the relevant administering powers "to dismantle the...bases and to refrain from establishing new ones (UN, 1959-66, p. 85)." In committee debate, the administering powers claimed a 'sovereign right' to maintain such bases, noting that the U.N. Charter had been silent on the matter. They also insisted that the bases safeguarded rather than obstructed the territories' 'freedom and independence', and stated, rather extraordinarily, that "the existence of a base was a matter for the people of a territory to decide and not for the (U.N.) Committee” (UN, 1959-66, p. 85). In light of the prevailing colonial status, it is unclear as to which procedure was available in 1965 (or subsequently) for the people of an NSGT to determine whether a military presence should be permitted on its territory.

The military provisions of the 1965 draft U.N. consolidated resolution were adopted by separate, majority vote in the Fourth Committee, and the entire resolution passed by subsequent majority vote. However, the military references were later removed by the General Assembly on procedural grounds following an interpretation mandating that a 2/3 vote was necessary on provisions seen as dealing with peace and security under Article 18(2) of the U.N. Charter. In this first instance, the Assembly failed to override the President's ruling to apply the Article, and both military provisions were removed from the draft resolution before it was adopted by the Assembly (UN, 1965a).

At the same 20th session in 1965, the UNGA considered a second draft resolution on implementation of the Decolonisation Declaration covering all NSGTs where the applicability of the 2/3 vote on military provisions was also considered. The proposed language "request(ed) the colonial Powers to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial territories and to refrain in establishing new ones” (UN, 1959-66, p. 85). In this second case, only a simple majority was required by the General Assembly to approve the military provisions which were included in the full resolution adopted by the General Assembly (UN, 1965c). The prevailing argument, supported by developing countries (and many former colonies), was that "the draft resolution was not concerned with military bases in independent countries but with those which had been installed without consultation and agreement with the people of the territories” (UN, 1959-66, p. 86).

At the 21st session of the UNGA in 1966, a new argument was introduced by the colonial powers that "military bases located in the colonial Territories would help them in their overall strategy in the so-called East-West confrontation," with the territories openly characterised as "part and parcel of the global military policy of the colonial Powers." This projected a heavy handed approach to the colonial stewardship, and actually supported the counter-argument that
"the continuation of colonialism had resulted in the preservation of military interests all over the world (with) the small territories slowly being turned into fortresses of destruction." It was further cautioned that "military bases maintained against the will of the colonial peoples formed part of the aggressive arsenal of the imperialist Powers...denying the legitimate right of the colonial peoples to self-determination and independence" (UN, 1959-66, p. 174). The counter narratives of peace and security versus colonialism continued at the 21st session, with the UNGA ultimately adopting its resolution on the implementation of the Decolonisation Declaration "request(ing) the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones (,) and from using those that still existed to interfere with the liberation of the peoples in colonial Territories in the exercise of their legitimate right to freedom and independence” (UN, 1966).

Subsequent action was taken by the UNGA at its 22nd session, reiterating the call for the dismantling of the military bases, and authorising the approval of a "study of military activities and arrangements by colonial powers in Territories under their administration" (UN, 1967). The study, conducted by the Special Committee on Decolonisation (C-24) on military activities in selected NSGTs,1 was published in 1968 without the input of the administering Powers who had refused to provide information. The study "condemn(ed) the use of military bases in colonial territories against third parties as contrary to the spirit of the Charter and a threat to international peace and security” (UN, 1968a). During discussions on the report in the C-24, certain administering powers argued that they were entitled to maintain military bases and installations in territories under their administration pursuant to the U.N. Charter and Trusteeship Agreements "in order to defend the inhabitants of the territories, as well as to maintain peace and security in the region." The counter argument continued that such installations remained an impediment to self-determination (UN, 1966-69, p. 175). The C-24 in its 1968 report "strongly condemned (the activities) as a crime against humanity," and also made the link between military activities and its effects on territorial economic development:

.. military activities and arrangements (in NSGTs)...inevitably led to interference with the economic development of the Territories concerned both through the extensive alienation of land for military purposes and by drawing the population away from productive activities, as in the case of Guam and Gibraltar where the bases played a dominant role in the local economy (UN, 1968b).

In 1968 through 1970, the C-24 continued its consideration of military activities in the NSGTs, and issued annual reports on the item, whilst the General Assembly proceeded to adopt resolutions repeating earlier concerns and calls for action in regard to this practice. Variations of the arguments continued in U.N. deliberation with the accompanying C-24 reports and repeated references by the General Assembly that military bases in NSGTs created a threat to international peace and security and impeded the implementation of the Decolonisation Declaration. Accordingly, the General Assembly adopted between 1970-78 a series of annual consolidated resolutions on the small territories, and general resolutions on the implementation of the Decolonisation Declaration. Most notedly, the General Assembly adopted the "Programme of Action for the full Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to

1 The NSGTs covered by the study were Namibia, Gibraltar, Territories under Portuguese administration, Seychelles and St. Helena, Southern Rhodesia, Papua and New Guinea, Guam, Bahamas, Bermuda, Turks and Caicos Islands, Antigua, and the United States Virgin Islands
Colonial Countries and Peoples which affirmed that "member States shall carry out a sustained and vigorous campaign against all military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration, as such activities and arrangements constitute an obstacle to the full implementation of Resolution 1514 (XV)" (United Nations, 1970). During the period, the legitimacy to use trust territories for military purposes was argued by some administering Powers, in particular the U.S., which insisted that "...under an agreement concluded with the Security Council and in conformity with articles 81 and 82 of the (U.N.) Charter...the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was a designated strategic area, and paragraph 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement granted the administering Power the right to establish such installations..." (United Nations, 1970-78, p. 52).

General Assembly resolutions from the mid-1970s to 1992 addressed various elements of military activities in NSGTs. Accordingly, from 1976 through 1983 resolutions included identical language that "called upon the administering Power to withdrawal immediately and unconditionally their military bases and installations from colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones." From 1984 the Assembly added the call "not to involve those Territories in any offensive acts or interference against other States." From 1995 to 1998, the Assembly began to "take note" in its resolutions "of the decision of some of the administering Powers to close or downsize some of the military bases in the Non-Self-Governing Territories." The Assembly had adopted in 1980 a second Plan of Action for the Full Implementation of the (Decolonisation) Declaration mandating that:

"Member States shall oppose all military activities and arrangements by colonial and occupying Powers in the Territories...as such activities and arrangements constitute an obstacle to the full implementation of the (Decolonisation) Declaration..."

In 1999, the General Assembly added to the call for termination of military bases the admonition that "...military activities and arrangements by administering Powers in the Non-Self Governing Territories under their administration should not run counter to the rights and interests of the peoples of the Territories concerned, especially their right to self-determination, including independence." From 2000-2002, the scope of the resolution was further expanded to include language "call(ing) upon the administering Powers to promote alternative sources of livelihood for the peoples of the Territories concerned" in recognition that the economies of the NSGTs were inordinately dependent on military activity. In a statement at the 57th session of the General Assembly in 2002, the U.S. again expressed its disagreement with the resolution's "contention that the mere presence of military activities and bases in the NSGTs is harmful to the

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4 See UNGA Resolution 35/118 of 11 December 1980.
5 See UNGA Resolution 54/91 of 6 December 1999.
rights and interests of the peoples of the territories," and insisted on the right to "take actions in accordance with their (administering power) national security interests." 7

In 2003, the annual decision of the C-24 adopted up to 2002 and entitled "Military Activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration" 8 was removed from consideration. 9 Subsequently, all reference to language on military activities in General Assembly decolonisation resolutions (heretofore informed by the C-24 decisions) disappeared from the 2003 General Assembly resolution on 'Implementation of the Decolonisation Declaration' without substantive debate on the omission, and would not appear again until 2017.

United Nations consideration of military activities in Guam

With specific reference to the U.S-administered dependency of Guam, the General Assembly adopted its first resolution with provisions on military activities in the territory in 1976 "deploring the policy of the Administering power in continuing to maintain military installations on Guam in contravention of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly." 10 By its resolution in 1977, the Assembly reaffirmed its "strong conviction that the presence of United States bases on Guam should not prevent the people of the Territory from freely exercising their right to self-determination ..." 11 By 1978, the Assembly resolution "recognised that the presence of military bases (in Guam) could constitute a factor impeding the implementation of the Decolonisation Declaration, and reaffirmed the strong conviction that the presence of military bases in Guam should not prevent the people of the Territory from exercising their inalienable right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Declaration and the purposes and principles of the (U.N.) Charter." 12

In subsequent resolutions on Guam the General Assembly regarded the practice of military installations in NSGTs as "incompatible with the relevant resolutions of the U.N." and began to "call upon the administering Power to take the necessary action to enable the inhabitants of Guam to regain possession of un-utilised land held at present by (U.S.) federal authorities and by the military." 13 The main themes of resolutions focused on "the presence of military bases (that) could constitute a major obstacle" to decolonisation, the responsibility of the U.S. to ensure that military activities do not hinder that right, and for the U.S. "not to involve the territories in any offensive acts or interference with any other States...relating to military activities and arrangements." 14 In 1987, the resolution also made reference to a U.S. Defence Department statement of a plan "to release an additional 1435 hectares to the territorial government in

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10 See UNGA Resolution 31/58 of 1 December 1976.
12 See UNGA Resolution 33/33 of 13 December 1978.
1986." In 1990, the theme of military ownership of land in the territory was expanded upon in the resolution on Guam:

Recalling that the 1977 Guam Land Use Plan recommended the release of 2,100 hectares of surplus federal land to the Government of Guam, and noting that, according to information transmitted to the Special Committee (on Decolonisation) in 1990 by the Guam Commission on Self-Determination 190 hectares had been transferred by the (U.S.) Navy to the Government of Guam, a further 462 hectares of the identified land had been released and an additional 175 hectares are in the process of being returned to the Government Guam.

In 1991-1992, the resolutions on Guam made reference to the "second round of negotiations" between the U.S. and Guam governments "at transferring land and facilities at the Naval Air station, Agana, opened in July 1991," noting that "large tracts of land in the territory continue to be reserved for the use of the (U.S.) Department of Defence." In 1993, the resolution on Guam noted that "pursuant to the request of the Government of Guam and the recommendation of the (U.S.) independent Base Relocation and Closure Commission..., the administering Power has approved of the closure of aviation activities at the Naval Air Station Agana." In 1994, the resolution on Guam abruptly excluded specific references to the linkage between military activities and decolonisation that had been included in resolutions from 1976 in apparent deference to the administering Power position that references to military activities in Guam were superfluous in light of the end of the Cold War—even as relevant language on military activities was retained in the U.N. resolution on the implementation of the Decolonisation Declaration for all NSGTs until 2002.

From 1994, the focus of attention shifted to related issues with the inclusion of text in the Guam resolution on the "programme of transferring surplus federal land to the Government of Guam," and on the call "by the people of the Territory...for a reform in the programme of the administering Power with respect to the thorough and expeditious transfer (return) of property to the people of Guam." The 1997-2002 resolutions on Guam included reference to military activities by taking note of the "proposed closing and realigning of four United States Navy installations on Guam and the request for the establishment of a transition period to develop some of the closed facilities as commercial enterprises." There were no references to military activities in Guam in resolutions from 2003 through 2006 whilst reference to issues of land transfer were retained. Resolutions on Guam from 2007 onward expressed awareness of deep concerns expressed by many residents, including civil society and others, regarding "the potential social (and subsequently cultural, economic and environmental) impacts of the

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15 See UNGA Resolution 42/87 of 4 December 1987.
16 See UNGA Resolution 45/32 of 20 November 1990.
19 See UNGA resolution 49/46 of 9 December 1994.
impending (and later planned) transfer of additional military personnel of the administering
Power to the Territory," but did not call for any particular action to be taken. 21

In 2016, reference was added in the resolution to "the statement made by the Speaker of the
Thirty-Third Guam Legislature before the Fourth Committee at the seventieth session of the
General Assembly that the most acute threat to the legitimate exercise of the decolonization of
Guam was the incessant militarization of the island by its administering Power, and noting the
concern expressed regarding the effect of the escalating United States military activities and
installations on Guam."22

Recent Developments
Developments at the U.N. beginning in 2017 marked a renewed focus reflecting the longstanding
concerns over the continued use of NSGTs for military strategic purposes after decades of
customary international law condemning this practice. Accordingly, the General Assembly
adopted three resolutions which included reference to military activities in NSGTs. The first text
which was introduced in the C-24 on 14th June on the 'Implementation of the Decolonisation
Declaration' returned to references which had been summarily omitted without explanation since
2003. Accordingly, the C-24 proposed text:

"Call(ed) upon the administering Powers concerned to terminate military activities and
eliminate military bases in the Non-Self-Governing Territories under their administration
in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly; alternative sources
of livelihood for the peoples of those Territories should be provided."23

An amended version of the resolution was later adopted by the C-24 on 23rd June which
inexplicably eliminated the reference to "alternative sources of livelihood."24 The amended draft
resolution was subsequently adopted by the Fourth Committee on 10th October, and by the
General Assembly on 7th December as Resolution A/72/111.

Also, on 14 June, the C-24 adopted a draft resolution on 'Economic and other activities which
affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories.' The resolution was
subsequently endorsed by the Fourth Committee with the addition of language re-inserted from
earlier resolutions on military activities reflecting the strong and detailed concerns of sixteen
petitioners from Guam who had addressed the Fourth Committee in October 2017 on the
deleterious impact of militarism on various sectors of their society. Accordingly, the resolution
was adopted by the General Assembly on 7th December as Resolution A/72/92 with both the
preambular and operative sections of the resolution reflecting the restored references:

22 See 71/113 of 6 December 2016.
23 "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," Draft
resolution submitted by the Chair of the Special Committee on Decolonisation, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2017/L.10,
14 June 2017.
24 "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," Draft
resolution submitted by the Chair of the Special Committee on Decolonisation, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2017/L.10/
Rev. 1, 20 June 2017.
Reaffirming also that any economic or other activity, including the use of the Non-Self-Governing Territories for military activity, that has a negative impact on the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories and on the exercise of their right to self-determination in conformity with the Charter, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the other relevant resolutions of the United Nations on decolonization is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter.

Reaffirms the need to avoid any economic or other activities, including the use of the Non-Self-Governing Territories for military activity, that adversely affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories, and in this regard reminds the administering Powers of their responsibility and accountability vis-à-vis any detriment to the interests of the peoples of those Territories, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the United Nations on decolonization.\(^{25}\)

A third resolution, on "The Question of Guam," was also adopted by the C-24 on 22nd June, by the Fourth Committee on 8th November, and by the General Assembly on 7th December 2017 as Resolution 72/102. The text repeated acknowledgement of "existing concerns of the Territory regarding the potential social, cultural, economic and environmental impacts of the planned transfer of additional military personnel of the administering Power to the Territory," and references from earlier resolutions to "the statement made by the Speaker of the Thirty-Third Guam (L)egislature before the Fourth Committee at the seventieth session of the General Assembly that the most acute threat to the legitimate exercise of the decolonization of Guam was the incessant militarization of the island by its administering Power, and noting the concern expressed regarding the effect of the escalating military activities and installations of the administering Power on Guam."\(^{26}\) The Guam resolution also added the agreed language from earlier resolutions as a powerful statement to the military strategic crisis in which the territory finds itself as a result of increasing militarism:

Recalling also its resolution 57/140 of 11 December 2002, in which it reiterated that military activities and arrangements by administering Powers in the Non-Self-Governing Territories under their administration should not run counter to the rights and interests of the peoples of the Territories concerned, especially their right to self-determination, including independence, and called upon the administering Powers concerned to terminate such activities and to eliminate the remaining military bases in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

The resolution also called for "all measures necessary to protect and conserve the environment of the Territory against any degradation and the impact of militarization on the environment and once again request(ed) the specialized agencies concerned to monitor environmental conditions in the Territory and to provide assistance to the Territory, consistent with their prevailing rules of procedure." The formal and informal dialogue from the 2017 through 2019 U.N. decolonisation sessions on the use/misuse of military activities in NSGTs generated a renewed realisation

\(^{25}\) "Economic and other activities which affect the interests of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories," Draft resolution submitted by the Chair of the Special Committee on Decolonisation, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2017/L.8, 14 June 2017.

\(^{26}\) "Question of Guam," Draft resolution submitted by the Chair, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2017/L.18, 19 June 2017
among many U.N. member states that militarisation in these territories was inconsistent with the decolonisation process, and violative of customary international law.

Conclusion
Since the adoption by the General Assembly of the 1960 Decolonisation Declaration there has been intense global examination of the impact of military activities on the implementation of the U.N. decolonisation mandate. Consistent conclusions have yielded clear recognition of the pernicious effects of such activities, and repeated calls have been made for such behavior to be terminated, or at the least, that it not impede the decolonisation process. Yet, the response by those countries which administer territories has been essentially to dismiss the applicable 'rule of law', particularly when it runs counter to any particular political position they may take. The peculiar and abrupt removal of the military activities issue from the U.N. agenda from 1993 to 2006 was disturbing on its face. This was indicative of a 'decolonisation fatigue' amongst U.N. member states which had seen little progress in decolonisation of the remaining, mostly small island, NSGTs as the U.N. entered a post-Cold War phase of decolonisation disengagement at the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, strategies were employed to phase out the U.N. role in decolonisation with attempts to legitimise the prevailing dependency arrangements rather than to advance genuine decolonisation.

Because of such efforts to circumvent the process to meet a new colonial legitimisation agenda, decolonisation was deferred rather than achieved - but the strategy did not result in the intended removal of decolonisation from the U.N. agenda. Through the period, the administering powers voted against, or abstained, on key U.N. resolutions in the General Assembly, and when the issue of the use of NSGTs for military activities was returned to the agenda in 2017, hackneyed rationalisations were retrieved from past decades, even as such arguments had been summarily dismissed by the international community for close to a half-century.

The arrogance of power was reflected in the U.S. explanation of vote at the Fourth Committee in 2017 where the claim of "sovereign right to conduct military activities in accordance with its (U.S.) national interests" was resurrected, contending that the "allegations" that the people of Guam opposed the military presence were "baseless." But it is difficult to ignore the clarity, sincerity and substance expressed by the sixteen Guam petitioners at the U.N. Fourth Committee in 2017 - a group which included elected legislators, distinguished academics, members of civil society, and students in opposition to the ongoing military buildup and overall militarisation. The U.S. opinion that U.N. resolutions were "non-binding and not reflect(ive of) international law" was indicative of their oft-employed diplomatic strategy when the international community takes a different position than their own, thus justifying inaction. The resultant lack of implementation of decolonisation directives remains the Achilles' Heel of the U.N., and is in dire need of attention by member states and the U.N. bureaucracy.

Koh and Doyle may have characterised it best in the journal "Foreign Affairs" (2013) in analysing the importance of adherence to "durable global standards," particularly for those nations in positions of international leadership. It is from this perspective that such standards including those addressing the impediments of military activities in NSGTs should be respected. As Koh and Doyle concluded: This is what the U.S. Government demands of countries such as China and Iran. Why should Americans expect any less of themselves?” (Koh & Doyle, 2013, p. 165).

In the immediate term, the tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the broader concerns for the increased influence of China in Asia/Pacific have placed the people of the island territories of the Pacific in the particularly vulnerable condition of being used unwittingly as forward outposts of strategic power projection by administering powers which continue to utilise these territories for military purposes in spite of longstanding international law and policy against such practices. The development and execution of legitimate processes of self-determination in these territories leading to their consequent decolonisation through legitimate political status arrangements of full political equality would be the best approach for the territories to gain the requisite political power and authority to regulate the extent and nature of such military activities. "Until that day," the condition of NSGTs under contemporary, ’modernised’ dependency arrangements continues to yield insufficient political authority and renders these dependencies susceptible to the deleterious effects of military activities which can significantly impede the process of genuine decolonisation.

References

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Guåhan and its Indigenous peoples, the CHamorus, have experienced one of the longest colonial histories across the globe. As a non-self-governing territory, the island has no political power to control matters such as the U.S.’s plan to transfer about 5,000 Marines from Okinawa, Japan to the island. The promise of a vibrant military economy as part of the Guam military build-up has not been accompanied by data or facts that evidence how it will be beneficial to the local economy. This paper explores the island’s economy and the contributions from the Department of Defense presence by way of job creation and the consumption of goods off the base. However, the limitation of low consumer spending and the end of a construction boom leaves a lot to be desired. Additionally, other considerations such as environmental and social costs need to be considered to assess the cumulative impacts of the military build-up on the island’s economy. Case studies in Okinawa, Japan and Fayetteville, North Carolina evidenced the challenges that military bases bring to the economic development of surrounding base communities. The case of the post-military economy in Subic Bay, Philippines was also explored and provides great hope for the possibilities of a vibrant economy even after the U.S. has packed up its base and left. Opportunities to educate students in the classroom to vision a world with genuine security provides promising prospects for the future.

Keywords: economy, base, build-up, genuine security, military, Okinawa

Introduction
In the Pacific Blue Continent’s Micronesian region lies Guåhan, the southern-most island in the Marianas archipelago and native homeland to Indigenous CHamorus. More commonly known to the world as Guam, the island’s historical significance is most popularly referenced in relation to militarization such as its role in World War II, the Vietnam and Korean wars, and as a target of threats from North Korea. As an unincorporated territory of the United States, Guåhan continues to play a critical role in the U.S.’s military strategy and has been dubbed the “Tip of the Spear” of U.S. military might. In 2006, the governments of Japan and the United States (U.S.) entered into an accord revealing plans to transfer 8,600 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guåhan. These plans were met with mixed reviews by island residents. The promise of economic prosperity for the island’s ailing economy was largely promoted by the local Chamber of Commerce and media sources. Grossly absent from the discourse was an economic analysis containing data to comprehensively assess the cumulative impacts of the military build-up on the island’s economy. This paper presents an assessment of the island’s colonial history and economy as impacted by the presence of U.S. military bases. In addition, the military economies of Fayetteville, North Carolina and Okinawa, Japan will be examined as referent points and an alternative to the military economy will also be reviewed in the case of Subic Bay, Philippines. Lastly, implications for education will be presented.

Historical Context of Guåhan
Indigenous CHamorus have inhabited the Mariana Islands for nearly four millennia. They are noted to have lived subsistently off the land as farmers, hunters, and fisher folk. CHamorus had a stratified society with three social classes: the matao (paramount), achaot (middle), and
manachang (low). They were a traditionally matrilineal society with clan lands transmitted along their mother’s line. Clans were led by both male and female chiefs, namely the maga ‘lahi and the maga ‘haga. Traditional values of inafa ‘maolek (collective peace) and fina tao tao’ (deep respect) guided their interactions with great value placed on the needs of the collective society. The island participated in regional trade and remained in relative isolation from the Western world until 1521.

In 1521, Ferdinand Magellan stumbled upon the island and Spain later claimed it in 1565. Colonization of the island began in the mid-1600’s when Jesuit priest Diego Luis de San Vitores arrived and established a mission to Christianize the island’s people. The Spanish maintained control of the island until the end of the Spanish American War when the island was ceded to the United States through the Treaty of Paris in 1898. In the following U.S. Naval Era, the island was governed as though a U.S. Naval ship under the command of an admiral.

In 1941, the island was attacked by the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II. During the war period, CHamorus suffered great atrocities to include massacres, work encampments, and the enslavement of women as comfort women. This period transformed Guåhan into a major U.S. player in the war against Japan with more than 200,000 military personnel and 21 bases occupying about 80% of the island’s land (Quimby, 2011). Japanese occupation ended on July 21, 1944, when the U.S. returned to reoccupy the island.

Guåhan remains an unincorporated territory of the United States and is listed on the United Nations’ list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. The island’s current political status does not allow residents to participate in the vote for U.S. president nor meaningfully in the U.S. Congress. U.S. colonization has resulted in land dispossession with the U.S. Department of Defense (US DOD) occupying nearly 1/3 of the island for its military bases and other installations. As a result of its colonial condition, the island’s native inhabitants have the right to self-determination and have embarked on a political decolonization process with three possible status options for the future: statehood (integration), free association, and independence.

**U.S. Department of Defense Presence on Guåhan**

Colonization by the U.S. has resulted in the rapid militarization of Guåhan. The U.S. desired the island for the development of military bases as a result of its strategic geographic location in the Pacific and the development of stations for coaling and communications (Mayo, 1992). The U.S. DOD currently controls about one-third of the island administered through the Joint Region Marianas with the Andersen Air Force Base in the north, the Naval Base Guam located in the south, and a number of installations scattered throughout the island. The US DOD footprint on island totals about 35,938 acres, more than land owned by the local Government of Guam and more than all private landowners combined. The total active-duty military population is approximately 7,000. Base activities include the homeporting of nuclear submarines and Naval ships, B52 and B2 stealth bombers, and the recent development of a THAAD system.

In 1898, following the ceding of Guåhan from Spain to the United States, the U.S. immediately placed the island under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department, where “absolute authority was held by the military Governor” (Thompson, 1944, p.1). The naval governor held powers in the realms of legislative, judicial, and executive functions. The island was closed for security
purposes and foreign ships were denied entry into the island’s harbor unless granted permission by the U.S. Navy. In 1917, the Guam Congress was established which served to consult the Naval Governor on matters of concern to the civilian community, however, the body held no power.

Land dispossession was rampant in the post-World War II period. The U.S. DOD took lands for the development of its bases following the war through eminent domain land condemnation proceedings. For example, in the case of Sumay in Southern Guåhan, a whole village of people was relocated from their ancestral lands to the village of Santa Rita. Sumay was developed into what is now Naval Base Guam. Nearly 11,000 CHamorus (almost half of the CHamoru population) lost their lands in this process (Quimby, 2011). Land condemnations were forced and compensation for lands was found to be grossly undervalued. This led to the filing of a class action suit and in 1983, the federal government paid out a settlement of $39.5 million (Mayo, 1992). Nonetheless, some families still found the settlement insulting and refused to accept it. Many Indigenous CHamorus also lost ancestral lands as a result of the taxation system established by Spanish colonizers and continued by the Americans.

The island’s natives suffered high levels of unemployment, which prompted the U.S. military government to address issues of the ailing economy. In response, the colonial government encouraged the development of local industries to include soap production and agriculture. However, these efforts were insufficient in consideration of the colonial policies that included the closing of the port at Apra Harbor until 1963.

Thompson (1944) described the interaction between the local and military populations following the war as one of social discrimination with the intention to keep the natives “in their place” (p.2). Further, she reported on the segregated school system separating local and military school children. In addition, when Naval enlistment was opened up to young men on Guåhan, they were only allowed to serve in the capacities of waiters and people working in the mess halls. Consistent with the social discrimination practices were policies that paid less for the same work performed by locals as compared to their American counterparts. Thompson reported the daily rate of $4/day for Americans and $2.50/day for natives. While the island’s local economy has developed since the post-war period, the current condition still leaves much to be desired.

**U.S. Proposed Military Build-Up**

In 2006, the governments of Japan and the United States entered into an accord agreeing to the relocation of 8,600 U.S. Marines from Okinawa, Japan to Guåhan. In examining the proposed military build-up one inevitably asks the question, “Why are U.S. Marines being relocated from Okinawa to Guåhan?” The Okinawan people have resisted the U.S. military presence for decades- particularly infuriated by the sex crimes committed against women and girls by U.S. service members. For example, in 1995, three U.S. service members raped and brutally beat a 12 year-old schoolgirl, which resulted in public outrage and protests.

The proposed military build-up was subject to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, which in 2009 released the U.S. DOD’s detailed plans to do the following: dredge nearly 72 acres of live coral reef to construct a bigger berthing for nuclear submarines, drill an additional 22 wells into the island’s northern water aquifer, erect a missile defense system
(THAAD), acquire an additional 2,200 acres of land for the construction of bases (increasing landholding on island to roughly 42% of the island), increase the island’s population by ~80,000 people (~51%), and desecrate Pagat village to construct a live-firing range complex.

The DOD reported that approximately 10,000 testimonies were submitted, which was unprecedented in U.S. DOD history. Also unprecedented was the nearly 11,000-page document that came with a 90-day review period. The island community’s collective response raised concerns related to the negative impact of the military build-up on Guam’s frail infrastructure (to include utilities, water, and waste-water systems), the environment, cultural properties, increased traffic, and the ailing local hospital, to name a few. None of these concerns were addressed in the release of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) in July 2010.

In 2011, a locally organized group, We Are Guåhan, along with others sued the U.S. DOD on the selection of the ancient CHamoru village of Pågat, a sacred cultural and burial site, as the preferred alternative for a live firing-range complex without sufficiently exploring all other possible options. The case was won in 2012, which set into motion a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) process. Findings of the SEIS indicated a reduction in the number of active-duty military personnel to about 5,000 and relocated the preferred alternative to Litekyan in its Record of Decision. Litekyan is an ancient CHamoru village with clusters of ancient artifacts throughout. This sparked another wave or resistance largely led by original landowners, environmentalists, and CHamoru activists. As the construction phase began, violations of the Programmatic Agreement with the Government of Guam and the lack of protection of the sole Hayun Lagu (serianthes nelsonii) tree evoked ongoing anger and protests.

Continued military expansion on Guåhan has included the development of the Mariana Island Range Complex (MIRC) and the Mariana Island Training and Testing (MITT). The MIRC, established in 2010, is a half a billion square nautical miles live-fire training range that surrounds Guåhan and other islands in Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. The MITT, whose Record of Decision was signed in 2015, encompasses nearly a million square nautical miles and is equivalent to the area of the U.S. states of Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, Montana and New Mexico combined. The MIRC and the MITT provide training environments in urban spaces, airspace, surface & subsurface sea space, and the ability to use live ordinance for training. The MITT is clearly the largest training area in DOD possession reaching across Micronesia to the nearby Republic of Belau.

In contrast to those who attended the NEPA meetings to voice their concerns of the build-up plans, supporters of the plan touted their primary reason as economic. Catherine Castro of the Guam Chamber of Commerce presented testimony dated October 5, 2017 in which she cited a poll conducted in April 2017 by Q-mark Research seeking out the community’s perceptions of the impact of the Guam military build-up. Castro indicated that nearly 70% of those polled were in favor of the Guam build-up and that 80% of Guam residents felt that the build-up would contribute to job creation and tax revenues. Contrastingly, Owen (2010) conducted a study of local Guam people to assess their level of support for the build-up and reported:

One important survey finding was that people were not as positive about the military build-up as pro-military observations of public commentary, news, military enlistment, fighting and death rates might suggest. When questioned anonymously about how
positive they are about the build-up, 53% are positive and 41% are not, a lower positivity rate than expected. Support is highly visible in public, on the local news and in many positively written commentary pieces on the build-up (p. 312).

Owen further examined the reasons given for the positive impact the build-up will have on the economy and participants in her study ranked them as business revenue increase (32%), funds from the US and Japan (29%), local job creation (23%), and infrastructural development (6%). She concluded her findings stating the perception that the build-up was good for the island’s economy and bad for the island’s culture. While it is clear that the community’s perception of the military’s impact on the local Guåhan economy is positive, there is a clear absence of hard data to evidence this assertion. This also raises the question of whether or not the cash infusion to the economy will trickle down to the local population.

Guåhan’s Overall Economy

As an unincorporated territory of the U.S., Guåhan’s economy reflects dismal performance at best in comparison to the U.S. Being a small island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean presents a unique set of challenges for Guåhan’s economic development. Ruane (2014), an economist at the University of Guam discussed a number of key factors to consider in small island economies:

Small islands around the world are constantly facing the challenge of how to enhance the growth of their economies so as to provide an increased standard of living for their population. The major culprit is these islands’ “smallness”, which reflects itself in different ways (small population, low total income and per capita income, limited productive resources) results in a lack of economies of scale and economic diversification, which limits opportunities for local production and for producing for exports and instead increases reliance on imports for a wide array of goods and services. (p.169)

The island’s economy is primarily fueled by the tourism industry, which has historically fluctuated as tied to the Asian market. In addition to tourism; the local Government of Guam, the U.S. federal government, and the DOD are additional contributors to the island’s economy. The island’s economic obstacles have evidenced not so great economic results.

Guåhan’s primary economic industry is tourism. This industry was initiated in the late 1960s-primarily capitalizing on the Japan market. Concerted efforts to diversify tourism to other countries have included expansion to South Korea, Taiwan, the U.S., and the Philippines. In recent years, the number of visitors has exceeded well over a million people annually. According to the Guam Visitors Bureau (n.d.), tourism statistics boast the following: creation of 21,091 jobs; every tourist spends about $1,140 on a trip to the island; $260 million government tax revenue is generated; and total tourism economy sales is at $1.85 billion. However, the vulnerability of the tourist industry is clearly evident as impacted whenever there are fluctuations in the economy of Japan and other countries. The global COVID-19 pandemic, for example, has completely slumped the local economy on Guåhan.

Guåhan’s economy can be assessed by examining economic indicators that provide a glimpse into the island’s economic situation. In 2018, the island’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was $5.92B with a growth rate of -0.27% (U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2019). The island’s GDP per capita in the same year was $35,713 versus the U.S. rate of $62,887 (Macrotrends, n.d.). These figures reflect a rate 43% less on the island in comparison to the metropole.

In examining the island’s employment trajectory, a similar disparity in comparison to the U.S. is evident. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2019), Guam-based workers earned $17.75/hour as compared to the U.S. national average of $25.72/hour. This computes to 31% less wages in 21 out of 22 major occupational groups. Data obtained from the Guam Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.) reflects an average unemployment rate of 4.03% from September 2018 to September 2019. An indicator of poor economic activity is the measure of income in the population living below the poverty line. Guåhan’s percentage of those living below the poverty line in 2018 was 23% (Indexmundi, n.d.). This accounts for nearly one in four people on island. More recently, the economic downturn as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the halt to the tourism industry presents a new set of challenges on top of an already ailing economy.

Guåhan’s Military Economy

The U.S. DOD budget for Guåhan has fluctuated over time. The 1990s saw a significant drop from about $507 million to about $461 million by the end of the decade (Quimby, 2011). These figures include costs associated with active duty military members and their families to include health, education, and Section 30 monies. In the early 2000s, defense spending began to rise again. This continued over the next two decades to come with military spending from base development connected to the Guam military build-up with a price tag estimated to be $7.5 billion. These funds were expected to primarily cover the cost of construction of the new Marine base that would occur over the period of several years. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) indicated that there would be a five-year boom period, however, the duration of the construction period was extended further over time as adjusted in the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy to mention that this economic boom period is anticipated to return to the island’s original baseline upon the completion of the construction phase.

Employment and Job Creation

During the U.S. Naval Era, Guåhan was catapulted into the wage economy, which was relatively unfamiliar territory for its people. Life transitioned from being more subsistence and living off the land to focused on the acquisition of employment and earning a living wage. The U.S. DOD enticed local farmers to shift from working on their farms to becoming laborers for the construction of military bases. The island had little opportunity for economic activity with the closure of its port. Hence, employment was primarily attainable only from the federal and naval governments.

The number of CHamorus employed by the U.S. federal government increased over time. By 1911, nearly 25% of CHamoru men were employed as laborers and nearly 40 years later, more than one-third of workers on island—about 8,700—were employed by either the U.S. federal or naval governments (Mayo, 1992). Mayo (1992) shared the findings of a University of Guam study of about 700 households in the 1970s indicating that almost half (49.7%) worked for the Government of Guam, 33% worked for either the federal government or were enlisted in the U.S. military, and less than 17% worked for the private sector. This trend continued until the 1980s.
In the 1990s, however, the U.S. DOD embarked on a Base Realignment and Closure process to downsize its holdings of military bases. This led to a reduced number of employment opportunities as federal employees were incentivized to retire and relocate to another federal job jurisdiction. The Guam Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.) reported the number of payroll employees for March 2019 as follows: 19,340 services; 12,920 retail trade; 11,520 Government of Guam; and 3,780 federal jobs. These figures affirm the downward trend in the number of federal jobs available on island. Federal jobs comprise a mere 5.8% of total payroll employees on island. Hence, the diversification of Guåhan’s economy has clearly been evident in the past few decades and the federal government’s contributions to employment have been nominal.

The pay scale for CHamorus employed by the federal employment, however, was considerably less in comparison to Americans as indicated by Thompson above. These jobs were more desirable because they offered high salaries in comparison to jobs in the local government and private sector and were consistent with wages set by Washington D.C. for the U.S. federal government. This pay disparity was eventually eliminated in the Organic Act of Guam that was passed in 1950. However, the discriminatory practice that continues to the present is the payment of an additional 25% to state-side hired employees as compared to those who are locally hired on Guåhan. This dual wage-standard inadvertently contributes to the brain drain and polarization of the talent pool of civilian workers toward federal employment. More tragic, however, is its perpetuation of the structural inequality between Americans and the local population on Guåhan.

Employment opportunities provided by U.S. militarism expands beyond the number of people employed by the federal government, but also incorporates those hired by local companies who have secured military contracts. This is often the case for the delivery of food services, skilled labor workers, and so forth. An example of a multi-national company that received these contracts is Raytheon Technologies based in Waltham, Massachusetts. These companies create jobs and pay Gross Receipt Taxes directly to the Government of Guam. It is noteworthy to mention, however, that many local companies who have competed for these military contracts are not able to compete with the cost of proposals submitted by national and multi-national companies. Local companies often do not have the capacity required to carry-out these large-scale projects. In this case, larger off-island companies win these bids and then sub-contract local companies to carry out components of the project. In these circumstances, the larger profit margins are typically kept by the multi-national company.

Another component of military employment on Guåhan is the enlistment of local residents into the U.S. Department of Defense. Data has historically revealed that Guåhan’s enlistment rate is higher than any U.S. state per capita (Osolla, 2018, December 27). Consistent with the higher rate of enlistment as compared to states is the higher rate of war mortality. Incidentally, this is the case with other U.S. territories and U.S. Freely Associated States as well. This may be largely related to the massive recruitment efforts in our communities. ROTC programs are present in most high schools on island and at the University of Guam. With the high levels of unemployment and poverty on island, enlistment in the U.S. military provides a quick vehicle to earning a living for those with a high school diploma. The future promise for educational
support adds to the enticement. The U.S. DOD embarked on its Focus 22 Program that specifically identifies 22 U.S. cities for its recruitment efforts. Walters (2020, June 15) stated, “The purpose of Focus 22, according to its Army architects, is to provide a pathway into military careers for young people in poor urban neighborhoods without a lot of employment options” (p.1). This similar target marketing strategy has been used on Guåhan for decades.

Other Contributions
In addition to the creation of jobs, the U.S. military’s presence on island also contributes to the local economy in other ways. Military personnel and their dependents often purchase goods available off base ranging from items in markets and stores, patronizing restaurants and entertainment establishments such as bars, discos, and theaters. Nonetheless, the volume of goods purchased off base is secondary to what is available on the base which is typically cheaper because the shipment of goods is subsidized by the federal government. Relative to the cost of living on Guåhan, Dawson (n.d.) warned military members being stationed on Guåhan: Expect a limited selection of almost everything, and prices are higher than on the U.S. mainland. The U.S. Mail delivers to Guam for the same cost as regular domestic postage but often it is slow, so online shopping is popular… A cost-of-living allowance helps active duty personnel defray the higher costs. (para. 19)

Hence, the option of online shopping is a popular one that affords access to familiar stores and labels and greater affordability.

Given these practices, the question of how much of the military shopping dollar actually stays and circulates in the local Guåhan economy remains to be seen. Ruane (2014) calculated the island’s macroeconomic multiplier at 1.30. She stated, “This 1.30 estimate already took into account spending/purchasing power that “leaked” out from the local economy to pay purchases from online sources (6.53% of Guam consumers’ annual purchases), off-island shopping (6.86%) and military base stores (15.78%)” (p. 172). The combination of leaks from online shopping and the military base stores accounts for over 20%.

In order to further examine the impending Guam military-build-up’s impact on the Guåhan economy, Ruane (2011) released a technical report from the Pacific Center for Economic Initiatives where she critiqued the use of the Hawaii macroeconomic multiplier figures. In particular, she stated that the significant difference in the scale of economies between Guam and Hawaii make it an inappropriate application. In her paper she did two things: (1) took a standard spending multiplier and presented a conceptual framework for how to adjust it to better reflect Guam’s specific economic conditions and (2) criticized the current practice of using Hawaii’s multiplier in analysis of Guam’s economy and, because of lack of Guam data, could only hypothesize (not verify) that Guam’s spending multiplier is lower than Hawaii’s. This implies that economic impact studies that use Hawaii’s spending multiplier tend to present a rosier picture of the positive economic impacts of proposed changes. She then took the most recent study of this type, the DEIS, and adjusted spending multiplier calculations using a lower, more accurate spending multiplier for Guam. Ruane’s study is a call to question the accuracy of the figures provided in the NEPA process. Further studies are needed to determine if the planned military build-up will truly positively impact the local economy.
Another major income stream directly to the Government of Guam is referred to as Section 30 funds as defined in the Organic Act of Guam:

All customs duties and Federal income taxes derived from Guam, the proceeds of all taxes collected under the internal revenue laws of the United States ... and the proceeds of any other taxes which may be levied by the Congress on the inhabitants of Guam ... and all quarantine, passport, immigration, and naturalization fees collected in Guam shall be covered into the treasury of Guam and held in account for the government of Guam and shall be expended for the benefit and government of Guam in accordance with the annual budgets (pp. 17-18).

These funds are an annual cash infusion into the Government of Guam coffers to the tune of about $70 million in 2019. These funds include withholding taxes of military personnel stationed on Guåhan and have more recently been used to pay compensation for the Guam War Claims Act to acknowledge suffering from the World War II experience.

In summary, the U.S. DOD has contributed to the island’s economy with the creation of federal jobs, the purchase of goods from off-base, the awarding of contracts to multi-national and local companies, and by the transmittal of Section 30 monies. However, an assessment of the economic impact of the military economy on Guåhan requires the consideration of not just dollars and cents added to local coffers, but also the cumulative impacts on the island. The island’s middle class, for example, have expressed concerns that they will not benefit from an increase in business activity on island. More specifically, they expressed little to gain, much to lose, and the lack of voice in the funding process of the military build-up (Owen, 2010).

According to Owen (2010), youth between the ages of 18-22 expressed negativity towards the economic benefits of the build-up, “indicating concerns about loss of jobs to off-islanders and the loss of lands that would be passed down to them for use in business, their homes, subsistence farming and fishing” (p.314).

A balanced assessment of the military economy on Guåhan should also take into account the cumulative impacts of the proposed military build-up. This should include considering the irreparable damage to the environment, the continued land loss by families, and the uncalculated costs of military contractors and the foreign labor workforce utilizing services off the base. Foreign labor workers brought on island to provide skilled expertise will not be eligible for services behind the military fences. Rather, they will avail of medical care and other services off the base. It is noteworthy to mention that the $7.5 billion associated with the cost of build-up is projected for construction projects on the base. These monies will not spillover and fund much needed upgrades to an already frail and ailing local infrastructure outside the military fences. Hence, the capacity of local infrastructure to bear the weight of the increased population from the military build-up also needs to be considered.

There are a number of unseen costs of the increased militarization of Guåhan. More specifically, the impact on services that may arise with the transfer of about 5,000 military members, their families, contractors, contractor families, and a foreign labor workforce also needs to be taken into account. The total population increase is projected to be in the ballpark of 45,000 people on an island with a current population of about 160,000 people. This accounts for a roughly 28% increase. The demand for social service programs will increase in the number of
applicants for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Women Infants, and Children (WIC) Nutrition Program, for example. With regards to the island’s water system, Camacho (2013) analyzed the DEIS and reported:

The anticipated population increase would have created up to 6.1 million gallons per day shortfall of water for the civilian community on Guam. The shortfall of water could have resulted in the contamination of drinking water that could have also “degrade[d] the basic sanitary needs of the population.” The DEIS stated “[i]t is probable that the impacts would fall disproportionately on the low income and poor.” While low-income communities on Guam were expected to face the possibility of contaminated drinking water and water rationing, DOD was predicted to have a surplus of 3.7 million gallons per day (p.185).

Camacho went on to share an increase in the demand for services in the public school system with an increase in student enrollment by 26% and in the island’s only public hospital by 20%. These are just a few examples of ancillary services that will be impacted by the military build-up requiring additional funding for operations that comprise the social economic costs that are not computed into the calculations of the economic impacts of the military build-up.

Economic Case Studies
In order to fully understand military economies, an exploration of other U.S. military bases can be made. Three specific bases communities to be examined include: Okinawa, Japan; Fayetteville, North Carolina; and Subic Bay, Philippines. Specific economic indicators in each base will be discussed.

The first U.S. military base community to be presented is in Okinawa, Japan. Okinawa is the southern-most prefecture of Japan. The former Ryukyu Kingdom, the island was an independent country until colonized by Japan in 1609. The island presently bears the burden of hosting 75% of US military forces stationed in Japan. Some of these bases include: camps Hansen, Schwab, and Foster; MCAS Futenma; and Kadena and Zama air bases. These bases and other U.S. military installations occupy 20% of Okinawa’s land mass. Problems reported over the decades have included traffic, noise pollution, and sexual crimes committed against women and girls by U.S. service members. Most problematic of the bases has been MCAS Futenma, which is located in a densely populated urban center sprawling over 500 hectares. A helicopter accident crashing into a school evoked continuous community resistance for the closure of the base. Current plans indicate that part of the Marines from MCAS Futenma will be relocated to Camp Blaz on Guam that is presently in the construction phase.

Considering that Okinawa has the greatest concentration of US military members, you would expect that its military-power economy would be one of the most robust in the country. However, the contrary is true: Okinawa is one of the poorest prefectures in Japan with child poverty an issue of grave concern. The island’s unemployment rate was 7.8%, which was double the national average for the country (Pajon, 2010). According to Pajon (2010), “The presence of the bases and the particular history of Okinawa have hindered the economic development of this Autonomous Prefecture and have contributed to the emergence of a ‘distorted’ economy” (p. 15). In 1972, after the reversion of Okinawa from the US to Japan, the US military economy contributed 15.6% of the gross prefectural income. However, by 2004, this figure was reduced
to a mere 5.3% of revenues. In the same year (2004), 9.6% of revenue was generated from tourism—nearly double that of US forces related revenue—and 38.2% came from public investment and public expenditures (Pajon, 2010). One reason given for the decline is the reduced purchasing power of U.S. service members who primarily buy goods on the base.

A second military case study to be examined was conducted by Dr. Catherine Lutz in her book titled, *Homefront: A Military City and the American Twentieth Century*. She is a faculty from Brown University and a co-director of the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. Lutz examined the base community of Fayetteville, North Carolina that hosts the Army base Fort Bragg. Fayetteville has commonly been referred to as “Fatalville” and “Fayettenam” for its negative outcomes in terms of violence and gross income inequalities. Lutz (2001) reported that the military is not the best sector to lead to the development of jobs indicating that military spending is one of the least efficient job creation engines. More precisely, Lutz indicated that $1 billion leads to the creation of a mere 26,000 military jobs. The same $1 billion will create either 37,000 health care jobs or 48,000 jobs in the arena of education. Hence, investing $1 billion in jobs from the health care and education fields generate more economic bang for your buck.

Lutz (2001) described Fayetteville’s economy as containing the military which could be likened to *one gigantic firm*. As we know, the presence of a military base influences a community’s wages, benefits, working conditions, and development opportunities. Lutz reported that Fayetteville had lower wages due to high competition for jobs with retirees and military dependents when compared to other areas of North Carolina. She also reported a loss of tax dollars through exemptions for federal land and consumer goods sold on base. She further went on to describe how reduced property taxes impacts public education; with Fayetteville spending the least per child in the North Carolina school system. In addition, military members and their families used public resources provided by the local government, with no supporting tax base. Lutz also reported that for younger military families, participating in social service programs such as WIC and SNAP made these services less available to non-military families in Fayetteville. Lastly, Fayetteville was noted for having one of the state’s highest rates of child poverty and infant mortality. Lutz (2001) stated:

> While Fayetteville’s military dependency has made fortunes for some…
> its economy was increasingly based on selling goods and services to soldiers, creating retail jobs that pay less than any other category of work. Despite the egalitarian pay and strong benefit packages military work brings to town, overall the installation established a low wage economy, a vulnerable labor force of dependent women and teens, the high crime rates that come with poverty, and a weak democratic culture and public sphere. (p.213)

Lutz did mention one group who benefitted from the military presence in Fayetteville: namely, shop owners who sold goods not found on base.

The base communities of Okinawa, Japan and Fayetteville, North Carolina are examples of constrained economic development. Propaganda about military bases’ positive impact on local economies is challenged in light of these facts and figures. Nonetheless, the idea of losing the presence of a military base is feared due to the anticipated collapse of one’s economy. An
examination of a third case study of a post-military economy is Subic Bay Freeport in the Philippines.

In 1991, the US withdrew its military bases from the Philippines; leaving behind its toxic waste and rubbish. Since then, the Philippines has transformed the same locale into a thriving economic development project. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) is a governmental agency created in 1992 to transform the former U.S. military base’s 67,452 hectares into an economic growth center. The SBMA worked quickly to create industries that included manufacturing, tourism, maritime shipbuilding, trading, and retailing.

The SBMA reported the amount of economic activity in US dollars along with the number of jobs created between the years of 1992 and 2012 (SBMA, 2015/2016 June 20). In 1992, the year immediately following the closure of bases, it reported $5.5 million and the creation of 622 jobs. By the year 2008, this figure had increased to $249 million and 7,303 jobs. This was followed by the most lucrative year reported in 2010, generating $1.2 billion and 8,050 jobs. This positive trend remained consistent with the SBMA reporting 11% growth in July 2017 for the first five months of the year. The SBMA has itemized its successes over the years. This data clearly gives hope for the development of alternatives to military-based economies.

These three case studies of Okinawa, Japan; Fayetteville, North Carolina; and Subic Bay, Philippines should cast some doubt to the rhetoric and myth of massive military money that supposedly comes from hosting US military bases. Rather, a cumulative assessment of the economic impact of military bases needs to move beyond the mere calculation of jobs created and the limited purchasing power off-base and take into account the social costs and liabilities that come with their presence.

**Implications for Education**

Upon the announcement of the Guam military build-up in 2006, the island community scrambled to gain a better understanding of the military plan and its impact on our lives. For example, the Guåhan Coalition for Peace and Justice (GCPJ) embarked on an educational campaign centered around the number of projected U.S. Marines to be transferred to Guåhan. They printed bumper stickers raising the question: “8,000? How will it change our lives?” The Guam Humanities Council utilized the same question for its project that facilitated critical community conversations exploring areas of concern and deconstructing the rhetoric to find the facts.

On Guåhan there exists two segregated school systems: one for civilian students served through the Guam Department of Education and the other for U.S. DOD affiliated students served by the Department of Defense Education Authority (DoDEA). Dawson (n.d.) well-articulated the military perception of the difference between the two school systems: “The DoD schools on Guam are well regarded. But military families familiar with the island warn that the public schools should be avoided: They say teachers lack resources, vandalism is common and bullying is an accepted childhood behavior—often not discouraged or disciplined” (para. 20). Irrespective of the school system that a student attends, implications for the classroom entails creating a safe space for critical conversations that examine the facts and data from all dimensions- whether it is analyzing the impact of the military presence on the economy, social costs of militarism, or the environmental impacts on the land, air, and waters.
The classroom is a scared space that should foster independent thought and the generation of new and innovative ideas. In order to facilitate this, educators are challenged to bring resources into the classroom that present all relevant data. Students can be engaged by inviting guest speakers, watching films or documentaries, and participating in debates about topics related to the impact of militarism. Online sources provide a wealth information that students should be encouraged to access as they formulate their positions. They should be encouraged to ask the hard questions and to come up with solutions that are centered in local and regional interests.

The framing of classroom discussions should be shifted away from the narrow constrictions of the concept of national security, but rather engage the more community-centered concept of genuine security. This shift moves the imagery of security from guns, weapons, and wars to focus on human needs. Genuine security embraces the following principles: people’s basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, health care, and education must be guaranteed; the physical environment must be able to sustain human and natural life; people’s fundamental human dignity should be honored and cultural identities respected; and people and the natural environment should be protected from avoidable harm (Genuine Security, n.d.). The introduction of the concept of genuine security provides a relatable framework for students and creates the opportunity for them to imagine limitless possibilities for the future. A tangible exercise for students in the classroom could be operationalizing genuine security and imagining what an economy for peace could look like. More specifically, what kinds of jobs can be created that foster respect for life, the use of diplomacy, and alternate ways of conflict resolution? This shift in the classroom can potentially change the world we live in.

Conclusion
Guāhan and its Indigenous peoples, the CHamorus, have experienced one of the longest colonial histories across the globe. As a non-self-governing territory, the island has no political power to control matters such as the U.S.’s plan to transfer about 5,000 Marines from Okinawa, Japan to the island. The promise of a vibrant military economy as part of the Guam military build-up has not been accompanied by data or facts that evidence how it will be beneficial to the local economy. This paper explored the island’s economy and the contributions from the DOD presence by way of job creation and the consumption of goods off the base. However, the limitation of low consumer spending and the end of a construction boom leaves a lot to be desired. Additionally, other considerations such as environmental and social costs also need to be considered to assess the cumulative impacts of the military build-up on the island’s economy. Economic case studies in Okinawa, Japan and Fayetteville, North Carolina evidenced the challenges that military bases bring to surrounding base communities. The case of the post-military economy in Subic Bay, Philippines was also explored and provided great hope for the possibilities of a vibrant economy even after the U.S. has packed up its base and left. Opportunities to educate students in the classroom to vision a world with genuine security provides promising prospects for the future.

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CHamoru is defined as the Indigenous people of Guåhan born on Guåhan before August 1, 1950 and their descendants (Camacho, 2011). Militarization is a process wherein a society organizes itself for the preparation of military conflict and violence (Merriam-Webster’s collegiate dictionary, 1999). The psychological impact of militarization on CHamorus has not been formally researched. However, limited data is available on the subject. CHamorus have survived conflict and warfare that were noted during the period of Spanish colonization. A more organized and direct attack on Guåhan is described with the bombings on December 8, 1941 by Japanese military forces during World War II. As families from around the island celebrated the feast of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and on Guåhan, it is the Feast Day of Our Lady of Camarin, with mass in Hagåtña, Japanese warplanes were dropping bombs in Sumay, Piti, Hagåtña, and other villages. The destruction of the island by Japanese forces was only the beginning of a three year period of physical and psychological traumatic experiences endured by the CHamoru people (Camacho, 2011). Guåhan was not immune to the militarized experiences of World War II. There has been a pervasive growth of a militarized culture in the United States that has been evident since World War II. This subtle growth has made marked acceleration in recent years with the insidious use of terms such as war (War on Drugs, War on Cancer, War on Terror, etc.) and defending the violation of civil liberties under the guise of national security and the unjust use of the Patriot Act (Carpenter & Innocent, 2015).

Keywords: CHamorus, colonization, militarization, psychology, trauma, war

Introduction
The impact of war is enormous. It cuts across all aspects of life, our environment, our economic health and our socio-cultural life. War has led to shifting or expanding borders. The most significant impact of war is the loss of human life, both civilian and military. The development and use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of war have had a devastating effect on the environment as well as those who live in such places. Environmental destruction was a tactic used in the Gulf War. This devastated the enemies’ communication access and transportation routes. Environmental destruction was also evident in the planting of land mines across Europe, Africa, Vietnam and Cambodia, a tactic used to prevent enemy movement. During the Vietnam War, the United States (U.S.) deliberately destroyed rice paddies to deny the enemy a food source and sprayed herbicides on farmland (Learning, 2000). The impact of war in the world as well as in our own back yard has had devastating effects that to this day is very difficult to measure.

CHamoru today refers to the Indigenous peoples of the Mariana Islands. They were the first people of the Mariana Islands. Historically, the term referring to the people of the Mariana Islands was Chamurres. During Spain’s colonization, CHamoru was a Spanish term used for shaven head. Chamorri is the term used to describe the high caste of people who shaved their heads (Cunningham, 1992). CHamorus have long been exposed to various forms of conflict and warfare dating to the period of Spanish colonization.

The psychological impact of militarization on CHamorus is under-reported and in many instances unreported. The most documented impact of war for CHamorus is traced to World War
II and the aerial bombings by Japanese forces. Aerial power became a major asset in military campaigns during World War II (Learning, 2000). These bombings were strategic in targeting the most populated areas such as Hagåtña, the Capitol of Guåhan. The bombings also occurred in the harbour, ports, and main routes to effectively paralyze people. The significance of the bombing of Guåhan is that this tragedy occurred on one of the most culturally and spiritually sacred celebrations, the Immaculate Conception, December 8, 1941. The nearly three years of Japanese occupation took a toll on CHamorus, and today those wounds remain deep and are intergenerational. Atrocities experienced by CHamorus such as murder, rape, mutilation, starvation, forced labor, beatings and bearing witness to the death and suffering of other friends and family members have left a proud people with trauma that has lasted several lifetimes (Camacho, 2011).

The liberation of Guåhan from U.S. forces was met with a sense of relief that salvation was coming. Songs, messaging and propaganda with a litany of American patriotism was very much alive at the time. The allegiance remains today with many CHamorus. This was a period of rebuilding for families, giving proper burials to their deceased, and reclaiming a semblance of the life they once had. Although the customs surrounding death may have been heavily influenced by the Spanish and Catholicism, the practice of deep respect for the deceased, communal grieving and consoling to commemorate the dead remained constant (Russell, 1998). The way of life CHamorus once knew would never be the same again. Many CHamoru families were displaced and were not able to return to their homes due to the bombings and ravages of war. Still many would never set foot on their family land again due to the United States seizing approximately three quarters of the island. For whatever reasons, gratitude for American liberation, the end to an agonizing reign of terror, post-war recovery, grief, numbness, traumatization, or all the above, CHamorus found it very difficult to fight the injustices of land taking by the U.S. government. Despite this state of conflict, they increasingly felt like squatters on their own land. Thus, the reminiscence of war patriotism shifted from that of being liberated to that of being reoccupied (Negron-Muntaner, 2015).

The CHamoru people of Guåhan are said to have embraced and simultaneously rejected and resented the Americanization of the island. When the U.S. liberated Guåhan from the occupation of Japan during World War II, CHamorus were very much pro-America (Diaz, 2001). These attitudes and beliefs continued on to contribute to the support of the recolonization of the U.S. in Guåhan. The value of reciprocity in CHamoru culture may have contributed greatly to the acceptance and passivity in some families of the land takings. CHamorus may have felt the need to pay the U.S. for the liberation of Guåhan and the post wartime development of the island (Souder, 1991). This frame of mind, psychological indoctrination has been reinforced by the continued impact of militarization on the island and the CHamoru people. It is a process wherein land takings, repossession, colonial rule exists and continues without question and in some cases blind acceptance. Historically, land was the most significant resource for CHamorus. Wars amongst villagers and clans were waged because of the use of land. Therefore, losing property to the U.S. post World War II was a form of dispossession and trauma for CHamorus which continues today. The Nasion CHamoru, a local activist group led by the late Senator Angel Santos during the 1990s staged a number of protests pushing for the removal of U.S. military personnel from Guåhan and demanding the return of American-possessed land to original landowners (Rogers, 1995).
The psychological impact of militarization is further supported by the editorials portrayed in Guåhan’s media stream. For example, a local media report would describe the liberation of Guåhan as a tribute to Marines and soldiers who died to ensure Guåhan remained free. Or interviews conducted would report on U.S. soldiers being stopped in the streets and thanked for rescuing the island (Dalisay, 2009; Viernes, 2009). Other consumer products that purport to support the liberation of Guåhan by U.S. forces is the SPAM liberation commemorative can (Guam’s Commemorative, 2017). When the liberation of Guåhan was achieved American soldiers brought with them canned goods such as Spam. Spam is a canned cook meat by Hormel Foods which gained popularity during World War II.

War and conflict occur for many reasons. However, the aftermath of war and conflict usually results in some substantive changes to the way of life for the people. The post war period on Guåhan significantly changed the economic system of the CHamoru people. The U.S. liberation introduced modern capitalism and consumerism of American made products. The CHamorus self-sufficiency in farming and fishing continued, but the values of Americanism were prevailing. The recollections of CHamorus in the Manenggon camp spoke of hunger, suffering, death and violence. Manenggon is located in the village of Yo’ña. The area was used as a concentration camp where CHamorus were held towards the end of the Japanese occupation during World War II (Tolentino, 2019). In addition to the economic systems, the liberation also established an education system based on American ideology. CHamoru values of interdependence and family obligation would soon also undergo substantive change.

The three years of occupation by the Japanese forces on Guåhan as well as the resilient survival of World War II was an enormously traumatic period for CHamors. These traumatic experiences are shared today from war survivors and their descendents who have re-told their experiences. In addition, the historical trauma experiences that date back to the Spanish-CHamoru wars and the systematic colonization of Spain, the U.S., and Japan have changed the cultural climate in Guåhan. Trauma is an emotional response to a distressing event or series of events. There are immediate and long term reactions to trauma that are subjectively experienced (Rowell & Thomley, 2013). Trauma affects the social fabric of culture. Cultural trauma is described as a collective experience by members of a group that affects their identity and consciousness in irreparable ways (Alexander, 2004). Historical trauma is trauma that is experienced by a specific cultural, ethnic or racial group of people. The trauma is multigenerational and passed from adults to their children as a collective psychological injury (Sotero, 2006). This process of adults experiencing emotional injury and childhood trauma is said to be related to unresolved cultural identity (Korinek & Teerawichitchainan, 2014). Cultural trauma includes remarkable loss of identity and a sense of meaning in the social fabric of one’s community. It affects people who have a sense of collectiveness and organization (Bith-Melander et al., 2017).

Historical and Intergenerational Trauma

Historical trauma is trauma experienced by a massive group of individuals. An example of historical trauma includes the prohibition of the use of the CHamoru language during periods of American colonization, land taking practices and restricting access to previously public places such as the Sumay Cemetery located in Naval Station (Viernes, 2013). Wartime trauma is widespread as multiple trauma exposures were the norm (Korinek & Teerawichitchainan, 2014). Historical trauma can have a significant impact on future generations or descendents of those
people who were offended such as the CHamoru people, Armenians, Jewish Holocaust survivors, Aboriginals, American Indians, refugees, Canadian First Nations, Australians, etc. American Indians refer to historical trauma as soul wounds, a spiritual injury, the wounding of the soul or the hurt of the elders, their ancestors. A soul wound stems from a history of traumatic colonization and unresolved grief (Duran, 2006).

Intergenerational trauma refers to psychological wounds that occur over a lifespan. If the traumatic injury is not dealt with in one generation, it carries on to subsequent generations (Xiong, 2015). The CHamoru survivors of World War II have relived their experiences through documentaries, books, interviews and testimony for war reparations. Guåhan’s war history dates further back than World War II. Historically, Guåhan introduction to resistance and bloodshed started since the arrival of Roman Catholic missionaries and the start of the Spanish American War, 1668-1898. Colonization continued with the U.S. Navy’s rule of Guåhan from 1898 until the start of the invasion of Japanese forces in 1941. Japan overtook Guåhan and remained as colonizers from December 1941 to June 1944. Guåhan has a complex and extensive history of trauma that remains unresolved (Pier, 1998).

Conflict is inevitable, from the perspective of ancient CHamoru conflict, warfare was tied to land and the right to use land. Conflict also involved violations of fishing rights. Warfare was used to avenge an insult (Cunningham, 1992). Culturally the CHamorus believed that if you attacked or slighted one person, you were essentially attacking that person’s family, clan and village. This type of belief system holds true today in our society. Conflict was resolved through warfare (Russell, 1998). Warfare entailed fighting to the deaths using various weapons, methods and/or strategies. The main types of weapons used during warfare were spears, sling-stones and their own hands. Spears were fashioned using carved bone spear-points from human leg bones. CHamorus also relied in their agility and strength to defeat an enemy. They used strategic tactics to defeat their enemy. Accounts from the Spanish conflicts reported CHamorus utilized trickery such as luring the Spaniards under false pretences and then defeating them. Other accounts were that the Spaniards were subjected to ambushes while pursuing CHamoru warriors through the jungle areas. CHamoru warriors would build booby traps to capture the Spaniards. These traps included falling into a hole dug up on the road or walking path. Also, CHamorus were so strong and agile that they would position large rock boulders above village trails and roll these boulders unto Spanish pursuers or campsites (Russell, 1992). CHamorus also used woven mat hats to protect their head and mats tied around the chest as a defensive mechanism or breastplate. Conflicts were usually settled when someone passes (Cunningham, 1992).

Further, defensive forts were also not apparent during the Latte Period (AD800- AD1700). CHamorus seemed less concerned about security. Ancient CHamoru warfare was not extensive, but warfare was taken seriously. Young CHamoru warriors were trained at an early age to be proficient with the sling and spear (Bevacqua, 2009). Pre-warfare rituals involved calling on the spirit to lead the warriors to victory and sitting with the chiefs on a mat to determine who carried the battle banner. When battle concluded, the peace process took over. This involved the losing clan or village sending gifts to the victors and in turn, the victors sending a turtle shell to their former rivals. A meal was served during the peace negotiating process (de Freycinet, 2003). The notion of war has been present in Guåhan’s history since the 1500s. However, the concept of militarization, organized warfare was introduced during the Spanish era and has remained a part
of the Guåhan climate today. The turning point for CHamorus occurred at the conclusion of World War II and the quasi American citizenship bestowed on the CHamoru people. Granting of American citizenship to native inhabitants allowed the U.S. to cease land and also allowed for Indigenous peoples to be drafted into war (Korinek & Teerawichitchainan, 2014). The “Guamanians,” as termed by military officials, were citizens of the United States and subject to the United States Draft Law. Military enlistment thus became a major career option for CHamorus. Although at that time in the 20th century, the only job offered in the military to minorities was in the mess hall as a cook. CHamoru involvement in military service has been the highest participation per capita found among any ethnic group in the U.S. since the Vietnam War (Natividad & Leon Guerrero, 2010). Draft laws were universal for young men from the 1960s to the 1980s. A study of Vietnam War veterans found posttraumatic stress disorder was central for trauma influences later in life on health (Korinek & Teerawichitchainan, 2014).

The militarization of CHamorus was further evidenced in their enlistment after World War II, during the Korean War, Vietnam War, Persian Gulf Wars, and the Iraq and Afghanistan conflict. During the 1930s a number of CHamorus enlisted in the U.S. Navy and settled in military bases in California. In the 1950s CHamorus enlisted to fight in the Korean conflict. They enlisted in the U.S. Army and Air Force. One in eight Pacific Islanders have served in the military. During the Iraq and Afghanistan war, the Army’s top recruiters were from Guåhan. Enlistment on island doubled (Hicks, 2014).

Guåhan is considered a strategic American naval hub in this part of the world. Prior to World War II, Guåhan was used as a coaling station for ships heading west. During World War II, Guåhan played a significant role as a logistics hub. During the Cold War, Guåhan was one of the first Polaris missile support bases which housed B-52 bombers. Guåhan was also a primary communications link for the state department. During the Vietnam War it was a B-52 staging area. The U.S. saw Guåhan as an investment and prime strategic location. Having territorial status under the U.S. allowed the military to achieve operational goals by investing in infrastructure and growth. As an American territory, the U.S. military was able to reduce the political challenges of building and using resources on the island (Erickson & Mikolay, 2005).

A study on post-war narratives found that participants constructed their post-war narratives based on the prevailing sociocultural discourses of understanding, social norms of family and the communities in which they reside. The themes that emerged from the constructed narratives were as follows: Resonance as transformative learning, social consciousness as an outcome of post-war learning, value of life, spiritual and moral development and determination to achieve post-war goals. The narratives related to transformative learning processes in sociocultural and posttraumatic contexts (Gilpin-Jackson, 2012). Enlisting in military service requires one to adapt to military norms, values and beliefs in order to be battle ready. Returning from military service or deployment requires another form of adjustment to the role previously held. Both experiences require an individual to reestablish their identity and create functioning roles and relationships for this newfound situation (Halliday, 2012). The perceived militarized community in Guåhan may have been impacted by the ongoing war by the U.S. and Guåhan’s strategic fortification. It also may be related to the values and beliefs shared by generations of families who serve in the military.
The long-term significance of war and conflict in child survivors showed significant health problems later in life. Child survivors of war who later in life (decades) were asked about war experiences were found to have long-lasting difficulties in individual functioning. For example, children who were in internment camps during World War II were highly likely to experience negative health outcomes later in life when compared to those children who remained outside the internment camps. This could also be attributed to other characteristics such as children being separated from their parents and/or siblings while in internment camps. Children in camps may have been exposed to violence toward a parent or family member. Further, social supports later in life for some survivors may have decreased which would significantly impact the child survivor (Mooren & Kieber, 2013). This phenomenon presented by Mooren and Kieber (2013) is significant for CHamorus on Guåhan who were child survivors of World War II and their descendants. Risk factors for consideration in a study on CHamorus would relate to health outcomes such as heart disease, diabetes, hypertension and cancer (Ichicho, et al., 2013). Other risk factors that need further research would be the risk factors for suicide.

Many historic and socioeconomic factors in Guåhan foster circumstances contributing to the heightened levels of suicidal risk. These circumstances include the impact of militarization on the loss of land belonging to CHamorus and the potential threat to sustaining language and culture. Additionally, value conflicts between CHamoru interdependence and beliefs and Western individualization and materialism. Finally, the impact of militarization in regard to CHamorus attaining minority status in their own island (Booth, 2010). For male youths, factors that contribute to suicide risk include unemployment or underemployment, increased exposure to Western youth culture such as peer-group acceptance, intergenerational conflict and isolation from parents and the elders in times of distress and conflicting role expectations (Booth, 2010).

The psychological impact of militarization in CHamorus can be found by analyzing casualties and numbers. Approximate war casualties in Korea, 2; Vietnam, 70; Iraq, 5; Afghanistan, 10; and the Gulf War, 2. Over two million soldiers have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. Although many veterans upon returning home are able to resume their lives without significant difficulty, almost 50 percent of the returning veterans experience challenges upon returning home (Magaly Freytes et al., 2013).

Approximately 50 percent of those enlisting across all military services are between 18 and 24 years of age. Gender wise, approximately 15 percent are women under the age of 25 years. In the 1970s women made up less than two percent of active duty personnel. By 2005 that number increased to 15 percent and by September 2008, the number of women enlisted personnel and officers in the Air Force was 20 percent. The Navy and Army had approximately 15 and 14 percent respectively of women serving (Kelty et al., 2010). Gender and race play a pivotal role in representation in the military. African-Americans, Hispanics, Latinos and immigrants are over-represented in enlistment numbers (Kelty et al., 2010). Similarly, CHamorus and Pacific Islanders have the highest rate of military enlistment.

**U.S. Wars, Trauma, & Militarism**

The psychological impact of militarization is explained in the notion that the United States is in a state of permanent war. This means that even during peacetime, military spending is continuous. Military funding increased in science to produce weapons and develop stealth sophistication. They have the largest budget and created what is termed a black budget whereas the military
does not report certain expenses to congress. Their budget in 2009 was about $1.2 trillion and excludes NASA, the State Department, the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Energy. The anticipated cost of the Iraq war was touted at approximately $3 trillion (Lutz, 2009).

The psychological impact of militarism on CHamorus is complex and ambiguous. There is the historical trauma factor and the immense experience of loss and grief resulting from World War II. Witnessing the beheading, murder, rape, beating and massacre of loved ones is insurmountable. During the period of submitting testimony for war reparations, my grandfather gave testimony of his wartime experiences. He spoke about how everyone suffered and that no family was spared the traumatic experiences of war. My grandfather’s task during the war was to sneak out of the Manenggon concentration camp at night and trek to the family ranch where he would dig up food hidden from the Japanese. He would then sneak back to camp praying that his absence went undetected. Night after night, he risked his life to forage for food for his family. He spoke of the brutal punishments administered by the Japanese to women, men, the elderly and children. He stood helplessly as Japanese soldiers beat his older sister for some perceived infraction and watched the near beheading of his own mother who was being punished for hiding food. Surviving such a traumatic period in one’s lifetime is life changing and mind altering. My grandfather for example, would cook a large pot of food for a small household of three. He would then store leftovers daily until all was consumed. There was always a lot of food in our home. He was a farmer and a fisherman. His harvest was abundant and his friends and family members through the years were recipients of vegetables from his farm. The unresolved history of trauma through land takings under the guise of national defense is enormous. CHamorus are tied to their land and warfare was waged over land resources and fishing rights long before the arrival of the Americans. To date, the CHamorus continue to fight for the return of ancestral lands from the U.S. military as well as access to property (e.g. Litekyan) and burial sites (e.g. Sumay) contained within the fence of military bases.

The traumatic factor is one that is unexplainable and leaves individuals in a state of numbness or an altered state of mind. Then there is the gratitude factor, the relief tied to the American liberation of Guåhan. The arrival of the U.S. military forces meant an end to this continuous ordeal of suffering, starvation and death during the Japanese occupation of the island in World War II. CHamoru salvation was within reach. The outpouring of patriotism and pro-military support was overwhelming. CHamorus were deeply indebted to the Americans. A family story shared at gatherings was the death of an aunt and cousin who were forced to march to Manenggon (Yo’ña). The aunt was pregnant and her daughter was sickly. Due to the Japanese soldiers’ physical violence, the aunt and her daughter both died on the trail. Her son who was a young child at the time recalled the incident vividly. He stated that as soon as he was able, he enlisted in the U.S. Navy where he served a full career until retirement. This individual attributed his military service as a form of payback to the debt he owed the U.S. for liberating Guåhan. This individual was patriotic to the very end and in full support of the military. His family had lost a large parcel of land to the military, but he reiterated that it was a form of payment for the liberation.

The conflicting factor of the impact of militarization falls into play in the matter of land taking. On one hand, CHamorus valued the belief of reciprocity. For as far back as ancient CHamoru warfare, reciprocity for the victors and losers of conflict was done in a systematic manner. This
matter was conflicting though, in return for the United States saving them from further trauma, CHamorus were resigned to pay for their salvation through land. And as noted by the historians, CHamorus paid big time. The late Governor Ricky Bordallo during one of his terms renamed the liberation celebration to “Fiestan Guåhan.” He remarked that the U.S. military was paid fully for any perceived debt incurred from the war. Governor Bordallo believed that the Fiestan Guåhan should be a time to celebrate the survivors of the war and memorialize those who had passed on during the war (Camacho, 2011). The loss of land very soon after surviving a traumatic war is a form of re-traumatization. Thereby resulting in unresolved historical trauma that transcends to the next generation of CHamorus.

The psychological impact of militarization continued with a campaign to further assimilate CHamorus by adapting to Western beliefs. This process involved the directives to speak English only, the forbiddance of interracial marriage (CHamorus and Caucasians), the adoption of a Naval Government in power, a new educational system, etc. Language and land are pre-requisites to cultural survival. These attempts by the U.S. military led to identity conflict. The choices are to assimilate to this greater power, the savior of our people or to challenge these edicts by continuing to speak in the native tongue and challenge these directives. Also, interracial marriages had been occurring for some time and many Americans who themselves married CHamoru women challenged the directive of the Naval Governor. The English only directive was also reminiscent of past directives by the Japanese occupiers. During the island’s period of colonization by Japan, the CHamoru language was also forbidden and people were punished for speaking the language.

Contemporary Impacts of Militarization in Guåhan
In 2020, the psychological impact of militarization on CHamorus can still be seen in the daily exposure to their presence on island. Low flying planes, urban combat, noise pollution, the presence of warships and the continual joint practice maneuvers with other countries (ex: Operation Valiant Shield) are part of our daily lives on Guåhan. Witnessing a platoon of combatants in tanks, machine guns and missile deplorers canvassing the island’s main thoroughfare Route 1, Hagåtña, Marine Corps Drive also desensitizes and normalizes the potential for war. In 2017, the constant media reports about North Korea threats to attack Guåhan and how the military is well prepared further impacts the psychological perspectives on militarism. The U.S. military presence actually made Guåhan a target rather than kept us safe; the island caught in the crosshairs between the U.S. and North Korea.

The psychological impact of militarization on CHamorus is apparent in the high military enlistment rates; the highest in the nation. It is apparent in the high war casualty numbers among CHamorus, the highest was during the Vietnam War. The number of military bases on Guåhan and the amount of land occupied by the military also has a gross psychological impact on CHamorus. Military families who have access to economic benefits such as paying much lower prices for necessities such as food and gas and having increased access to healthcare, also impacts militarization perspectives in CHamorus.

The psychological impacts of militarization on CHamorus are rooted in historical trauma, unresolved trauma and the transmission of trauma. The enduring effects of colonization and cultural oppression and the marginalization of Indigenous peoples are forms of trauma (Kirmayer et al., 2014). It is rooted in the impoverished economic conditions faced by the CHamoru people.
and the limited resources available. It is apparent in the number of veterans today who suffer from psychological conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder or addiction.

The psychological impacts of militarization on the CHamoru people are immense. Impacts related to the environment and the deliberate storage of toxic materials in our water and land also affect our way of life economically and culturally. The psychological impacts in reference to land-takings are deeply wounding; as land is symbolic of family unity and strength. The psychological impacts related to repudiating the CHamoru language by adopting English only policies in schools and public places. Language is the heart of culture and to forbid the speaking of one’s Indigenous language is to deny their identity. The psychological impact of delaying and hindering the road to self-determination for the Indigenous CHamoru people is traumatic bastardization. It is a denial of full reconciliation with historical trauma. The most common psychological impact of militarization on war survivors is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD is sometimes detected much later after the conflict; it can be long-lasting and has been shown to be transmitted from one generation to the next. Other psychological impacts on war survivors and victims are anxiety, depression and insomnia. The most devastating impact of war on psychological well-being is the loss of life; the loss of a loved one. CHamorus have been represented in every war fought by the United States and the casualties are enormous. Such losses are immeasurable.

Considerations for future discussion include research the reasons individuals and families enlist in the military. It is important to know if the choice to pursue a career in the military is due to having no other alternatives to employment or civilian careers. Studies on the long-term effects of child war survivors today may contribute to the literature on this topic. Are there long-term negative effects of surviving a war or exposure to trauma?

References


Access to Åmot Chamoru Behind Guåhan’s Military Fences

Tricia A. Lizama, University of Guam

The Indigenous people of Guam, the CHamoru, have used traditional healing arts for over 4000 years. The traditional healer learned about picking åmot (medicinal plants) at a very young age. Not limited to making åmot, the traditional healers also massaged (låsa) and intervened with spirits (suffe) to assist those who were dealing with a health issue-physically, mentally, and spiritually. The traditional healer has had to struggle with the difficulty of finding åmot due to colonization and militarization. Many of the roots and plants that are needed are behind military fences such as the Ritidian Wild Life Refuge, Andersen Air Force Base, and the U.S. Naval Base Guam. This article examines the political and cultural struggles that directly impact the survival of the traditional healing practices of Guåhan.

Keywords: åmot, traditional healers, Ritidian/Litekyan, militarization

Introduction

Traditional Chamoru healing arts have been used for over four thousand years to treat a wide range of health problems. The Yo’åmte (traditional healer), Suruhånu (Spanish term for male healer), and Suruhåna (Spanish term for female healer) are known to be the keepers of the traditional and sacred knowledge. This valuable knowledge is considered to be very secretive information and was once only shared with family members (Cruz-Ortiz, & Kamminga-Quinata, 1994; McMakin, 1978; Pobutsky, 1983, 1989; Pobutsky-Workman; Thompson, 1941/1947). The Yo’åmte served as the sole medical providers for the Indigenous CHamoru’s before the introduction to Western medicine. The Yo’åmte specialized in different types of healing practices, including lasa, or to “press or massage,” making åmot, which included the use of making medicines from plant products collected from the land, and suffe, or to mediate between spirits. A major part of the Yo’åmtes’s time is spent picking, preparing, and making the åmot. These plants—the hâle yan hâgon siha (roots and leaves) can be taken from around the healers homes but mostly are gathered from the hålomtåno. The hålomtåno is considered to be the jungle area. The focus of this article will be on the hålomtåno, the jungle area which is the natural habitat of where the åmot grow. Many of the hålomtåno areas are behind military fences or in the case of Ritidian was transferred to Fish and Wildlife and deemed a refuge. Much of the hålomtåno was taken away by the CHamorus and used for military purposes. One third of the landmass of Guam is occupied by the military government.

Role of the I Man Yo’åmte Siha (of the traditional healers)

In Ancient CHamoru times, prior to the Spanish colonization, there existed two types of traditional healers: the makana and the kakahna. CHamoru’ beliefs were heavily tied to the interconnectedness of the land, sea, and sky; hence, creating disharmony could lead to a physical or a spiritual ailment. The Makana healed their patients using a combination of massage techniques and herbal medicines (PSECC, 1994). Makana also had the ability to communicate with the supernatural spirits. The Kakana were considered sorcerers who could manipulate spirits for either malevolent or evil purposes.

During the Spanish colonization, which started in 1668, the mission of the Spanish Catholics was to challenge and eradicate many of the beliefs and practices of the Indigenous CHamoru (Hattori,
2004). The challenging of these beliefs and practices lead to the elimination of the *makana* and *kakahna* and any type of CHamoru ancestor worship. These *makahna* and *kakahna* later transformed into *suruhånu* (male healer) and *suruhåna* (female healer) to survive periods of colonization. The knowledge of the *suruhånu* and *suruhåna* consisted of the cultural healing practices that were preserved orally and families were very secretive of this knowledge. It is hypothesized that they were secretive because they feared “getting into trouble” as the CHamoru suffered and continue to suffer from colonization.

The CHamoru sought health care from *suruhåna* (female) and *suruhånu* (male) healers. The traditional healing methods involved medicinal remedies using natural plants such as herbs (the åmot); palai, which entails applying an ointment made of natural remedies on the skin; and *lasa* or massage. Some of the ailments recorded and described by Thompson (1941), included remedies for headaches, body aches, tooth aches, earaches, asthma, and women’s issues. In addition to these ailments, McMakin (1978) found that *suruhåna/nu* also treated ailments such as diabetes, high blood pressure, and *taotaomo’na* sickness (spirits that could harm you if you created some type of disharmony).

If there was a disrespect against the *taotaomo’na*, this could result in the spirits being angry and retaliating by making the individual sick (*manmalangu*). Some *suruhåna/nu* would be able to communicate with the *taotaomo’na* asking what was done to offend them. This would result in the *suruhåna/nu* offering the person a resolution in telling the patient the offense and how to ask for forgiveness or for the *suruhåna/nu* to make a medicinal tea out of herbs as treatment for the illness that was put on the individual from the *taotaomo’na*.

*Suruhånu* and *suruhåna* performed viable roles in the lives of the CHamoru people living on Guam. Most often, the use of the “services” of the *suruhåna/nu* were discussed within families. Families would discuss and through direct experience or word of mouth would then refer another family member to a specific *suruhåna*. How a person might be referred depends on the problem that they will be describing. Each *suruhåna* had a speciality. Many of them could prepare åmot, lasa, do palai and suffe, however, not everyone opted to suffe for their own reasons. Prior to the work of Pobutsky et al. (1994), the *suruhåna/nu* were not documented in a directory of services. In 2009, upon calling the Department of CHamoru Affairs to inquire about contacting *suruhåna/nu* they explained that they do not have a list and had great difficulty establishing a contact list as the healers did not want to be publicized. Therefore, to include the treatment of *suruhåna/nu* in a health survey is significant because it had not previously been documented. To further elaborate, there were three health surveys conducted on Guam: the Elderly Needs Survey (Kasperbauer, 1978), the Northern Area Needs Assessment Survey (Kasperbauer, 1980), and the Islandwide Health Needs Assessment Survey (Kasperbauer et al., 1985). The Elderly Needs survey was conducted in 1978 and asked the following question: “Have you ever been treated by a *suruhånu* or *suruhåna*? The results of that survey indicated that 1 in 5 elderly Chamorros indicated that they had been treated by a *suruhånu/a* (20.9%). Chamorros reported the highest percentage (23.7 %) when the population was broken down by ethnicity. These results indicate that Chamorros were seeking out treatment from a *suruhåna/nu*, that *suruhåna/nu* exist, and that the *suruhåna/nu* comprise the community’s options for healthcare.
The Northern Area Needs Assessment Survey (1980) was a random sample of 453 households and asked respondents the following question, “When you have some kind of illness or health problems, how frequently do you get (a) information about what is wrong with you, (b) medicines and treatment, and (c) pregnancy and family planning from a suruhânu/na, hilot (Filipino traditional healer) or other traditional healers?” The results of this study showed that 33.1% of the population indicated seeking out traditional healers for diagnosis (information/advice), 28.6% for treatment (cures), and 26.3% for pregnancy and family planning information. The results of this study revealed not only that healers were being utilized, but also examined what type of issues they were being utilized for. Interestingly, in the Lizama (2011) study, many of the healers shared that they were being sought out for certain illnesses, both spiritual and physical, as well as for information regarding fertility and pregnancy.

The Island Wide Health Needs Assessment Survey (1984) was a random sample of 400 households that was conducted to assess health behavior and needs of the Guam population. One of the questions asked was, “When you have some kind of illness or health problem, how frequently do you get information about what is wrong with you from a suruhânu/na, hilot, or other traditional healers?” Out of the total population sampled, one-third of the respondents reported the use of traditional healers, with almost 40% of Chamorros being the highest reported users of traditional medicines. This finding indicates that Chamorros are utilizing the services of a suruhânu/a, and also reveals that traditional healers have a significant role in providing Indigenous health care to the people of Guam (Lizama, 2011; Pobustky, 1983).

These three surveys, completed from the late 1970s through the early 1980s, indicated that Chamorro traditional healing methods were an option for people in seeking out health care at that time. In 2020, there are no current statistics in regard to the utilization of traditional healing, and the last recorded statistics were completed in the 1980s. Although there are no current statistics on what percentage of Chamorro people use traditional health care practices, traditional medicine provides a major source of health care for more than 66% of the world’s population (Kale, 1995; Ndulo et al., 2001; Pillay, 2002).

Although there have not been any current quantitative studies available since the 1980s, there was a survey done that included one question in regard to health care. The survey asked the following: 1) Where do you get most of your health care? Out of the 511 respondents, 5% of the respondents said that they sought out care with a traditional healer. Most of the respondents were college aged (G. Badowski, personal communication, July 13, 2020). While there has been limited quantitative data available, there have been several attempts to collect data with some data collection completed by the Guma Yo’ámte (House of Healers). The Guma Yo’ámte opened its doors on May 22, 2016, right before the 12th Festival of the Pacific Arts and Culture (FestPac) was held in Guam. This house (Guma) was established as a result of Resolution 492-31 passed in September 2012 by the Guam Legislature, this resolution commended the Háya Foundation and supported the inaugural Ámot Conference that was held September 6-8, 2012. In collaboration with the Háya Foundation and I Man Yo’ámte Siha (the healers), the Guma Yo’ámte was established to serve, promote and perpetuate the traditional healing practices (Háya Foundation, n.d.).
This mission reflects the sentiment and need in the community to promote, preserve, perpetuate and to fill a need for a home because many people in the community shared that they wanted to access a healer but did not know where to find one. Traditionally healers never advertised as it was considered to be against cultural values, which is also why it is challenging to establish a directory of healers. As mentioned earlier, discussions about which healer and specialty usually took place among families or good friends. Healers were typically recommended through word of mouth. In addition, healers always practiced out of their home, which they considered to be their natural environment. They would also not be regulated by hours of “operation” meaning that a patient could come to the home at any time. At the Guma Yo’âmte, there are 4 healers and 1 apprentice that practice full-time at the Guma Yo’âmte site. The initial Guma Yo’âmte opened at the Sagan Kottura Chamoru Cultural Center in May 2016, the Agat Guma Yo’âmte opened up in February 2019 and the Yona Guma Yo’âmte opened up in March 2019. Since its initial opening in 2016, these various locations continue to meet the demands of providing almost 10,000 consultations, nontraditional medical treatments, and follow-up appointments (Celis, 2019). The type of services provided by the healers include massage, herbal medicine, palai (rubbing or putting oil or cream or any substance onto the skin), and the traditional healers also offer home visits. This home visit service is very different from past practices as healers did not usually go to the patient’s home unless it was a spiritual issue and they had to suffice (to mediate between spirits) the persons home and other belongings. The two healers who do the home visits get many requests as people have had strokes or more serious health conditions and are not able to be transported by car to Guma Yo’âmte.

Since the 2016 opening of Guma Yo’âmte, the healers have served community members with thousands of consultations. A healer does not see a patient one time, instead it is recommended that the patient return at least three times because the healer would like for the patient to report back if he/she is getting better, to discuss any new symptoms, and to follow-up in order to decrease symptoms. If improvements are not seen, then a different treatment can be tried or a referral to another healer will be made. It should be noted that at the beginning of the opening of Guma Yo’âmte, there were many tours and visits of the site that included field trips to bring exposure to the Guma. It is not known how many of these visitors were also patients as there were not any recordkeeping or surveys that were done at this time. It can be estimated that many of these people were patients and some are repeat visitors following a normal regimen for most treatments, which recommends the patient come and be treated three days in a row. Having a house of healers and healers that also provide home visits is very different from what had been practiced in previous decades. Below are charts that show how many patients visited the Guma Yo’âmte from May 2016 until June 2017 (Figure 1). The response from the community was phenomenal, the Guma Yo’âmte was originally only open Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays, and a half-day on Saturdays. Yet, due to the demand, as of September 2017, they shifted scheduling to be open every day except Sunday and in 2019 also opened the additional healing centers in Agat and Yona to accommodate the southern population.

The chart below illustrates that the Guma Yo’âmte has had about 1,999 visitors since it first opened in May 2016 averaging about 143 visitors a month. Initially, a logbook was left on a table at the Guma Yo’âmte requesting visitors, patients, guests to sign in by name and provide a contact number for record keeping purposes. After having the logbook out for several months and through observation, it was determined that it was not being completed by every visitor. As a
result, an intern developed a standard log sheet that was used to track patient demographics and their reason for visits; the initial plan was to have the intern or apprentice ask patients/guests the questions but due to a lack of personnel, the sheets were left on the table for patients to complete at their own will. Despite the fluctuation in standardized recordkeeping for patient visits, the average numbers of visitors continue to hold steady signifying that the role of a healer is still very much important in modern day Guåhan. Prior to the opening of the Guma Yo’âmte, there was very little documentation done by the healer—those who practiced out of their homes, typically did not record any patient information instead interactions/engagements were completely verbal with the exception of some healers documentation of recipes. Some recipe books of the âmot (medicines) were donated by Suruhânu Margarito Tenorio to the University of Guam’s Micronesian Area Research Center (MARC) library. It may be the case that the healers resorted to minimal documentation as a strategy that allowed them to maintain their practices during colonization by Spain and the United States. The Spanish considered these practices as pagan and did not want the healers to practice. During early occupation, the Americans were trying to advocate for the CHamorus to go to the newly built Naval hospital for medical treatments, which they opposed as they were accustomed to utilizing the services of the Suruhâna/nu. These are just a few examples of how colonization influences the practice of traditional medicine in the twenty-first century.

Figure 1
Guam Yo’âmte Visitor’s Log

![Guam Yo’âmte Visitor’s Log](image)

Note. May 2016-June 2017 visitor log data

**Impact of Militarization and Colonization**

Although there seems to be a gap in statistical data, there have been other types of research such as interviews and testimonials that heavily support the findings that traditional healing practices are very much alive, vibrant and necessary in providing Indigenous health care to the CHamoru
people of Guam. The journey that the Chamorru people have travelled today is one that is filled with colonization, militarization, oppression, and historical trauma. US policies included prejudicial practices against the Chamorru. These policies also extended to the traditional healers. The Naval government in Guam created two laws that attempted to eliminate the power and authority of all alternative and native health practitioners, including the yo’åmte and the suruhânu. The first law mandated that midwives refer complicated cases to the Naval Hospital and the second law attempted to monopolize the production and distribution of medicines on the island (Naval Government of Guam General Orders [NCGGO], 1904; Naval Government of Guam [NGG], 1936). These two laws prohibited the use of the suruhâna and suruhânu because the Navy did not want the Chamorru to use any other type of practitioner other than the ones at Naval Hospital that were trained by the Navy. In addition to creating these two laws, the Navy printed and distributed various educational health literature about the importance of seeking proper medical care at the Naval Hospital. In addition, the Navy also printed that the use of CHamoru beliefs and practices were inaccurate and not scientific as they related to health care (Hattori, 2004). For example, DeLisle (2015) discusses the U.S. Navy wanting to control patteras (midwives) some of whom also served dual roles of being a suruhâna. The Navy wanted to “recruit” younger women in these roles in order to ‘influence’ them to instead practice medicine the way the U.S. Navy deemed appropriate—this period of military rule and colonization considered what the suruhâna and pattera had already been doing for years before the Navy came to Guam was inappropriate. Ultimately, the U.S. Navy targeted the suruhâna who were also patteras as they relied on CHamoru medicine and lasa in their caring of women (DeLisle, 2015).

As can be observed from these laws and literature, the Navy wanted to eradicate the practices of the suruhânu and suruhâna. The Chamorru people believed that illnesses were attributed to the supernatural, which was regarded by the Navy as primitive beliefs (Hattori, 2004). The Navy also believed that it was because of these beliefs that the Chamorru were seen as being resistant in seeking free medical care from the Naval Hospital and its doctors. According to government reports, Chamorru were not willing to consult with the American doctors due to superstitions and the authority exercised by the suruhâna/nu (Sablan, 1929).

Although the practices of the yo’åmte were trying to be eradicated by the Navy, these practices continue to be preserved and perpetuated but not without challenges. In a dissertation by Lizama (2011), eleven healers were interviewed, and they shared that the two of the major struggles of the healers are that they have a difficult time passing on the tradition to a family member and that the medicinal herbs are much more difficult to find. Many of the healers cited that due to destruction of the jungles due to modernization and militarization, it has made finding the âmot increasingly difficult. Due to colonization and militarization prime lands on Guam have been requisitioned for military use, specifically for military bases.

The Department of Defense (DOD) owns 25% of Guam’s 212 square miles of land which includes Andersen Air Force Base, Naval Air Base Marianas and several refuges including Ritidian Wildlife Refuge and Litekyan (Burrows, 2017). Due to its strategic location for the U.S. military, Guåhan is headquarters for Joint Region Marianas, which oversees Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base Guam. The island is also occupied by a Naval Ordnance Annex, a Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station (NCTAMS), use of Apra Harbor as a home port for
fast-attack nuclear submarines, and in 2013, the THAAD, a terminal high-altitude area defense missile defense battery was moved to Guam (Villalona, 2019). In 2020, the U.S. government plans to move 5,000 Marines and their dependent family members to Guåhan due to the ousting of the military in Okinawa (Robson, 2020). This buildup would require the military to take more land, destroy over 70 acres of coral reef, overwhelm Guåhan’s environment and infrastructure which have already been overburdened with Guåhan’s current existing military structures. As part of this buildup, a firing range for the U.S. Marines is requested to be built on the Ritidian refuge, specifically Likteyan, despite the fact that firing ranges already exist in the other military bases; the “need” expressed by the DOD for the firing range is due to the U.S. military preparedness and security for the region. To build a firing range in Litekyan would require the destruction of 315 acres of land including 89 acres of native limestone forest and 110 acres of disturbed limestone forest; furthermore, Litekyan is sacred, historical, has many ancestral connections and has been deemed a critical habitat for three species endemic to Micronesia (Na’puti, 2019).

Ritidian Point Refuge alone is comprised by 22,500 acres of land. Both the refuge and Likteyan are under the auspices of the DOD, and therefore require special access permission, which has significant consequences for suruhåna/u. Both of these areas have historical and cultural significance as they have been deemed sacred places, “Litekyan is so much more that a location for the US military to test weapons or build firing ranges-it is a historical place of great cultural significance” (Na’puti, 2019, p. 5). This also a place where healers go to find åmot, Na’puti (2019) explains that she attended a hike at Litekyan lead by a suruhåna who pointed out useful plants needed for healing. If this historical and culturally significant place is destroyed for construction of another firing range, gone with it will be the åmot in their natural habitats. These concerns for the land and the struggle to protect it and access it for traditional healing is not new. Ritidian is actually the second place that was identified for the firing range, the first choice for the U.S. military was to build a firing range on Pågat, an ancient Chamorro village.

In 2010, three private groups jointly filed a lawsuit against the DOD in an effort to prevent the military from building firing ranges on ancestral lands in Guam. The Guam Preservation Trust, We Are Guåhan, and the National Trust for Historic Preservation filed the 89-page lawsuit with the District Court of Hawaii to “compel the Department of the Navy to comply with” environmental, historical and coastal zone management acts, according to a news release from the groups (Flack, 2010; Guam Preservation Trust et al. v. U.S. Navy, 2010, p. 2). The lawsuit was won and the U.S. military plans to build the firing range at Pågat were put to a halt in 2011, now in 2020, many of the same concerns over access to sacred land are returning as the military is planning to build the firing range in Ritidian. Despite the significance of the land in the ways mentioned above, the U.S. military demonstrates that it values destroying the land and denying access to build its proposed fire range.

In response, another community group has formed—Prutehi Litekyan (Protect Ritidian)—to once again fight the militarization of sacred land and to challenge the military’s reasons for building another firing range. Davis (2011) states that due to its colonial status, Guåhan has become of the last places that the U.S. military can increase its military operations with impunity. However, Guåhan is also a place where continued social movement organizing, questioning, and resistance against militarization is happening (Davis, 2011). The community
resistance also challenges how the military buildup will directly impact traditional healing practices.

One particularly telling example of the impacts of militarization can be seen in the 2011 Programmatic Agreement regarding the U.S. military relation to Guåhan, which highlights that the U.S. military has made decisions about the land and access that seemingly disregard cultural perspectives and practices of the suruhâna/u (Ridgell, 2014). According to the 2011 Programmatic Agreement with the Guam State Historic Preservation Office for the Guam Military buildup, the Navy Facilities Engineering Command Marianas will “allow” traditional healers to collect plants on federal property prior to vegetation clearing for future military buildup projects. A public meeting was held on November 21, 2014 in which military personnel shared with the healers that they would have about three to four days to collect plants over several hectares of land. There was complete outrage in regard to the parameters set by these military personnel. In response to this “favor” that the military was giving the healers an opportunity to pick plants, former Guam Senator Hope Cristobal responded (2014):

The military apparently doesn't understand or care about what these traditions really mean. ‘Picking’ åmot is not just about taking plants. It involves time of day, the healer's intent, taking only certain parts of the plant, leaving behind other parts to continue to grow, allowing the plant to be in its natural habitat, maintaining the habitat for learning and spending time with the plants, and so much more. "Picking" plants is only a minute aspect of this tradition. Going in there to ransack plants like it's a Saturday at Ross is disrespectful and insulting! Tai respetu! (No respect) Ti båli buildup!! (The buildup is not worth it).

Cristobal’s sentiments were also echoed by the healers. It should also be noted that prior to surveying the area for plants, the healers (or anyone) would need to complete an unexploded ordinance training as there is a possibility that live ordinances are still buried underground in the area. This situation is very traumatic and scary for the healers, and many of them did not want to complete the training or risk going out to survey the property. It raised questions such as: Was the U.S. federal government request to converse with the healers and allow for limited access a genuine request? Or, was it a “token” to appease healers and the community while more of the hâlomtano is bulldozed for the development of more military buildings and structures? As an outsider, the U.S. military telling the CHamoru people of Guam what to do and how to do it, despite the community’s hundreds of years of “experience” with treating physical and spiritual ailments with plants, continues to go ignored when making decisions about militarizing the land.

As mentioned earlier, these lands require special access. A healer interviewed shared that he gets several åmot (medicinal leaves/plants) at Ritidian. He explains that as he enters the jungle, he is stopped by a park ranger and told that he can’t just go into the jungle as there are procedures that he has to follow. He further shares that he just wanted to go in and get his åmot and then go back out. The park ranger further explained that he would need to go to the office, produce an ID, get a pass/permit and then he would be escorted into the jungle and followed to get his åmot. He concludes by saying:
You know I almost got arrested at Ritidian Point because I went there without any permit and I did not know the rules and got into an argument with the security. I said you Fedäråles (Federal Government), you come here and tell us what to do. This is the land of our forefathers and this is where some of the medicine is preserved for us to use and we can’t even get it. Don’t get me wrong, I am not going to take a whole plant, I just want some of the leaves. The security guard called me a wise crack and told me that I would have to go to the office and get a permit. So I was not able to get the medicine that day.

This yo’åmte further details the difficulty of obtaining the åmot due to access to certain lands owned by the military, destruction of sacred places and jungles for military use such as a firing range and also the destruction of jungles for the new buildings. As a result of these difficulties in accessing/locating åmot, traditional healers have had to resort to growing their own åmot. However, growing åmot is not easy as CHamorus believe that the åmot have their own spirit and adapt and grow in environments that are nurturing to them. As a result, not all åmot can be grown in or around the home front. More recently, in June 2018, writer was able to arrange access to a navy military installation and sponsor in three yo’åmte. In the touring of the base, trying to assess what kind of plants were available, the healers shared that they were able to find some åmot that they haven’t seen in awhile. However, the dilemma was that they could not take away any samples or cuttings of the åmot as there were signs posted around the beach and jungle areas that stated that nothing could be removed from these areas. This created a lot of frustration and anger amongst the healers, as they would probably have to go through another process to obtain some samples and cuttings of the åmot.

These issues with obtaining cuttings/plants are also the same issues that the Guma Yo’åmte has been faced with. The Guma Yo’åmte is located at Sagan Kottura Cultural Center on the backside and close to a part of a jungle. Some healers at the Guam have tried to grow certain åmot especially those that are either very difficult to find or access is challenging. An example of what was tried to grown and was not successful are Potputput and Tupun Ayuyu (both use for respiratory illness). So although the Guma Yo’åmte has helped with access to the healers themselves, it has not solved the issue have having better access to the åmot. Another attempt to grow the åmot is at the Åmot Farm in Northern Guam. The farm assists in growing food and herbs that can help with healing. Although the Åmot Farm does grow many types of åmot, there are still some åmot that have to be grown in their natural habitats, that are behind the military fences.

**Value of Land**

In ancient times, land was not “owned” by the Chamorus, instead they were keepers of the land. The Chamorus instituted a practice of “communal land” in which anyone could use that land as long as they asked for permission. The practice of “communal land” was changed by the Spanish as the Spanish imposed a system of real estate taxes. The Spanish wanted to impose a system of proclaiming ownership, possession of lands, and establishing a title to the land. Further, after the Spanish American War of 1898, when the United States gained control of Guam, the Treaty of Paris ceded all land to the US government. The Governor at the time, Captain Richard P. Leary, abolished the Spanish tax system and implemented a new tax system. Leary’s tax system was
based on the size and type of land. The new rates imposed on the Chamorus caused many Chamorus to lose their land (Political Status Education, 1996).

In an effort to reclaim Guam from the Japanese in 1944, the American forces pulverized the island with bombs and explosives. These bombs destroyed highly populated areas of Hagåtña and Sumay and many other villages along the western coast. During the re-occupation time, there was still not a system in place to determine the value of land. With the Navy in charge, the Naval governor was condemning huge tracts of land including villages. The military occupied 85,000 acres, which accounted for 63 percent of all the land on Guam (Political Status Education, 1996).

It then became evident to the Chamorus that the Naval administration of re-occupying Guam were for different intentions. Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman (1946) the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, summarized the circumstances surrounding the American re-occupation:

> In late 1943 and early 1944 we made our plans for the recapture and development of Guam, and those plans made the maximum use of the natural facilities of the island, of the harbor, of existing roads, and of the land which was best suited to most readily be adapted for the construction projects which we had to press at maximum speed after the capture of the islands of the group. In many cases the best sites for airfields were located on land which because it was well drained, reasonably level, and accessible, had been sites for agriculture and for the life of the natives before we took the island. As a specific example, in our travels around Guam in 1938, we determined that the site on which an airfield count be built most quickly was in the coconut groves on Orote Point. It was in that position that the Japanese developed their first air field (p. 3458).

The U.S. Government has confiscated prime lands to use for strategic military purposes, and a history of landgrabbing and occupation on the island. Requisitioning local land to create military bases, which has restricted land access (and thus, medicine access) has created a crisis for CHamoru healers. Guam’s landmass is approximately 30 miles long and eight miles wide in which one third or 33% of its land portion is currently being controlled by the U.S military (Natividad & Kirk, 2010). In more recent news, there have been many burial sites found and many ancient tools and artifacts identified in an area called Magua’ where the U.S. government is clearing land to build a Marine base. There is a movement to request for the Department of Defense to stop the clearing of the land so that their can be an agreement to preserve these burial sites and artifacts. As the contemporary U.S. military buildup plans for the Marianas reveals these strategic plans continue to impact the local community, the land, and the cultural practices of healers.

**Limited Access to Ritidian in Modern Guam**

Particularly problematic for the healers is limited access to Ritidian. Ritidian, is possibly derived from the Chamorro word “Litekyan” which means, to stir, or a stirring place, and is probably a reference to the rapidly stirring or churning waters, is a wildlife preserve unit of the Guam National Wildlife Refuge (GNWR), covering 371 acres of coral reefs and 832 acres of terrestrial habitats including limestone forests. The refuge is home to native animals, the endangered Marianas fruit bat, the Mariana crow, as well as to hawksbill and green sea turtles (U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service, 2020). In addition, the Fish and Wildlife’s Nature Center, provides a wealth of information about local wildlife and the geological significance of the area.

Although Ritidian is not a military base, it is land “owned” by the U.S. Federal Government. According to Greenberg (1997), Davis (2005), and Krupar (2007), it is not uncommon for former military sites to be turned into reserves of some kind. Transferring the land from one federal agency to the other, has legitimized the U.S. government’s redesignating of these lands (Havlick, 2007, 2014). Since 1987, Chamorro organizations have been calling for the return of land not actively being used for military purposes. However, instead of returning the bases to their former customary landowners, the US military has been transferring bases to other US federal agencies, such as the US Fisheries and Wildlife Service. The US government has put 20% of Guam property into a “wildlife refuge,” but they do not fund programs to preserve the environment or endangered species on that land. Havlick (2014), conducted research at 15 national wildlife refuges in the United States that have been created out of former military lands since 1988. This research reveals that although the creation of these refuges seems positive as it creates opportunities for conservation, without proper funding and training, habitat and wildlife goals are constrained in which he defines as “opportunistic conservation.” Davis et al. (2007) shared a similar example of the people of Vieques in which their land was also turned into a refuge, as a result the natural landscape has become constructed as a place that must be protected from the local population rather than a place where they belong. This idea that the land, plants, animals, and overall environment has to be protected from the native people is an insult.

The irony is that the lands have still not been returned to the original landowners, as the land, by deemed as a refuge, has to be protected? Protected from whom? The native people? Due to regulations set in place, what waters fisherman can fish has been determined for them. When and where deers are hunted has also been determined for the hunter. How plants are extracted have already been determined for the traditional healer. This is an insult because years of Indigenous knowledge has already taught the CHamorus when to do hunt, fish, and pick âmot.

As the land is “owned” or “managed” by the US government, access to the land is limited and restricted. For example, if one needs to go onto a military installation, they either have to have a military ID or be sponsored on the base by someone else who has one (B. Santiago, personal communication, 2010). In a research study conducted by Lizama (2011), participants provided numerous examples of how colonization and militarization has affected not having easy access to the herbal plants. Ten of the eleven suruhâna/u stated something similar to “It’s harder to find the medicine.” For example, Participant 10 shared:

Due to Guam becoming more modern, more buildings are being built, which equates to more jungles (habitat for growing medicine) being destroyed. The destruction of the jungles have made it more difficult for people to find the medicine they need, and therefore suruhâna/u have had to adapt.

This participant highlights how the âmot are the ingredients needed to make the healing remedy. If one of two are missing due to not being found, then the ingredients are not complete. Therefore, the medicine may not work the way it was intended to work or may not have the same potency needed to heal. This may then require a prolonged sickness and a longer treatment...
period greater than three years. Some ways of adapting include growing medicine in their own backyard. However, several respondents noted that there are things that need to be considered when growing your own medicine. Participant 9 shared:

If you want to grow a type of herbal plant in your backyard, you first need to ask permission (referring to asking the tāotaomo’na spirits). If you do grow herbs, it can’t be right next to your house and needs to be about 15-20ft away. If it does grow, that means you were allowed to grow the herbs. If it does not grow, then that means you were not allowed or granted permission to grow the herbs. The herbs are protected by the guela and guelu.

Another way that the healers have adapted is by freezing or drying the leaves of certain herbal medicines found. The leaves are frozen or dried to help preserve them for future use. However, it is not certain how the freezing or drying process maintains the potency for the åmot. The healers have shared that this is not ideal and picking fresh åmot, most time, same day picking is the best, however due to challenges expressed earlier, picking fresh is not always an option. This creates a worry among some healers that if the medicine is not prepared the way they are supposed to prepare, that it won’t be effective as it usually is. A healer always wants to help their patients and want to be as effective as they can to heal. This sentiment was expressed by some healers as they worry that the patients won’t be healed.

Many participants shared getting herbal plants at Ritidian. As Ritidian is considered a preserve it cannot be entered unless one has a permit and is escorted by a park ranger. Ritidian point is a refuge of about 22,500 acres of land that is administered by the U.S. Air Force and U. S. Navy (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 2020). The stretch of land is located at the Northern End of the Island, where an abundance of Indigenous and medicinal plants are plentiful. In talking about Ritidian, Participant 12 shared a story:

You know I almost got arrested at Ritidian Point because I went there without any permit and I did not know the rules and got into an argument with the security. I said you Fedäråles (Federal Government), you come here and tell us what to do. This is the land of our forefathers and this is where some of the medicine is preserved for us to use and we can’t even get it. Don’t get me wrong, I am not going to take a whole plant, I just want some of the leaves. The security guard called me a wise crack and told me that I would have to go to the office and get a permit. So I was not able to get the medicine that day.

The Yo’ânte further commented that he felt very sad as he was not able to get the åmot that he needed that day to help his patient. One of the main values of a healer is to help those who are sick, therefore, to be put in a position of not being able to help patients also greatly affects the healer. This is also the reason why healers who practice out of their home do not set limits to healing in terms of their labor and hours. Homes are open for anyone to come when they are ill and in need of help. They do not turn people away generally, but if for some reason they do not have access to the åmot, then they will have to refer to another healer who may have access. Another adjustment that healers have made is to tell the patient and their family to look for the åmot and bring it back to the healer. This notion of trying to get the åmot yourself is very
challenging. I have gone with the healers on several åmot hunting treks through the jungle over
the course of several years and I still have a hard time identifying the åmot as many of the plants
look similar. Although this is not a common practice, some healers have had to resort to this as it
has been difficult to access certain åmot due to the military’s restrictions placed upon the land.

Although “access” exists on Ritidian, access is limited to the operating hours of the Refuge.
According to the Refuge website, in 2020 the Refuge is open Wednesdays-Sundays and holidays
(U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 2020). For a traditional healer whose hours of healing are not
regulated as people do not know when they will get sick, having limited access to the Refuge
translates to not having access to åmot which means that they are not able to help the people who
see their assistance. As noted earlier with the Ritidian example above, that healer felt a deep
sadness for not being able to assist his patient.

Despite the militarization and colonization, the traditional healing practices of the CHamoru
people continue to survive. However, if the ingredients that they need to make the åmot is not
available to access on their own lands, the yo ’åmte is forced to either alter the åmot (change the
potency which may not be as affective), ask the patient to locate the åmot on their own (which
would be really difficult), or not treat that person for that particular illness. It would be very hard
for a carpenter to do carpentry without wood. It would be very hard for the yo ’åmte to continue
to make åmot without having access to the åmot. Understanding the complex dynamics of access
to åmot is important for health and well-being as well as for education.

Regarding implications in the classroom, the first movement that needs to be done is bring about
a greater awareness. Many people are not aware of the impact of militarization on Guåhan. As
part of this awareness and education, culturally and politically relevant textbooks should be
developed for school age children. In reference to textbooks, Hattori (2018) states that there
should be a move away from standard political textbooks and instead textbooks that also
recognize women’s contributions could help in the process of decolonization. In trying to
identify reading material to assist in learning and promoting awareness, special selections of the
text used is warranted to not continue perpetuating the acts of colonization. Another resource is
“20 Facts about the Ancestral Village of Ritidian (Litekyan) That will Amaze You (Middle
School Edition.” This is a free and interactive book to teach people of all ages the importance of
Likteyan (Ayuda Foundation, 2018). In addition, policies should be developed in the
preservation of these medicinal plants. The only law that exists in regard to preserving medicinal
plants on Guam is the Hatdin Chamorro. This law allows for three tracks of land to be given to
people who want to grow medicinal plants/herbs. Although this law is helpful, more laws and
policies need to be developed. For example, a CHamoru Health Care Act should be established
that would follow similar models such as Hawaii and the Phillipines. The Native Hawaiian
Health Care Act of 1988 that was subsequently updated to the Native Hawaiian Health Care
Improvement Act in 1992, is a model that could offer an example for the Guam context.
Furthermore, the U.S. Congress recognizes that Hawaiian medicine is important in assisting the
overall deteriorating health of the Hawaiians (Donlin, 2010). Perhaps a CHamoru Health Care
Act would be useful in that it would acknowledge the role of the healer in practicing Indigenous
health care and improving the health care needs of the CHamoru people.
Conclusion

The role of the Suruhånu/Suruhåna/Yo’àmte is evident in the history of the CHamoru people and in the role of providing Indigenous health care. The use of traditional healing has been documented in numerous interviews, articles and has more recently been evident in the volumes of people who have been seeking traditional healing methods at the various Guma Yo’àmte locations in Guam. The Guma has been able to solve the problem of being able to access a healer. However, a consistent issue amongst healers is the lack of access to medicinal plants due to many of the plants being “behind the fence” with a challenging process to navigate the rules imposed by the U.S. military just to be able to access the plants. Particularly, being able to access Ritidian and Litkeyan, both of which healers provided documented examples of not being able to access the plants in a timely manner due to these restrictions. This results in patients not being healed, being turned away, having to resort to finding the àmot for themselves, suffering from prolonged illness, and/or not receiving any treatment at all. In sum, the impacts of militarization could lead to continued poor health outcomes for the CHamoru people.

From a cultural standpoint, the healers also suffer and feel sad that they are not able to help a person in need. Perhaps as part of the establishment of a CHamoru Health Care Act, there can be a provision that allows any established healer a “special pass” to enter lands at any time without questions. Alternatively, the act could enforce that the U.S. federal government allocate funds to clean up the refuge and return the land back to the people of Guam for their use as desired and as the people deem necessary. Although modern health care exists on Guåhan, the rates of diabetes, hypertension, kidney disease and cancer continue to increase (David et al., 2015). Initiatives should be developed to further support the preservation of land use specifically for healers and in the preservation of their àmot.

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Counter Military Recruitment Efforts in Guåhan’s Public High Schools: The Case of Na‘matatnga I Manhoben

Kisha Borja-Quichocho-Calvo, PhD Candidate, Political Science (Indigenous Politics), University of Hawai‘i-Mānoa

On Guåhan, the US military is normalized throughout the island and in the general mindset of the community. Much commemoration occurs for US military officials and military-related events. These include the names of frequented thoroughfares, “Liberation Day” festivities, and the celebration of American holidays like July 4th (Independence Day). Moreover, the US military has become normalized in Guåhan’s public high schools, where there is a strong military presence, as evident in the JROTC programs, teachers who serve in the Guam Army National Guard, regular visits from military recruiters, and the many military-related paraphernalia—lanyards, coffee mugs, posters, and t-shirts—throughout school campuses. This normalization of militarization in schools is directly impacted by the normalization of militarization in the overall island community. Because adults hardly question this normalization of militarization in our everyday island community, our island’s youth are not taught to question its presence in their schools. This essay looks at one Guam Department of Education high school and the student organization, Na‘matatnga I Manhoben (2010-2014), whose goal was to question and challenge the normalization of militarization in their school via counter-recruitment efforts. Na‘matatnga I Manhoben’s work was important because it offered students another perspective on their futures, one that did not have to include working in the military.

Keywords: counter-recruitment, public school, normalization, Militarization, Na‘matatnga I Manhoben

Introduction

It was March 2, 2012: The Opening Ceremony for Mes CHamoru29 (CHamoru Month) at a Guam Department of Education (GDOE) high school. The high school gymnasium was warm as usual and filled with hundreds of teenage students. It was a large event (it involved the entire school), which initiated the festivities for the annual Mes CHamoru celebration. At the beginning of the Opening Ceremony, two representatives from the Na‘matatnga I Manhoben (means to make the youth brave) student organization, proudly wore their mestisas as they held a large Guåhan flag and walked around the gymnasium floor. The other students cheered loudly as they walked by. After they did a lap around the gym, they stopped in front of the main stage, and everyone stood with their right hands over their hearts, sang the “Fanohge CHamoru,” and recited the “Inifresi” (the Guåhan national anthem and pledge, respectively). Neither the school’s JROTC30 color guard performance nor the singing of “The Star-Spangled Banner” took place, both of which were always done at school-wide functions.

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29 CHamoru refers to the Indigenous people, culture, and language of the Mariana Islands. In 2018, CHamoru became the official spelling in Guåhan via PL 33-236. This decision was supported by I Kumisión i Fino‘ CHamoru yan i Fina‘nå‘guen i Historia yan Lina‘la’ i Taotao Tåno’ (the CHamoru Language Commission). Other variations include “Chamorro” and “Chamoru”; in this paper, these spellings are only used in original quotes.

30 Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps, a military training program for high school students; all GDOE high schools have a JROTC program.
Days leading up to the ceremony, Na'matatnga I Manhoben members questioned the involvement of the US military (through the JROTC and “The Star-Spangled Banner”) in an event which was supposed to highlight the CHamoru culture and history. They requested that the JROTC color guard and “The Star-Spangled Banner” be removed from the Opening Ceremony agenda. The school’s administration agreed that the event should focus on the CHamoru culture and history and that the color guard and American national anthem did not fit the agenda and theme of the event. Considering that the color guard and the American national anthem were part of every major school event, Na'matatnga I Manhoben not only allowed the school to re-focus its time and energy on the CHamoru culture and history, but it also challenged the dominant narrative of the normalization of militarization in public high schools on Guåhan.

US Militarization of Guåhan

This military value of Guam as a strategic geopolitical location in order to build its power base in the Asia-Pacific region is crucial to understanding US policy to the island and its Indigenous [Chamorro] people, first during this period, but even up until today. During the [pre-WWII] period, as Guam was just a transit site, American policy and investment to the island was minimal, it was a site to be controlled and held but nothing more. Guam would thus become the ‘USS Guam’ with naval officers and governors at the helm and Chamorros forced along for the ride, and treated like an afterthought on their own island. (Bevacqua, 2014)

From 1898 to 1941, Guåhan was under the US naval administration. “During this period, Guam was run as if it were a military base, or more aptly a US naval base. The executive officer was a US naval governor appointed by the US Navy” (Bevacqua, 2014). Rules and laws governing the island were absurd, impacting almost every aspect of CHamoru life: regulations of fiesta celebrations, whistling in the streets, and mandating how many rats and iguanas CHamorus were expected to kill (Hattori, 2014, p. 18), as well as rules about clothing etiquette (the length of CHamoru women’s skirts) and restrictions on courting practices.

When the US returned in 1944, it continued to maintain a militarized-style occupation of Guåhan. It executed land grabs of large parcels of CHamoru lands — eventually occupying two thirds of the 30-mile long, 8-mile wide island — and restricted travel into and out of the island (Forbes, 1996, p. 42; Leon Guerrero, 2002, p. 91). Today, the US military continues to occupy one third of the land on Guåhan for its bases, hospital, housing facilities, storage munitions, and training areas. “[…] This includes the most scenic, the most agriculturally productive, and the largest fresh water resource in Micronesia” (Howard, 1997, p. 161). These occupied lands and waters include the villages of Sumay/Sumai, Litekyan (Ritidian), Haputo, Inapsan, and Fena (and many more). Many of the CHamoru families with ties to these lands have limited or no access to them and are still waiting to be returned to their lands. This has caused much strain in our community between the military and civilian populations. Further, with Fena in particular, the Navy built a large reservoir to supply water to its military community and to the local community — for a fee — and in recent years, proposed to sell the reservoir to GovGuam (the island’s local government) for about $300 million and a vote on the board of GovGuam’s Consolidated Commission on Utilities; this was upsetting for island residents (Tolentino, 2019).
Since 2006, Guåhan has also been faced with the hyper-militarization of the island through the US military’s plans for realignment — more commonly known as the military buildup. The buildup plans include the relocation of about 5,000 US Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guåhan, as well as thousands of off-island contract workers. It is anticipated that the influx of thousands of people to the island would come at a tremendous cost to the local community — culturally, environmentally, and socially. In addition to the buildup, the military has continued to engage in other major plans, such as the Mariana Islands Range Complex (MIRC) and the Mariana Islands Training and Testing (MITT) — about 1 million square nautical miles of ocean and air spaces to conduct naval trainings (MITT, MIRC, and the Programmatic Agreement, 2019). These have (and will continue to have) detrimental impacts on the entire Mariana Islands archipelago.

The Normalization of Militarization in Guåhan
After over 120 years of US occupation — albeit a rather benevolent occupation, it is no wonder that many people in Guåhan view the US military as part of everyday life, where questions or critiques are not often raised regarding the institution (this is referred to as the normalization of militarization, where the military is viewed as a normal part of everyday life). There is rarely ever critique of the many fence lines and “No Trespassing” signs which run throughout the island and serve as invasive reminders of which lands the US military occupies, barriers which separate many CHamorus from the lands of our ancestors. There is not much comment made about annual trainings that occur on and near Guåhan, or on other Mariana Islands (such as No’os or Farallon de Medinilla). Even when the marines conducted training exercises at the Governor Ricardo J. Bordallo Complex (the Governor’s Office) in Adelup on February 2017, not much criticism was raised by the local leaders or our broader community. Almost daily, military helicopters fly in our skies and large military trucks drive on our roads, and while people may wonder about what the military is doing, nothing is done to halt the military activities; they are typically seen as regular activities. These examples demonstrate how normalized the US military has become in Guåhan.

Moreover, there are other ways that the US military has invaded and pervaded the lives of the people of Guåhan. For example, it is typical for young people to have their parents tell them to join the military or, for the girls, to marry someone in the military so they can get an “ID” and obtain base privileges. Another example is the annual “Liberation” Day festivities, inclusive of a summer carnival, parade, coronation of a “Liberation” Day queen, and fireworks, which commemorate the day that the US returned to Guåhan (July 21, 1944), ending the Japanese occupation, and “liberating” Guåhan (Perez, 1996, p. 72). The Liberation Day parade itself is the largest event on the island (Ada, 2017) and has been celebrated on Guåhan since July 21, 1945 (Perez, 1996, p. 72).

Other examples of the normalization of militarization on Guåhan is evident in the commemoration of local road names, public school names, and phrases which refer to Guåhan.

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31 It should also be mentioned that in contemporary Guåhan, there has always been an activist community, groups fighting for the return of CHamoru lands and to end US occupation on the island. Today, there remains a number of groups which have fought against the military buildup and have continued to fight for the return of CHamoru lands. These groups include Nasion CHamoru, We Are Guåhan, Independent Guåhan, Prutehi Litekyan, and Our Islands Are Sacred.
Popular road names include Marine Corps. Drive, Vietnam Veterans Highway, Purple Heart Highway, and Nimitz Hill. Even some of Guåhan’s public schools are named after American presidents, the commander-in-chief of the US military: George Washington High School, John F. Kennedy High School, Harry S. Truman Elementary School, and Lyndon B. Johnson Elementary School. Popular phrases referring to Guåhan include “Where America’s Day Begins,” “Tip of the Spear,” and “America’s Gateway to Asia”. These place names and phrases reflect the influence of the US military on Guåhan and have become part of everyday language in the island and people often do not think twice when saying the names or phrases.

The normalization of US militarization in Guåhan, in its people’s mindsets and lifestyles, has resulted in the normalization of militarization in the island’s public schools. There are six public high schools in Guåhan (GDOE, 2017), all of which have a JROTC program, where students in the program take courses in US military preparatory training, wear military-like uniforms on a weekly basis, and even carry replicas of actual rifles (for color guard events and competitions). None of these military-related activities and the roles they play in the youth’s lives are ever questioned; thus proving (again) how normalized the military is in Guåhan’s schools.

Other cases of the pervasiveness of the US military in Guåhan’s public high schools are evident in the frequent presence of military recruiters, the many military-related brochures in the school counseling offices (which often outnumber college brochures), and the military paraphernalia used by school staff in the school offices, such as military coffee mugs, pens, posters, t-shirts, and lanyards.

At one central public high school, school staff refer to the different wings of the school by using the alphabet adopted by the US military. For example, A-wing is referred to as “Alpha”; B-wing, “Bravo”; and C-wing, “Charlie” (“Military Alphabet Code,” 2017). “[…T]he militarization of language reflects the militarization of society; it normalizes the military as a part of everyday life. Given that America has the world’s second-largest standing army, it makes sense that its military terminology is particularly pervasive” (Hawking, 2016). As a US territory, this applies to Guåhan as well.

During annual Career Day festivities at the high school, there are typically many representatives from the various US military branches who come and speak to the students about their careers. When looking at the school parking lot, one can see the area lined with numerous military vehicles. According to former Na’matatng I Manhoben member Nichole Quintanilla: “In almost every classroom that I went to during Career Day, it was someone from the military […]. I saw that as […] influencing children […] that this [the military] is their only option […]. This is the only way you’ll be successful” (Na’matatng I Manhoben [To Make the Youth Brave], 2015). Moreover, one academic school year, the school administration did not have a problem with the many military representatives being on campus (as expected); however, they did discourage teachers from inviting professionals who had careers in the cosmetology field (e.g., hair stylists and makeup artists) because they did not consider such careers to be legitimate (they thought of these careers as mere hobbies).
How the Normalization of Militarization Contributes to the Enlistment of Guåhan’s Youth into the US Military

With the intention of enlisting in the military, high school students in the island enroll in the JROTC program and/or take the ASVAB (Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery), “[...] a multiple-aptitude battery that measures developed abilities and helps predict future academic and occupational success in the military. It is administered annually to more than one million military applicants, high school, and post-secondary students” (ASVAB Testing Program, n.d.). The ASVAB also provides recruiters with personal information about the students who take the test (Allison & Solnit, 2007, p. 7). The ASVAB is often marketed as a career aptitude test; however, [t]he aptitudes it measures are specifically aligned with military jobs” (Allison & Solnit, p. 36), thus helping the military recruiters to fulfill their recruitment goals.

Further, Ronni Alexander (2011) summarizes Julian Aguon’s thoughts on JROTC and military recruitment in the Marianas: “The situation is complicated by the fact that many young people, already prepared by JROTC, believe enlisting in the US military to be the only viable option for their future” (p. 11). Additionally, students feel that joining the US military will grant them special privileges (like base access and access to more affordable goods/services), opportunities to travel, and the ability to provide for and give back to their families (Aguon, 2008, pp. 120-124); in the minds of many, they would not have been able to afford these if it were not for the US military. Aguon states: “[...T]he kids are catching on. Falling. In formation” (p. 120). Lisa Natividad also criticizes the US military, stating that it “‘vampires our best’ through its universal recruitment in Guam’s schools” (as cited in Letman, 2016).

Rather than critique the US military, different generations of people on Guåhan engage in “very low-level, colonized thinking” (Natividad as cited in Letman, 2016), promoting the military through glamorizing it and making youth believe that it is their only option for a better life, which motivates many young people to enlist. Young people also seem motivated to join because of the legacy of the military in their respective families (Letman). And while “Our children are no longer the flower of our nations but the labor units of industry and the military” (Trask, 1999, p. 103), they seem to be okay with this choice, as long as they are able to meet their career and personal goals and familial obligations.

Federal Policies + Federal Funding = Federal Access to Students

Why is the US military allowed to have a strong presence in public high schools on Guåhan? How is the military allowed to have access to high school students’ personal information? The answers to these questions can be found in the No Child Left Behind Act:

- Under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) of 2001, which amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), high schools that receive federal funds must provide certain student contact information to military recruiters upon request and must allow recruiters to have the same access to students as employers and colleges. (Feder, 2008)

Thus, because of the Guam Department of Education’s use of federal funding, the US military is allowed access to GDOE students’ “directory information.” Meanwhile, the Family Educational Right and Privacy Act (FERPA), to a certain extent, is supposed to protect students from
disclosing personal information, such as their contact information. But even FERPA has its limitations because schools still:

may disclose, without [student and parental] consent, ‘directory’ information such as a student’s name, address, telephone number, date and place of birth, honors and awards, and dates of attendance. However, schools must tell parents and eligible students about directory information and allow parents and eligible students a reasonable amount of time to request that the school not disclose directory information about them. Schools must notify parents and eligible students annually of their rights under FERPA (emphasis added; U.S. Department of Education, 2015).

In other words, students’ information is easily accessible for military recruiters, but parents have to submit a written request to their children’s school to opt out of disclosing the “directory information” to the military recruiters (King, 2016). On Guåhan, however, GDOE high schools do not inform parents and students of this opt-out option which means that military recruiters have more access to more students. And all of the GDOE high schools (all GDOE schools) are categorized as Title I schools — where majority of the children come from low-income households (U.S. Department of Education, 2018). Since many GDOE students come from low-income households, they look for ways to access financial stability for themselves and their families and to them, the military seems like the quickest way to get a career and to access financial stability. This is often promoted as the best option (even the only option) for high school youth in Guåhan. The military is also aware of this and exploits the children, accessing the students’ information and actively recruiting them to enlist in its violent institution.

When it comes to military recruitment in GDOE high schools, our community must consider: How can we remain critical of the active and pervasive US military presence in Guåhan’s public high schools? How do we limit the military’s access to our island’s children? How can we protect our children from the violent institution that is the US military? We are responsible for protecting our children, for informing them of their options after high school, outside of the military.

What is Counter-recruitment? How Can It Look in Guåhan Public High Schools? : The Case of Na‘matatnga I Manhoben

One of the ways that our community can protect our youth and offer them options outside of the US military is counter-recruitment, the “broad-based, strategic approach to challenging the roots of unending war and militarization […] an effective way to challenge the prowar, antieducation priorities of our government” (Allison & Solnit, 2007, pp. X-XII). Various places around the world (to include Germany, the UK, and the US) have engaged in counter-recruitment efforts. In Guåhan however, as of 2010, no formal counter-recruitment efforts had been made in the island’s public high schools. That year, in a Guam Department of Education public high school, the student organization Na‘matatnga I Manhoben (means to make the youth brave) was created to do just that.

Prior to the creation of Na‘matatnga I Manhoben, I was asked by two students to be the advisor of a school club which would inform high school students about the proposed (at the time) military buildup on Guåhan. They knew of my involvement with the local coalition, We Are Guåhan — which aimed to “inform and engage our community on the various issues concerning
the impending military buildup [and] to unite and mobilize our people to protect and defend our resources and our culture” (About, 2013). Essentially, the students wanted to create a youth version of We Are Guåhan. While completing the paperwork to register the organization, the student members had to create a name for the group as well as establish a mission. With the help of CHamoru language practitioners, the students came up with Na’matatnga I Manhoben (often referred to as NIM for short). The group’s main goals were to speak out against the military buildup as well as to teach and learn about the CHamoru culture, engage in counter-recruitment efforts, and promote peace in our communities.

Anti-buildup sentiments were shared among the group of youth in Na’matatnga I Manhoben. They were passionate about standing up against the buildup, learning more about and educating others about the buildup, and participating in community anti-buildup efforts. The group participated in activities such as the Rise Up Guåhan gathering at Adelup (which called the community to come together in solidarity against the buildup), a hike to Pågat village, and the Pågat demonstration “Back Up the Back Road” (where hundreds of people created a human chain on both sides of Route 15) which was meant to encourage local leaders and community members to protect Pågat village from becoming a live-firing range site. In 2011, Na’matatnga I Manhoben also performed a group slam poem entitled “We Say NO to the Buildup!” at a school talent showcase (access the video at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KoA8muU7u0). What was significant during the first year that Na’matatnga I Manhoben was created was that the students were passionate about trying to stop the military buildup, something that directly affected their home and their culture. And while there were concerns raised by some of them (incited mostly by their parents and buildup supporters on the school campus, e.g. other students and teachers), they showed how brave they were and needed to be in order to speak against the buildup.

In the years following 2011, Na’matatnga I Manhoben continued to engage in counter-recruitment efforts. However, with the negative stigma attached to CHamoru activism and being called an “activist” on Guåhan (Alexander, 2011, p. 13), it must be noted that the term “counter-recruitment” was not used blatantly by Na’matatnga I Manhoben, though the work the group did was in line with counter-recruitment efforts. Thus, instead of using the term “counter-recruitment,” Na’matatnga I Manhoben—in order to garner more support for its mission and efforts—came up with creative strategies to communicate their points to their peers regarding the US military and the institution’s destruction of local lands and sacred cultural spaces and the high rate of enlistment into the military. Some of Na’matatnga I Manhoben’s counter-recruitment work from 2010-2014 included Know Your Options, Peace Week, tabling at various school-wide events, and the Opening Ceremony of Mes CHamoru (CHamoru Month) in March 2012. The following are descriptions of each counter-recruitment effort.

- **Know Your Options** was a weekly campaign, in which members of Na’matatnga I Manhoben set up a table in various parts of the school campus and distributed handouts, pamphlets, and opt-out forms and had conversations, informing their peers about other career and education options they had, outside of the military.
- **Peace Week** was an annual week-long event sponsored by Na’matatnga I Manhoben. Every day during Peace Week focused on a particular theme related to peace in the school, peace in the island community, and peace in the world. Some of the themed days included: Wall of Peace (students colored a peace handout and wrote what peace
meant to the them; the handouts were placed on large pieces of butcher paper and posted around the campus; Pieces for Peace (students sang songs and recited poetry related to peace on the stage of A106, the Speech and Drama room); Can o’ Peace (students collected food for a canned food drive); and the Peace March (students made signs related to peace and marched from A-wing to G-wing, one side of the campus to the other, chanting phrases like “Peace for you! Peace for me! Peace for all humanity!”). During the first Peace Week in 2011, participation was small, but in the years following, participation grew (because Na’matatnga I Manhoben worked with various teachers and their students).

- **Tabling at school-wide events** involved Na’matatnga I Manhoben members hosting a table at school events such as the Club/Organization Drive and Mes CHamoru, where they informed their peers about the military buildup and about the CHamoru culture.
- Prior to the **Opening Ceremony of 2012 Mes CHamoru**, Na’matatnga I Manhoben requested from the school administration that there be no color guard performance by the JROTC and no singing of “The Star-Spangled Banner” during the event (for more details on this event, refer to the beginning of this essay).

The Realities of Counter-recruitment in Guåhan’s Public High Schools

One of the things that must be considered when thinking about counter-recruitment in Guåhan’s public high schools is the everyday realities in the public high schools. For instance, Na’matatnga I Manhoben refrained from using the term counter-recruitment in their counter-recruitment efforts. Why was this the case? While a critique can be made about the approach that Na’matatnga I Manhoben used, which could be viewed as essentially sugarcoating the truth of the US military’s agendas, one must keep in mind the context of the very pro-American, pro-military mindsets of many people in Guåhan (CHamoru and non-CHamoru), much of which has to do with the over 100-year US colonial occupation of the island and the normalization of militarization in the community. As Michael Lujan Bevacqua (2017) states:

> On the surface, Guam appears to be like any mid-size American city, only in the Western Pacific on the edge of Asia. As the ‘Tip of American’s Spear’ it is strategically important to US military interests […]. The island’s educational system and government were imported from the United States, and most popular cultural consumption comes directly from the United States via television, movies and the internet. (pp. 25-26)

In other words, people in Guåhan have been very much influenced by America, becoming some of the most patriotic “citizens” and enlisting in and promoting the country’s military. This patriotism and loyalty to the US stemmed from WWII and the tragic experiences of CHamorus during the Japanese occupation:

> The [WWII] experience had dramatically changed the Chamorro people […]. They emerged from the war with a very different self-perception, one in which they no longer resisted American colonial charms […] and began to place their impressions of the United States at the apex of their cultural possibilities. (Bevacqua, p. 29)

In large part because of such a strong patriotism to the US and its military, it is interesting to see the implications of this patriotism on the public high school environment. The military has a stronger presence on school campuses than even Guåhan’s two post-secondary institutions, Guam Community College and University of Guam. Military recruiters are more present on
school campuses than college recruiters. Additionally, Career Day events bring in many people from different branches of the military.
Moreover, to my knowledge, there are no opt-out forms—a form which parents or students over 18 complete in order to “keep [the students’] private information from being released to military recruiters” (Allison & Solnit, 2007, p. 30)— included in the Guam Department of Education registration packet. There is a “Student Information Form & Federal Survey” (GDOE, 2013), which could very well be used by military recruiters to access students’ directory information. This brings up another issue: The public high schools are allowing military recruiters access to students’ contact information without theirs or their parents’ knowledge or consent (which is a violation of FERPA).

Further, one of the issues of contention for Na‘matatnga I Manhoben was its counter-recruitment efforts. Several of the members of the organization experienced resistance to their efforts, backlash from their peers and even some faculty. This resistance usually came in the form of heated debates, verbal confrontations, and “dirty looks from ROTC students and some teachers” (N. Quintanilla, “Na‘matatnga I Manhoben: To Make the Youth Brave: Guåhan Actions to Counter the Militarization of Youth,” 2015). While the Na‘matatnga I Manhoben members were learning about counter-recruitment and how to facilitate discussions, how to respectfully have conversations about such intense, controversial issues, they were also faced with resistance, almost immediately after the creation of the organization. For example, there were multiple instances when they would return to the classroom after tabling for Know Your Options and would vent about how JROTC students would approach the Na‘matatnga I Manhoben table and criticize the group’s efforts and, instead of dialoguing, would make the Na‘matatnga I Manhoben members feel defeated.

The everyday realities of counter-recruitment efforts and the challenges that come along with pushing such efforts in one of Guåhan’s public schools demonstrate how difficult it was (and is) to engage in counter-recruitment in such a patriotic and militarized setting. It also showed, again, how brave the youth in Na‘matatnga I Manhoben were, as they traversed through the unfamiliar grounds of counter-recruitment in local public high schools.

What Needs to Happen in Guåhan’s Public High Schools: A Note from a Teacher
Local educational institutions should not be spaces where violent institutions like the US military are glorified, endorsed, and promoted, especially on a US colony. Inactivated rifles, violent speaking (in the form of yelling), and the indoctrination of our island’s youth regarding the military should not be permitted on school grounds. And with issues like the military buildup (and the MITT and the MIRC) as well as the political self-determination of the CHamoru people being at the forefront of local politics and conversations, it is imperative that more critical discussions regarding these issues occur with our island’s youth.

Throughout this essay, I described the counter-recruitment efforts of the Na‘matatnga I Manhoben organization and the challenges that they faced. As I taught at the high school for four years (2010-2014) and served as the advisor for Na‘matatnga I Manhoben during that time, I would like to offer a few thoughts regarding counter-recruitment efforts (albeit critiquing the presence of the US military in general) in Guåhan’s public schools. A few suggestions that I have include:
• Offering students a variety of career and educational choices outside of the US military, providing at the very least, a balance of information (“Na’matatnga I Manhoben [To Make the Youth Brave]: Guåhan Actions to Counter the Militarization of Youth,” 2015);
• Ensuring that students and parents are informed of and understand their options in terms of disclosing their personal contact information (e.g., through the opt-out form);
• Prohibiting JROTC’s involvement (e.g., color guard) in non-military related events (e.g., Mes CHamoru);
• Breaking the normalization of militarization in Guåhan’s public high schools through increasing consciousness and criticality of the presence of the US military in school settings;
• Incorporating curriculum that “provides a critical lens with which to examine the [US] military […] and how it affects this nation’s economy, affects how we see ourselves, and affects how we see the world” (Mayorga, Picower, and Rader, 2008, p. ix);
• Removing the presence of military-related weapons (e.g., inactivated rifles) and vehicles (e.g., Hummers) on school campuses.

Conclusion
Throughout the years that Na’matatnga I Manhoben was active, its members demonstrated how brave they were, engaging in counter-recruitment efforts in their high school. They were involved in on-the-ground work that, unlike their US military counterpart, did not appear all that glamorous to their peers. Nonetheless, they worked to educate their peers about the negative effects of the military buildup in Guåhan, provided information about education and career options aside from the military, promoted peace in our community, and advocated for the protection and perpetuation of the CHamoru culture.

Today, Na’matatnga I Manhoben is no longer an active group, and there are no current counter-recruitment efforts or organizations in any of the GDOE high schools. However, there are teachers in some of the schools who are working to establish a critical lens towards US imperialism and militarism on Guåhan, and this work should be acknowledged. Still, more must be done with counter-recruitment efforts in GDOE high schools. The work of Na’matatnga I Manhoben was just one example. Hopefully, more people will engage in this necessary work and will be able to make themselves (and each other) brave. As teachers, this is our responsibility to our youth, and for our youth, this is their responsibility to each other. Together, this our responsibility to our home and to other Indigenous homelands and peoples. We must continue to work together to stop the US military from taking any more of our children.

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Securing Nature: Militarization and the Environment in the Northern Mariana Islands

Theresa (Isa) Arriola, PhD from University of California at Los Angeles

The Mariana Islands Training and Testing (MITT) Study Area covers just under one million sq. nautical miles of land, water and air that the U.S. Military uses for training and testing surrounding the Marianas archipelago in the western Pacific. As one of largest federal managers of land throughout the United States and “its” territories and commonwealths, the U.S. Military must contend with a legacy of environmental damage while completing its defense goals. To do this, the military has increasingly articulated its territorial claims over the Marianas in terms of “the environment”-stewardship, conservation, and protection. In this article, I argue that paying closer attention to the ways that the U.S. Military mobilizes conceptualizations of “nature” and “the environment” reveals how militarism becomes naturalized through environmental planning processes. In doing so, this research highlights the inequalities that undergird the relationship between the United States as a settler nation and its territorial and commonwealth counterparts.

Drawing on long-term fieldwork conducted on the island of Saipan (Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands) from 2016-2019, this article examines the CNMI community’s engagement with United States environmental planning processes and analyzes Environmental Impact Statements as objects of ethnographic inquiry by drawing on archival research and participant observation from a public meeting on March 18, 2019 regarding the creation of a Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (S-EIS) for the Mariana Islands Training and Testing (MITT) Study Area.

Keywords: Mariana Islands, environment, conservation, MITT, SEIS, militarism

Introduction

On March 18, 2019, I arrived at Kanoa Resort on Saipan for the U.S. Department of the Navy’s (DoN) public meeting on the Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (S-EIS) for the Mariana Islands Training and Testing (MITT) Study Area. Upon entering the chilly air-conditioned room, I was greeted by U.S. Military personnel and asked to sign in by leaving personal information such as my name, email and affiliation. At one table near the entrance sat two tablets where individuals could watch videos of the Department of the Navy’s oceanic research within the MITT Study Area. Emblazoned on both tablets were large logos that read “U.S. Navy Stewards of the Sea” alongside the phrases “Defending Freedom,” and “Protecting the Environment” (Figure 1). On another table sat a display that included an explanation of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) timeline of which the night’s meeting was specifically addressing “Step 4” or the public review and comment period (Figure 2). Individuals were encouraged to walk throughout the room, stopping by each table to learn more about the military’s proposed project and speak to various military personnel throughout the night. While it was not clear to me in the moment, I later found a picture that mapped out the physical set up of the room, which ended with a public commenting table (Figure 3). A lone stenographer sat in the corner of the room to transcribe public comments about the Draft S-EIS and aid with translation since most if not all of the information presented was in English, an issue that community
members have historically lamented as being problematic to the older generation of Chamorro and Refaluwasch speakers.32

As part of the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, the production of an EIS is required by United States Federal law whenever a lead agency proposes to make large scale changes to the environment that are seen as significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. An EIS offers a certain number of facts related to environmental impacts that include but are not limited to: the scope of the project, various project alternatives, and opportunities for public comment. From an anthropological perspective, these documents are useful not so much for researching the validity of their content or the holes in the document’s logic and argumentation, but in their ability to highlight how militarism becomes naturalized through environmental planning processes, revealing the limits of Indigenous political decision-making in today’s security landscape in Oceania.

In this article, I argue that paying closer attention to the ways that the U.S. Military mobilizes conceptualizations of nature and the environment has the potential to reveal new forms of long-standing sociopolitical inequities that structure the relationship between the United States as a settler nation and its territorial and commonwealth counterparts. Answers as to why militarism is resisted, negotiated and even promulgated by Indigenous people whose lives have long been influenced by colonial processes can be found-at least in part-through the examination of the environment as a site through which power moves. Thus, I ask: What is at stake for the Indigenous people of the Marianas in light of the military’s conceptualizations of the environment? In turn, how do Indigenous peoples negotiate the military’s reconceptualizations of the environment? I answer these questions by exploring how discourses surrounding nature and the environment get taken up by various actors—including military personnel, Indigenous community members, and government officials—during federal environmental planning processes in the Northern Mariana Islands during fieldwork conducted between 2017-2019. In particular, I engage in an examination of Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) as objects of ethnographic inquiry and draw on long-term ethnographic data, personal experience growing up as an Indigenous Chamorro woman in the Northern Mariana Islands, as well as a March 18, 2019 public meeting regarding the creation of a Draft S-EIS for the Mariana Islands Training and Testing (MITT) Study Area held on Saipan.

One might wonder why a document as long and technical as an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) would be so important for understanding social life and shifting ideas of the “environment” and “nature”? As socially meaningful documents understood within the historical context of militarism throughout the Pacific, EIS’s reveal a story not simply about the U.S. Military’s many impacts on the environment that are most visible, but about the Department of Defense’s (DoD)

32 This contemporary indifference towards Indigenous languages mirrors the long-standing colonial role of the military in its orientation towards Chamorro people underscored by the long history of Naval Government policies that were antagonistic to Chamorro language and culture in the Marianas. One such policy was implemented in 1917 on Guam entitled Naval Government Executive Order No. 243 which “designated English as the only official language of Guam and ordered that Chamorro must not be spoken except for official interpreting” (Clement, n.d.). The issue of translation was raised by local activists and community members Jacinta Kaipat and Peter Perez in the CNMI on Saipan on December 8, 2015 in the Saipan Tribune, where they argued that the DoN must be more sensitive to the fact that older generations of Chamorros and Refaluwasch are not native English speakers (Perez & Kaipat, 2015).
capacity-as an institution with tremendous amounts of social, political and economic influence-to transform the very meaning of the environment throughout the Marianas archipelago. As Geographer Jeffrey Sasha Davis has pointed out, “…military activities do not just destroy nature, they also actively produce it” (Davis 2007, p.231). Given this reality, EIS’s have come to occupy an important role in the way that the DoD conceptualizes the environment, often as a bounded space that is constructed as vital to national defense even when such spaces are used for destructive purposes over Indigenous homelands.

**Contemporary Militarization in the Marianas**

In general, military planning in the Marianas has required that the DoD produce an extensive catalog of legal documentation in order to accommodate for an upsurge in planning and development. This increase came shortly after an announcement in 2005, which indicated the DoD’s plans to pursue a massive military marine relocation (otherwise known as the “Build-up”) in the Pacific region as part of a bi-lateral agreement with the Japanese government. This move is characterized by the DoD as an attempt to reduce the troop burden in Okinawa and restructure forces throughout the Pacific, but was also spurred by decades-long protests by Okinawan residents who had opposed military land use, pollution and the ensuing violence of military personnel in their local community, including hundreds of instances of violence against women (Aguon 2006, p.87). The original plan for this move would involve the relocation of 8,000 marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to the island of Guam (or Guåhan in Chamorro) by the year 2014 (Lapore, 2008). On Saipan, the *Marianas Variety* reported that this Build-up was estimated at $15 billion with Japan paying for more than $6 billion of that cost. The move encompassed not only the relocation of military personnel and their families, but also thousands of construction workers and other civilian Defense Department employees to aid in the process. Given the enormity of the move, talks about needing an additional 22,000 workers to support the infrastructural needs of the Build-up began to surface (Pincus, 2009).

The sheer magnitude of this project culminated in the release of a November 2009 Guam and CNMI Relocation Draft EIS which was met with major resistance (Natividad & Kirk, 2010) on Guåhan and produced a number of public protests that highlighted the centuries long social and political inequity that has characterized the relationship between Indigenous Chamorro peoples of the Marianas and the United States. The D-EIS also incited major community organizing on Guåhan as individuals throughout and community came together to comment on the document which spurred the formation of the community advocacy group We are Guåhan. In part through the group’s critical efforts and its creation of a “comment drive,” 10,000 comments were submitted to the D-EIS. We Are Guåhan remains “the most well known activist group on Guam in opposition to the proposed military buildup” (Mays and Camacho, 2019) and an integral part of the overall story of Indigenous engagement with EIS’s as a form of resistance (Bevacqua & Bowman, 2018). The militarization of Guåhan in particular was a direct affront to the ability for Chamorro peoples to exercise self-determination. When the Build-up was announced, Julian Aguon, a human rights lawyer and Chamorro native from Guåhan explained in an interview,...

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33 Guåhan is the Indigenous Chamorro place name that is used in place of the settler name “Guam.” I use both terms interchangeably throughout this article depending on its various usages in scholarship and documentation.

34 The difference in spelling between “Chamorro” and “Chamoru” reflects a sociocultural and historical difference in usage between the Northern Mariana Islands and Guåhan (Guam). On Guåhan, the *Kumision I Fino’ Chamorro*
... Guam remains one of only sixteen non-self-governing territories, i.e. UN-recognized colonies, of the world. We don’t even vote for the US president. We have no effective, meaningful representation in the US Congress. And the entire buildup was announced, and it was basically — any Chamoru consideration was really de facto. We’re never really at the table. We were just informed by the US that they were going to bring in outside population of these many tens of thousands of people (Democracynow.org, 2009).

These sociopolitical concerns were then merged with major environmental concerns, many of which were mirrored by the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) rejection of the Draft EIS for the Guam and CNMI Relocation when it was given a rating of EU or “environmentally unsatisfactory” (Lutz, 2019). In the CNMI, military forums regarding the relocation were initially met with little attendance, while most seemed to view military planning as a welcome relief to the economic depression facing the island. The business community was excited about the opportunity that it would pose despite the negative consequences associated with environmental degradation. In 2009, one popular Saipan blogger, Ruth Tighe, noted on her blog On My Mind:

Attendance was sparse at the hearing held earlier this week on U.S. Air Force plans to use either Saipan or Tinian airport as a "divert"/back-up destination should circumstances make it impossible to use any of Guam's airports, military or civilian. The Air Force brought in a dozen officials, more than a dozen posters, multiple copies of the executive summary, flyers, brochures and of the nearly inch-thick full text of the Environmental Impact Statement prepared in connection with the plan, as well as boxes of sandwiches, donuts, lumpia, fresh cut oranges and watermelon.

The event was given a fair amount of publicity— with announcements of the hearing appearing in the paper, the event featured as a story, and listed under community events. But still, few came to learn, listen, comment. It does seem a fairly benign project— extending either the Saipan or the Tinian runways and adding some support structures— without any significant impact on the environment or its inhabitants. With predicted use of the facilities only a few times a year once construction is completed, other than some temporary increase in noise level in the Kagman and Dandan areas, it would nevertheless appear to promise increased activity in the economic sector— most welcome to the islands’ floundering economy.

This blog piece was significant for both its description of the everyday nature of militarized environmental planning in the CNMI and as a rare form of public documentation regarding the

(Chamorro Language Commission) formally changed the spelling of ‘Chamorro’ to ‘Chamoru’ in 1994. For a historical account of the name change and the ensuing controversy that followed please see: https://www.guampedia.com/chamorro-vs-chamoru/. While I use both Chamorro and Chamoru interchangeably, my perspectives are rooted in experiences and research in the CNMI, where “Chamorro” remains the standard form of spelling.
military’s presence in the earlier days of Build-up planning where the DoD’s presence was viewed as rather uneventful in the CNMI. Tighe’s description regarding the amount of documentation that the U.S. Air Force personnel brought along with them (i.e. more than a dozen posters, multiple copies of the executive summary, flyers, brochures and of the nearly inch-thick full text of the Environmental Impact Statement…) underscores the magnitude of information outlining proposed military projects that had already been in the works prior to their arrival on island. Her statement also reveals a sense of the unknown regarding the island’s future involvement with military planning, whereby the infrequent and divert usage of the CNMI was perceived by the community as a “fairly benign” project increase in the overall military Build-up in the Pacific, where most people seemed to welcome the economic benefits of such projects with open arms.

Despite the optimism surrounding the economic prospects associated with the Build-up, much has changed since the release of the original plans in the CNMI, including the view that the Northern Mariana Islands play a relatively insignificant role in the overall relocation plans as contingent or “divert” locations and complications began to plague the move. For example, Pagan, an island north of Saipan that was evacuated in the early 1970’s due to a volcanic eruption in the Northern Marianas, was later described as the key “linchpin”35 for the Build-up by US lobbyist Juan Carlos Benitez in 2013 (Camacho, 2013). In the CNMI, protecting Pagan Island has become a critical part of the rallying cry to resist destructive military practices throughout the archipelago due in large part to the leadership of former CNMI Congresswoman and attorney Cinta Kaipat and her family on Saipan, who was born on Agrihan and raised on Pagan in her younger years. The desire to resettle Pagan and to increase interconnections between the other Northern Islands informs critical discussions surrounding Indigenous revitalization, resurgence and resistance amidst ongoing militarism. For example, in April 2019, House Bill 21-43 was introduced by Congressman Joel Camacho (R-Saipan) to remove eligibility restrictions on interested individuals wishing to avail of the Department of Public Land’s homestead applicants in the Northern Islands (De La Torre, 2020).

Today, current projections estimate that 5,000 Marines will relocate to Guåhan in waves beginning in 2024 with the full relocation complete by 2028 (South, 2019) while the Japanese government foots $3 billion worth of projects and the U.S. Government covers the remaining $5.7 billion of the costs (Robson, 2020). Further, many of the DoD’s plans have either been stalled or slowed for a variety of reasons including resistance movements by Indigenous residents throughout the Marianas, including a July 27, 2016 lawsuit filed by EarthJustice on behalf of advocacy groups in the CNMI, DoD budgetary constraints, lack of foreign visas for construction workers, and other considerations based on world events. For example, on September 29, 2019, the Air Force Times reported that United States President Donald Trump was reallocating funds for the military Build-up to aid in the construction of the southern United States border wall (McAvoy, 2019). This was a shift reflected in the Pentagon’s budget (Hartung, 2020) that highlights the interconnections between the militarized policing of the

35 Hawai’i has also been described by the U.S. Military as a “linchpin of U.S. military strategy…in the Asia-Pacific region” (Kajihiro, 2000), a similarity which echoes the deeply interwoven histories of colonialism and militarization throughout Oceania and highlights the militarized language employed to characterize Pacific Islands as “vital” (as the definition of the word “linchpin” suggests) to defense goals.
southern border within the continental United States and its intersections with militarized foreign policies abroad.

From Marianas Archipelago to Military “Study Area”

On March 18, 2019, the 1,452-page MITT Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (S-EIS) for the Mariana Islands Training and Testing (MITT) Study Area was released for public comment and public meetings were announced throughout the Mariana Islands. The public meetings and comment period were extended past the original February deadline due to typhoon Wutip. A S-EIS is required when “substantial changes to the proposed action are relevant to environmental concerns” or when “there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to the environmental effects that have bearing on the proposed action or its impacts” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). In regulatory terms, the MITT Draft S-EIS would support ongoing and future activities at sea and on Farallon de Mendinilla (No’os in Chamorro) within the MITT Study Area beyond 2020 such as sonar testing, as well as the issuance of federal regulatory permits and authorizations under the Marine Mammal Protection Act and Endangered Species Act. Having received a number of comments from attendees at the public comment meeting regarding the confusion over what the Draft S-EIS was addressing exactly, one of the military’s representatives described it as a simple “legal requirement” that was being updated because of permitting deadlines. In declaring that this Draft S-EIS was being completed for purposes of complying with environmental regulations, this statement foreclosed the possibility of meaningful community discussion regarding its connection to the broader military Build-up throughout the Marianas or the Pacific Pivot more broadly. In fact, military personnel at the Public Comment meeting made it a point to describe this particular Draft S-EIS as unconnected to the broader military Build-up, which created the appearance that such military plans were disconnected and isolated from one another.

Despite the fact that living within the confines of the MITT Study Area makes no discrimination between the implementation of EIS’s, the separation of the MITT S-EIS from the original MITT EIS through bureaucratic and legal instruments is critical to the construction of disconnectedness between various military projects and complicates what such plans mean in everyday life for the people of the Marianas. As a supplement—a term which implies an enhancement or “add on” to an original project—this EIS might appear to be a rather benign project in the overall picture of military planning throughout the archipelago since it addresses smaller portions of the MITT Study Area (what the DoN calls the “at-sea” and Farallon de Medinilla portions of the Study Area). Arguably, it can be viewed as quite the opposite given the legal stakes of its approval, which grants the Department of the Navy additional regulatory permits and authorizations under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). It comes at the heels of the DoD’s creation of the MITT Study Area in 2015, from which the Draft S-EIS informs one part. The creation of the MITT Study Area was noteworthy for effectively doubling the land and oceanic space that the U.S. military already uses for live-fire training and testing on and around the islands36, including the use of active sonar, live-fire training and explosives. Kanaka Maoli scholar Noela Goodyear-Kōpua has recently noted the significance of the

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36 The 2010 Mariana Islands Range Complex (MIRC) created a half-million sq. nautical mile training range around Guåhan, Rota, Tinian, Saipan and all but the furthest islands to the north in the Marianas archipelago. In 2015, this area was nearly doubled to just under one million sq. nautical miles and renamed the Marianas Islands Training and Testing (MITT) Study Area.
MITT in combination with the U.S. Military’s other training areas in Hawai’i and writes that, “Together with the existing Hawaiian Islands Range Complex and the transit corridor between them, the new MITT opens America’s largest training and weapons testing area in the world” (Goodyear-Kaʻōpua 2019, p. 92). By bringing the Marianas and Hawai’i together, Goodyear-Kaʻōpua highlights not only the vast expanse of territory occupied by the United States in Oceania, but the transoceanic militarized currents (Shigematsu and Camacho, 2010) that conjoin Indigenous territories through a common settler militarism (Nebolon, 2017).

**The Cultural Politics of Nature**

Scholars in Anthropology and Geography have long examined the production of terms such as “nature” and “the environment.” Geographer David Harvey’s research has been instructive of this critical move to unpack what he describes as foundational concepts such as space, time and nature—all of which are so expansive in their definitions that they have become nearly impossible to define. Harvey argues that, “We need critical ways to think about how differences in ecological, cultural, economic, political and social conditions get produced…and we need ways to evaluate the justice/injustice of the differences so produced” (Harvey 1996, p.7). Thus, by highlighting the cultural politics of nature, one is “…attending to cultural practices like making meaning of nature, classifying it, and representing it, while also tracing how these cultural practices distribute resources among human groups and individuals” (Cattelino 2008, p. 238). Anthropological investigations of the intersections between power and nature offer ways to illuminate how nature has been evoked as a “regime of truth” (Foucault, 1995) that seeks to normalize certain social relations. Nature and the environment can therefore be understood as complex socio-cultural productions (Braun, 2002; Cattelino, 2008; Greenough & Tsing, 2003; Haraway, 1991; Raffles, 2002; Tsing, 2005) that are deeply entangled with political economies and control over resources (Carroll, 2015; Cattelino, 2015; Paul Robbins, 2012; Peluso & Watts, 2001). In the context of Indigenous communities who continue to struggle over the control of their lands, Cherokee scholar Clint Carroll argues that it is more apt to describe the environment not so much through the use of the phrase “The environment is inherently political,” but rather through the phrase, “The political is inherently environmental” (Carroll 2015, p.12). The DoD’s cooptation of environmental ideas (Marzec, 2016) to promote militarism is thus deeply implicated in this process of politicization. These perspectives are key to unsettling the way in which seemingly innocuous environmental processes that aim to protect one’s surroundings, can actually re-produce colonial logics of dispossession by erasing and reframing Indigenous connections to land as secondary to militarized policies(Bevacqua & Bowman, 2018; Lutz, 2019; Na’puti, 2019; Powell, 2018; Voyles, 2015; West, 2016; Wolfe, 2006). Chamorro scholar Tiara R. Na’puti has described an Indigenous “archipelago rhetoric” (2019, p.5) that invokes a Chamorro sense of place to resist these militarized renderings of the environment.

A number of important scholarly interventions have worked to unpack the complexity of the military’s engagement with the environment and the various ways in which militarized environmental discourses work to obscure colonial policies and political inequity (Davis, 2007; Coates et al., 2011; Dongoske et al., 2015; Frain, 2018; Harris, 2015; Marzen, 2015; Na’puti, 2019; Woodward, 2001). In her book, *Wastelanding*, Traci Brynne Voyles examines “wasteland discourse” on Diné (Navajo) land whereby uranium mining renders certain spaces, particularly desert space, as “valueless” and thus destroyable for settler purposes. Voyles analysis of wastelanding is valuable for understanding how the discourses employed by the DoD to describe
the islands as trainable and testable spaces, enact material consequences over the environments in ways that encourage further militarization. In places where militarism has slowly transformed landscapes into places of violent training and testing, the land is positioned as a major site of contestation for the survival of Indigenous livelihoods. This is because, as Patrick Wolfe describes it, “Land is life—or, at least, land is necessary for life. Thus, contests for land can be—indeed, often are— contests for life” (Wolfe 2006, p. 387).

**Stewardship and Care for the Environment**

Given the irreparable damage to the environment that so much military planning has on the land, it might be tempting to ask if the DoD cares about the environment at all? As one of the largest managers of federal lands throughout the United States and its territories totaling 26.9 million acres leased or otherwise possessed worldwide (Congressional Research Service, 2020), it is also one of the biggest polluters on planet earth. The complex web of U.S. military bases throughout the globe and their ensuing environmental footprints have been detailed at length (Colgan, 2018; Davis, 2011; Lutz, 2009; Martini, 2015; Marzec, 2016). According to a Brown University study conducted by the *Costs of War* project, the DoD is “the world’s largest institutional user of petroleum and correspondingly, the single largest producer of greenhouse gases in the world” (Crawford, 2019). Thus, while the DoD is responsible for the management and preservation of large swaths of the planet, it must also contend with its legacy of environmental disturbance by finding ways to remain “environmentally compatible” (Woodward 2001, p. 202). To do this, the DoD draws largely on ecosystems management data and environmental discourses to support decisions related to national defense, which has resulted in the hiring of a large body of professional resource managers who are tasked with “harmonizing environmental protection duties with military missions” (Coates et al. 2011, p. 467). The process of “greening of the military” (Marzec, 2016) has been examined as a form of “greenwashing,” in which the DoD has been critiqued for “…adopt[ing] the language and imagery of environmentalism to improve their public relations and gain acceptance of practices that otherwise might struggle for support and legitimacy” (Harris 2015, p. 21). More importantly for this analysis, is the fact that the DoD’s principal purpose is to assure that these lands, water, airspace, and coastal resources provide the necessary space and conditions to support mission-related activities (Department of Defense Instruction, 2011).

As with other Indigenous communities who must contend with processes of militarization on their homelands, Chamorro and Refaluwasch people in the Northern Mariana Islands also remain committed to the preservation of environment and stewardship over the land, but for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of a homeland, sustenance, and a way of life for future generations. In this light, the question is less about *if* the DoD cares for the environment, and more about *why* it cares so much. The stakes of this research lie in unsettling how this concern is naturalized by the military in the form of environmental discourses regarding stewardship and preservation for future training and testing even as it continues to buttress against forms of Indigenous place-making and dispossession.

**Environmental Impact Statement as Ethnographic Object**

One of the primary vehicles by which information regarding military planning is made available within the CNMI is during the U.S. Military’s many environmental planning processes, including the creation of Environmental Impact Statements (EIS). Generally, these processes aim
to follow regulatory guidelines set out under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970 and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966. While NHPA comprises a critical component of the U.S. Military’s environmental planning processes throughout the islands, this article takes the production of Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) and a subsequent public meeting regarding the Draft S-EIS for the MITT Study Area as its primary focus. Although NEPA’s extraterritorial application has been debated throughout the years, its legal application has been applied broadly to “the nation” which has been “interpreted to include the trust territories” (Fogleman 1990, p.13). Thus, as a U.S. Commonwealth, NEPA’s application extends to the Northern Mariana Islands.

As per NEPA regulations, an EIS is a document that is prepared to describe the specific effects that the proposed activities will have on the environment and the types of mitigation that would lessen or remove negative impacts. The creation of an EIS is an important part of taking precautionary measures to lessen the impact of any projected plans and is designed, in practice, to be a participatory process (Palerm 2000, p.581). Before it can be finalized, the EIS goes through a number of steps, including: a published notice in the Federal Register, a Draft EIS (D-EIS) which includes a 45-day public review and commenting period, a Final EIS, and lastly, a Record of Decision (ROD) which describes the agency’s final decision, alternatives considered and plans for mitigation and monitoring. In theory, the commenting period and NEPA more broadly, was created to democratic participation on behalf of an American public. This was a point that DoN officials stressed on their visits to the CNMI during the public commenting period for the MITT Draft S-EIS. For example, the DoN’s MITT EIS website notes that, “Submitting substantive and concise public comments on the Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS is one of the most important aspects of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.” In practice, learning about military planning through EIS’s place a great deal of the liability to participate in the NEPA process on the general public and as Lutz (2019:121) argues, “…is a process by which the burden of ignorance and the identity of the ignorant party shifts from the colonized to the colonizer.”

To Comment, Not to Participate

What participation actually meant to people living in the community during this process is something that was frequently remarked upon throughout Saipan. Aside from the fact that many community members were simply uninformed about the NEPA process and how to get involved in the public commenting periods, it was common for community members to make comments like: “who cares if I make comments, the military is going to do what they want anyway” or “even if I say no, what is that going to do?” One Refaluwasch woman questioned in frustration, “what good are my comments when the military owns half the islands anyway?” In an area as highly militarized as the Marianas, these comments reveal the unique challenges that Indigenous communities who refute or question military planning are facing, since they often feel powerless to make any changes over decisions being made on the lands that are already leased by the DoD from the CNMI Government. Rather than dismissing these experiences as cynicism towards the military, they instead highlight the futility of “participation” in this context.

37 During a broadcasted hearing via YouTube on September 7, 2017, convened by Senator Therese Terlaje in the 34th Liheslaturan Guåhan (Guam Legislature), Sen. Terlaje noted that in regard to environmental impact statements, “our entire role was to comment…that was it…not to participate.”
For those in the community that actively protested military planning, there were even less opportunities for such opinions to be expressed during the NEPA process. As a federally mandated document, EIS’s inform the public of the military’s impacts on the environment, which includes project alternatives, but does not seek consent or permission. As Candace later remarked during a personal conversation, “Remember…It’s not like the military is asking if their plans can happen when they write an EIS…they’re saying that it’s going to happen and we have to deal with the impacts.”\footnote{Personal communication, 2018.} For this reason, the DoN actively discouraged comments that were read as a yes or no answers regarding military decisions. On the back of one blank public meeting comment form, The DoN (See Figure 4) wrote,

> Comments on the Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS are not counted as votes or as part of a referendum on Navy decisions. They are used to improve the document and analyses, and to ensure impacts are adequately determined before the Navy makes a final decision on the proposed project. Therefore, avoid comments that state “I am in favor of this project,” or “I am opposed to this project.” Remember that the more clear, concise, and relevant to the Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS your comments are, the more effective they will be and more likely they will be used to improve the final documents and affect the agency decisions.

This statement highlights the way that public participation is viewed by the DoN, as a process which does not necessarily change the trajectory of the plans outlined in an EIS even if portion’s of a project are eventually altered. It also serves as a stark reminder of the political limitations that residents living in a U.S. commonwealth face, where federally mandated regulations can take precedence over local decision-making to further defense goals with little to no consequence. Importantly, community members throughout the Marianas have continued to use the commenting period as platform for expressing their concerns, including both support and dissent, creating an important public record of community opinions.

While the participatory nature of NEPA may not be flawed per se, the cursory nature of public participation in the context of environmental planning points to the fact that these environmental documents do precisely what they are supposed to do for the DoD in the context of militarization under U.S. hegemony. That is, they delimit and guide the conversations about the environment in ways that primarily support defense goals and they set the parameters for how Indigenous involvement in the NEPA process can occur but only during specific timeframes (i.e. public comment periods) and in ways that are recognizable to the environmental planning process (i.e. substantive comments that reflect in-depth knowledge about military planning and EIS’s). In her examination of the environmental politics of coal power plants within the Diné (Najavo) Nation in New Mexico, anthropologist Dana Powell’s research reveals similar discrepancies regarding the limits of environmental planning over Indigenous territory. She argues that these participatory moments are less about “the failure of democracy” and more about “an exposure of democracy’s limits in practice” (Powell 2018, p.150). In a settler context, militarized environmental planning can obscure Indigenous rights by justifying control over the land as critical to military “readiness” without having to engage with the outcome of this control over Indigenous land and livelihoods. This is particularly consequential in places portrayed as remote and insular such as in U.S. territories and commonwealths where Indigenous communities lack
adequate political bargaining power to engage in meaningful dialogue with the United States regarding military planning.

**The Paradox of Environmental Regulations in a U.S. Commonwealth**

In the context of U.S. federal legislation as it is applied to U.S. territories and commonwealths, there exists a paradox of environmental regulations. Whereas Indigenous people can be both constrained by federal environmental regulations, they can also benefit from their application to protect the environment at the same time. In other words, while federal environmental regulations can be wielded as knowledge systems that deny Indigenous participation, they can also be used as a form of protection against the encroachment of further militarization on Indigenous territories. Indigenous peoples must therefore continually negotiate the constraints and opportunities provided by EIS’s in ways that complement their values and visions for the future. This is exemplified in the Marianas as Indigenous activists have increased their opposition to military planning by employing NEPA as a guiding framework for environmental protection, holding the DoD accountable to the regulations required under the law. As Chamorro scholars Na’puti and Bevacqua point out, “Even as the territorial designation for Guåhan establishes a precarious relation to the United States, by engaging in the environmental discourse of the nation-state, the efforts to preserve and protect Pågat proved to be an effective strategy for the movement” (Na’puti and Bevacqua 2015, p. 850). Here the authors are referring to the mobilization of activists protesting the creation of a live-fire training range over Chamorro ancestral lands on Guåhan on the grounds that the U.S. Military did not satisfactorily meet environmental standards under NEPA.

The mobilization of environmental laws to protect the CNMI against further militarization has also been employed by activists and environmentalists in the current legislation discussed below, as well as in 2002 when the Center for Biological Diversity, represented by Earth Justice, sued the DoN for violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) on the island of Farallon de Medinilla where military training and testing is conducted. Throughout the MITT Study Area, approximately one hundred and fifteen species of seabirds and shorebirds protected under the MBTA occupy the area. These protections ensure that any taking, killing or possessing of migratory birds is illegal unless permitted by regulation (Department of the Navy, 2019). On March 13, 2002, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan issued an injunction that put a stop to all military activity on Farallon de Medinilla for violating the MBTA. While Judge Sullivan’s ruling sent a strong message to the DoN that its plans were in direct violation of the law, the DoD was able to skirt this ruling by submitting legislation to Congress that would exempt its projects from the MBTA (Earth Justice, 2002). Under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2003, the President agreed to “exempt the Armed Forces from the incidental taking of migratory birds during military readiness activities” (MIRC Draft EIS, 3.10-1). Such a move not only highlighted the power behind invoking environmental law to slow or deter military planning as a way to safeguard environments and people, but simultaneously...

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39 According to the DoN’s Marianas Islands Range Complex (MIRC) Draft EIS (pg. 3.10-1), Congress defines “readiness activities” as “all training and operations of the Armed Forces that relate to combat and the adequate and realistic testing of military equipment, vehicles, weapons, and sensors for the proper operation and suitability for combat use.”
displayed the DoD’s power to skirt these same regulations by defining their plans as necessary for military “readiness.”

Despite the history of litigation against the DoN in the Marianas, the military frequently employs the language of environmental stewardship to temper the consequences of its impacts on land and sea and downplay its toxic legacy throughout the Pacific. For example, the DoN cites its environmental stewardship programs such as its marine species research, sea turtle monitoring and its coral reef surveys as indicators of their commitment to both their mission as well as the environmental health of the Marianas and its people. At the time of the MITT Draft S-EIS meeting, I was handed a glossy 15-page booklet prepared by the DoN that was filled with colorful photographs of marine and terrestrial animals, maps and graphs regarding the MITT Study Area. While the booklet highlighted the technical aspects of the Draft S-EIS, it also served as a way to showcase the DoN’s commitment to marine resource protection, alongside its concern with protecting public access and safety out at sea. For example, under the heading of Environmental Stewardship read a blurb, “The military’s environmental stewardship programs contribute to both the success of the military mission and the preservation of the natural and cultural heritage of the Mariana Islands.” On the next page it continued, “The military shares these areas with the community and recognizes the importance of public access to ocean and coastal areas.” By couching destructive military practices within the context of a “shared” space in which the DoN also engages in environmental stewardship, both destruction and stewardship are framed as processes that co-exist alongside one another without contestation rather than completely incongruous practices. This move characterizes “military training and environmental protection as conceptually equal…” and “implies that weighing up military activity and conservation is possible on the same set of scales, that the two originate from a unified set of objectives” (Woodward 2001, p.209).

While environmental stewardship programs aim to encourage a sense of care over nature, they do little to highlight the reason why care is so fundamental to military planning and how these militarized discourses obscure the overall trajectory of military planning in the region. While the DoN refers to the importance of its long-standing relationship with the sea and environmental stewardship programs as necessary components of their commitment to sustainability, these plans are noticeable for what they leave out of the discussion, such as the DoD’s historical legacy of contamination and destruction. In the Marianas, this legacy continues to present itself in material ways such as in the presence of Agent Orange contamination and Superfund sites on Guåhan, the DoD’s use and abandonment of polychlorinated biphenyl’s (PCB’s) in Tanapag Village on Saipan and the hundreds of pounds of ordnance and wartime waste left behind during the WWII era (Denton et al., 2016).

The promise of “mitigating” these toxic sites has remained a long-standing issue throughout the Marianas. Under NEPA, to mitigate is to lessen or remove the negative impacts associated with a proposed project. For example, while the Draft S-EIS for the MITT noted the damaging effects of sonar and other explosives on marine populations, the DoN has explained that, “Minimizing impacts on the marine environment is imperative to the Navy” and that their findings “indicate[d] that the majority of predicted effects on marine species would be behavioral responses.” Thus, “The Navy will continue to implement mitigation and monitoring measures to minimize effects on marine species.” By this logic, any negative effects on the environment,
cultural properties or marine species that were a result of military training were viewed as rectified through the lens of mitigation. However, the power to define when and how mitigation will occur rests solely on the DoN which leaves little room for community input regarding the long-term effects of military planning on human and non-human environments.

In this case, mitigation can be similarly compared to what Tanya Murray Li (2009) describes as, “…presenting failure as the outcome of rectifiable deficiencies; smoothing out contradictions so that they seem superficial rather than fundamental; devising compromises.” This process has the potential to absolve the DoD of any responsibility to the local community outside of making their plans known. Further, it depoliticizes the military’s plans by merely noting the existence of mitigation efforts without ever having to acknowledge the long-term disruptions that such changes incur on the environment. In the context of the Marianas, mitigation can be further understood as a “mechanism of denial” (Kuletz 2001, p. 242) similarly used by those in the nuclear industry in which the environmental consequences of militarism are downplayed, ignored or denied in ways the obscure Indigenous connections to land particularly in places where people lack political power to enforce any meaningful change.

Segmenting the Land
Compounding the relative inaccessibility of EIS’s is the fact that military plans are often conveyed as seemingly unrelated projects. Indeed, one of the most consequential outcomes of the military’s EIS process is the appearance of this segmentation among military projects, into smaller more manageable training and testing areas. Local activists continue to voice their concern over this segmentation, which they view as an intentional breaking up of military planning in direct violation of NEPA regulations which has misled the public into thinking that the U.S. Military’s environmental impacts are less than described. The resultant outcome has been the release of multiple EIS’s that fail to address the connectedness of all military activities, and thus, military plans slated for various islands were often understood by community members as unrelated.

This outcome has been so powerfully articulated by various branches of the U.S. Military that its opposition comprises the bulk of a lawsuit filed on behalf of Indigenous activists in the CNMI as part of the Alternative Zero Coalition (AZC) on Saipan. AZC is an umbrella coalition that includes: Tinian Women Association, Guardians of Gåni’, and PåganWatch. AZC has been instrumental in the resistance movement against militarization in the Northern Mariana Islands. The coalition’s name itself signals a desire to promote a “zero alternative” option, in which increased military planning would not occur.40 Alongside the Center for Biological Diversity,

40 The meaning of the name “Alternative Zero Coalition” was shared in a personal conversation with AZC co-founder Peter Perez in 2017. According to the Executive Summary of the Supplemental MITT EIS, a “no action alternative” would mean that the DoN would not be able to train or test in the MITT Study Area and therefore “…Cessation of proposed Navy at-sea training and testing activities would mean that the Navy would not meet its statutory requirements and would be unable to properly defend itself and the United States from enemy forces, unable to successfully detect enemy submarines, and unable to safely and effectively use its weapons systems or defensive countermeasures due to a lack of training of forces and testing of systems that replicate the conditions to which Naval forces must operate while executing the range of military operations required to further national security objectives.” (Supplemental MITT EIS 2020,ES-3).
Tinian Women Association filed a lawsuit against the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, Navy Secretary Richard V. Spencer and Defense Secretary James Mattis for allegedly violating NEPA regulations. The advocacy group’s lawsuit argued that the Department of the Navy failed to consider all the impacts associated with the Marines Relocation from Okinawa to Guåhan and its connection to the military’s plans to conduct live-fire training and testing on the islands of Tinian and Pågan, within the CNMI.

In one informal interview with the co-founder of AZC, Peter Perez, he explained in frustration, “The military likes to break their projects up into smaller projects, so that nobody knows the whole picture. They become so broken up that nobody seems to know what they are even doing anymore.” Two years earlier in 2015, Perez had similarly echoed this concern in an op-ed published in the *Saipan Tribune* alongside fellow AZC co-founder Ms. Cinta Kaipat when they wrote,

The U.S. military has intentionally broken its large-scale development of the Mariana Islands and surrounding waters into the world’s largest live-fire training range into multiple proposals with the resulting effect of misleading the public and minimizing apparent impacts (Perez & Kaipat, 2015)

On August 9, 2018, I attended the latest hearing for AZC’s lawsuit at the Horiguichi Building on Saipan. There were about twenty-one people in attendance, including the plaintiffs represented by Kimberly King-Hinds, a Tinian native, and attorney David Henkin from Earth Justice along with other Saipan community members and Indigenous activists in the Alternative Zero Coalition. Inside the courthouse, I took a seat next to a woman named Candace who I had met for the first time. As it turns out, she was tasked by the CNMI government to comment on the MITT Draft S-EIS as a government agency employee. I reached out to her a few weeks later to meet for an informal interview to discuss her perspectives on the U.S. Military’s process of drafting EIS’s in the CNMI. Given the confusion that individuals had expressed regarding their creation, I wanted to get a sense of how government agencies were being tasked to respond to these documents and how these experiences might differ from the perspective of an everyday citizen in the CNMI.

I: What were some of your concerns regarding the comments that you submitted for the Draft Supplemental MITT EIS?

C: There are both procedural and substantive issues here. Personally, I am concerned about the apparent segmentation of apparently interrelated actions but this is a matter that is currently before the courts. Substantively, there appears to be a lack of sufficiently clear information to make reasonable assessment of potential impacts of the proposed activities.

I: Which concerns were the *most* pressing for you?

41 Pseudonym
C: On a personal level, as a community member and someone who sails, I am concerned about the socio-economic impacts of a 10 nautical mile danger zone around Farallon de Medinilla as well as the ecological impacts of continued live fire bombing of that island and other testing activities.

I: What has been your overall experience writing these comments in the CNMI?

C: I have reviewed numerous EIS/EIAs, and find the DoD’s publications for this region to be very complex, somewhat nebulous, and generally challenging to respond to.

Similar concerns regarding the MITT Study Area were later picked up by Guåhan Senator Kelly Marsh Taitano in May 2019 who expressed concerns over the fact that the Department of Defense was proposing a bifurcation of the Programmatic Agreement for the MITT, which she viewed as an “inappropriate and fractured view” (Atalig, 2019) of the impacts that military training and testing would have on the islands’ combined cultural, historical and environmental resources. The contemporary concerns regarding the segmentation of military planning mirror longstanding anxieties regarding the sociopolitical and economic separation of the Marianas archipelago’s people perpetuated by U.S. governmental and military policies. Historically, as Smith (1991, p.34) points out, “…it is often argued that the United States was pursuing a deliberate (and successful) strategy of ‘divide and rule’ in Micronesia” in the early days of the political status negotiations.” Thus, while the CNMI Government has argued to retain separate agreements to maintain the integrity of inter-island government decision-making, Senator Marsh Taitano’s comments echo the tenuous history of division and attempts at reunification between the CNMI and Guåhan and speak to the need for increased unity when negotiating the outcomes of military planning throughout the Marianas as the DoD continues to separate and disperse its plans.

In May 2019, the CNMI Government officially signed a $21.9 million 40-year deal with the DoD for the construction of a “divert” airfield on Tinian (Erediano, 2019) that promises economic and infrastructural developments for the island’s depressed economy. The signing was viewed as a momentous occasion that was expected to benefit the economy of Tinian and the CNMI more broadly, but also highlighted the segmentation of military planning in the region. Days after the deal had been signed, the Secretary of the Navy, Richard V. Spencer, requested an airspace exemption directly from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) without consulting with the CNMI government, requesting that they would “lift airspace limitations to allow live-fire training” on the island. This letter prompted backlash from local legislators and Tinian residents, who viewed Spencer’s letter as an affront to local leadership. In response to Spencer, Commonwealth Ports Authority (CPA) Chairwoman Kimberly King Hinds, explained that she was “surprised and beyond disturbed” by this action and noted that “In effect you are asking the FAA to remove airspace protections over one of our airports, effectively turning over control of this airspace to the Navy.” This move, she continued, “reflects the historic callous policy of United States' westward expansion, seizing property as it justified for security or any other reason and in complete disregard of the interests of those already there” (Commonwealth Ports Authority, 2019). CPA’s disagreement with the DoD continues to reflect the way in which local
decision-making has taken a back seat to military planning where defense goals remain the top priority, despite local opposition to aspects of military planning that may harm the local community. The DoD’s ensuing plans to use airspace surrounding Tinian without consulting CPA further reflects the process by which the encroachment of militarization occurs—project by project—often in continuous waves, without a clear understanding of these plans are intimately connected to one another from both a legal and community perspective.

Despite the Tinian community’s general support for military projects related to the Divert Airfield, this latest spat highlights two common objections that residents have raised about military planning in the islands, both of which are connected to the historical legacy of U.S. policies that have sought to divide Indigenous communities throughout the Marianas. The first relates to the military’s record of skirting Indigenous decision-making in favor of completing urgent military planning needs. Secondly, it highlights the confusion over the military’s overlapping projects that make simultaneous use of land, sea and airspace, all of which are commonly presented as separate projects, but are in fact, integrally connected to the overall picture of militarization throughout the Marianas and the broader Pacific. As Indigenous activists on Saipan commonly remarked, “Give them an inch, and they will take a mile.” This phrase was used to refer to the practice of the military making decisions regarding one project, with other projects overlapping or following shortly after, without having received the same amount of consultation or analysis by the local community.

**Conclusion**

One night over dinner, I struck up a conversation with an individual employed by the DoN whose work had brought him to the Mariana Islands on a number of occasions for training purposes. Halfway through our conversation his wife, who had been listening intently to the conversation innocently inquired, “But why would you use the Marianas for testing of all places?” He turned to look at her, chuckling, and replied, “…well, I mean, we couldn’t do it in the middle of Los Angeles!” These everyday moments reveal the limits of our political power in the Marianas, where our political status and “strategic” location define our use-value in the broader Military Industrial Complex (MIC), in ways that are deeply personal and discomforting to confront and accept. The production of the Marianas archipelago as a security necessity is only possible through its simultaneous production as dispensable, largely through the framing of our environments as irreplaceable for conducting military missions. The environmental planning process is one of many sites where the impingement of imperial structures on Indigenous worldviews are crystallized, in the everyday and often mundane way that such processes are implemented in the Marianas, and in the types of knowledge that are omitted during the process. This has contributed to what anthropologist Catherine Lutz has termed the “weaponization of bureaucracy” and the “production of ignorance” whereby the seemingly benign and less spectacular events surrounding militarism go unnoticed as the military draws on performances of expertise while leaving the public ignorant of its broader plans (Lutz 2019, p.108).

While conducting fieldwork on Saipan, there was a real sense of frustration building among community members regarding environmental planning process by the DoD. Individuals often expressed that their opinions were not being adequately incorporated into what was supposed to be a participatory process. These feelings were often complicated by the fact that many possessed a strong sense of loyalty towards America and its military so that even questioning the
military’s plans were often viewed as suspect. While many environmental planning documents aim to protect or preserve the environment, these processes take on entirely different meanings in the context of contemporary imperialism—such as in U.S. territories and commonwealths where local laws continue to be superseded by federal legislation and where military renderings overlay Indigenous connections to place.

The types of knowledge production that render the environment visible for violent practices are rooted in a much longer history of United States imperial policies abroad and in the blanket extension of U.S. domestic environmental policies within the territories. The militarization of the environment thrives on the recycling of imperial tropes that naturalize outcomes of war preparation. The process by which EIS’s are created speak to the way in which, “…settler perspectives and worldviews get to count as knowledge and research and how these perspectives-repackaged as data and findings-are activated in order to rationalize and maintain unfair social structures” (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 2). How Indigenous epistemologies will shape the production of environmental knowledge through the currents of imperialism is yet to be fully realized. What this research has revealed, however, is how our Indigenous worldviews continue to shape our political futures, not simply through resistance to nation-state narratives about the environment, but in ways that exceed the militarized renderings of the environments that surround us and inform who we are as a people. In the context of settler colonialism among the territories and commonwealths, federally mandated environmental protections can sometimes do something contradictory—they can preserve dispossession through environmental protection. I am not suggesting that environmental protections are not useful, but instead advocating for a deeper interrogation of how these regulations are applied in various militarized and settler colonial contexts, especially when presented as inherently good for everyone involved by way of their association with environmental stewardship.

These findings are a testament to the multiplicity of “imperial formations” (Stoler et al., 2007) that continue to manifest in unexpected places in our contemporary world, such as in the context of militarized environmental planning. In order to unpack how the militarism of the environment is naturalized through environmental policies, we must remain vigilant about how such processes are enacted over time and space. Drawing on the conceptualization of “slow violence,” (Nixon, 2013), this is what postcolonial scholar Elizabeth DeLoughrey argues is the longue duree (DeLoughrey 2015, p. 353) on which militarism flourishes. On the other hand, this research has found that Chamorros and Refaluwasch also employ forms of slow resistance to complex environmental processes that have forced the DoD to delay, re-work and shift their projects over the land. Despite the DoD’s issuance of its “final” decisions regarding its many plans, Indigenous peoples throughout the Marianas and abroad continue to defy the finality of these decisions through their continued negotiation, dialogue and resistance to environmental planning processes.
Figure 1
A tablet featuring videos about the Department of the Navy’s interactions with the environment during the MITT Draft Supplemental EIS at Kanoa Resort on March 18, 2019. Saipan, CNMI. Photo courtesy of author.
Figure 2
An informational poster set up by Department of the Navy personnel describing the NEPA process timeline regarding the MITT Draft Supplemental EIS on March 18, 2019. Saipan, CNMI. The orange arrow reads “We Are Here” to indicate that the project is on Step 4 “Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS Public Review and Comment Period.” Photo courtesy of author.
Figure 3

A page from inside an informational booklet handed out during the March 18, 2019 public meeting on Saipan, CNMI. The bubbles indicate a physical mapping of the room set up by the Department of the Navy during the MITT Draft Supplemental EIS public meeting, ending with the collection of public input via a comment table. Source: www.mitt-eis.com.
Tips for Providing Substantive Comments on the MITT Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS

Submitting substantive and concise public comments on the Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS is one of the most important aspects of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.

The most effective comments are those that provide useful information to the Navy. For instance, submit comments if you find:

- An error in analysis that may affect the outcome
- New information that would change the analysis and conclusions
- Any peer-reviewed scientific literature that should be considered in the analysis
- Something that should be clarified
- A substantially different alternative that meets the purpose and need statement and has not been considered

General recommendations to keep in mind when making comments on any NEPA document:

- Support statements with details. If, for example, you are concerned about biological resources, it is helpful to focus on a particular problem or issue, such as a species that you feel was not sufficiently analyzed, instead of making a broad statement such as “the Navy did not adequately analyze the impacts on biological resources.”
- Back up your statements with explanations, facts, and references, as appropriate.
- Be as specific as possible with your comments and refer to page numbers and paragraphs in the Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS.
- Focus comments on the specifics of the proposed project under consideration.
- Submit your comments within the timeframes announced to ensure that your concerns are considered and addressed in the Final Supplemental EIS/OEIS.
- Request to be included on the EIS/OEIS mailing list to receive notification of public meetings and project updates.
- Recognize that the potential impacts on resources are likely to be described in more than one section because there are interrelationships between the resources and programs.
- Become familiar with the contents of the Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS, including the purpose and need statement and the responsibilities of the lead agency (Navy).
- Review the project website to become familiar with the proposal, learn about the NEPA process, understand the responsibilities and authorities of the federal agency, keep up to date on public meetings and comment periods, get answers to frequently asked questions, and view agency notifications. The website for the MITT Supplemental EIS/OEIS is www.MITT-EIS.com.
- Comments on the Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS are not counted as votes or as part of a referendum on Navy decisions. They are used to improve the document and analyses, and to ensure impacts are adequately determined before the Navy makes a final decision on the proposed project. Therefore, avoid comments that state “I am in favor of this project,” or “I am opposed to this project.” Remember that the more clear, concise, and relevant to the Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS your comments are, the more effective they will be and more likely they will be used to improve the final documents and affect the agency decisions.

Visit www.MITT-EIS.com for project information.

Figure 4

The back page of a public meeting comment form handed out by DoN personnel on March 18, 2019 during the MITT Draft Supplemental EIS public meeting at Kanoa Resort on Saipan, CNMI. The front page provides space for individuals to submit public comments while the back of the form includes “Tips for Providing Substantive Comments on the MITT Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS.”
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Conducting Women-Centered (Re)search as Resistance in the Marianas Archipelago

Sylvia C. Frain, Cofounder, The Everyday Peace Initiative, Aotearoa New Zealand

This paper provides an overview of my women-centered doctoral thesis carried out through a “settler responsibility” (Garrison, 2019) framework as an non-Indigenous scholar. This project explores how women nonviolently resist the invisible and visible sexist and environmental politics of everyday and expanding militarization by the United States in the Marianas Archipelago. Through an emancipatory research design, three analytical structures are highlighted; 1) conducting (re)search as resistance; 2) utilizing digital and new media to disseminate open and public scholarship; and 3) the importance of referring to previous women-centered and created research. The aim of this summary is to inspire educators, activists, and (re)searchers by providing an example of academic activism based on critical theoretical and practical conceptual frameworks. My doctoral thesis was created in solidarity with others writing and working for decolonization and demilitarization and is designed as politically engaged qualitative resistance (re)search.

Keywords: Marianas Archipelago, Pacific Feminism, Settler Responsibility, Women-Centered Research, Digital Platforms

Introduction

This paper explicates the concept of (re)search as resistance designed for other academic-activists working in scholarly solidarity to educate their communities about the impact of everyday and expanding militarization. Based on a “settler’s responsibility” (Garrison, 2019), this summary is of my doctoral thesis, carried out in the Marianas Archipelago from 2013 – 2017. An overview of the emancipatory research design for gendered (re)search in the Marianas Archipelago and the methodologies to enquire about Indigenous women’s legal, political, spiritual, and digital resistance are outlined. To decolonize (re)search as resistance amongst the sexist and environmental politics of everyday and expanding militarization, an understanding of Oceanic culture and respect for Indigenous approaches to (re)search, resilience, and resistance and are essential.

(Re)search as Resistance

As part of a larger project working to decolonize resistance studies, the intent of my doctoral thesis was to engage with (re)search as resistance (Brown & Strega, 2005). Through (re)searching resistance in the Marianas Archipelago, I strive to illustrate the role scholar-activists can potentially play in fostering solidarity with others working to “decolonize America’s militarized empire in the Pacific… [through] genealogies of resistance” (Camacho, 2011, p. xiv).

As a non-Indigenous, privileged pāhekā (of European decedent) researcher, I am aware of the potentialities of (re)colonization if I carry out research on subjects as others who are “worthy” of academic investigation (Wheatly & Hartmann, 2013, p. 147). I choose to use the term “(re)search” as a form of resistance to challenge imperial and Western-dominated forms of inquiry (Smith, 2012). “(Re)search” marks a decolonized conceptualization to critically analyze history, as well as academia. The “(re)” signifies a (re)examination of previous research, founded
on imperial ideologies and from mostly male perspectives. To “(re)search” is to re-learn, re-examine, and re-comprehend legal, political, and social systems of the West. In addition, the term “Indigenous knowledge(s)” is employed to provide a broader perspective to recognize diverse and varying approaches to (re)search findings, information, and understanding(s) gained. This project is aligned with Clare Land’s (2015) approach for non-Indigenous scholars and Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s (2012) direct for supporters of Indigenous struggles who believe that both scholarly and solidarity work must be decolonized and (self)reflective. I am aware that I “occupy both marginal and privileged spaces,” and intentionally “engage in research practices from a position of solidarity with the marginalized” (Brown & Strega, 2005, p. 11). Understanding the sexist and environmental politics of everyday and expanding militarization in the Marianas Archipelago is accomplished through reflective and decolonized (re)search approaches. In continued collaboration with the Indigenous CHamoru and Refalawasch communities in the Marianas Archipelago, this (re)search as resistance has not been done on them but rather for their cause and with their participation (Hokowhitu et al., 2010, p. 18).

This paper honors and contributes to decolonization and demilitarization academic activism and scholarly solidarity efforts taking place throughout the Marianas Archipelago, across Oceania, and within the continental United States (US) (Bloom & Carnine, 2016). My politically engaged qualitative doctoral study addresses the (de)colonial politics of resistance and sexist and environmental politics of militarization in the Marianas Archipelago. It is through (re)search as resistance, based on critical theoretical and emancipatory conceptual frameworks, that digital, legal, political, and spiritual dimensions of Indigenous women-led resistance against everyday and expanding US militarization were analyzed and e-published (F rain, 2018).

Margaret Kovach outlines an Indigenous (re)search framework guide for researchers working with Indigenous communities (2009). Firstly, the researcher must honor the relational connections within the collective community and the natural environment while assuming responsibility and accountability to the participants. Specific elements that informed my reflective autoethnographical fieldwork include “experience as a legitimate way of knowing, storytelling (talk-story) as an appropriate way of sharing knowledge” (Kovach, 2005, p. 28). Secondly, it is the researcher’s obligation to share the research collected and gathered with the community and participants. I have selected to do so through digital, new media platforms.

Alice Te Punga Somerville (Vakarua) Associate Professor at the University of Waikato in Aotearoa New Zealand, has worked at the University of Hawai‘i Mānoa and Victoria University of Wellington, Aotearoa New Zealand. She is the author of Once were Pacific: Māori Connections to Oceania (2012). The book invites readers to join her on her canoe voyaging across Oceania to discover the shared identities of Pacific and Māori peoples. Her Facebook post “An Indigenous scholar’s request to other scholars,” (created with the Facebook feature Note) is as an example of a scholar using a new media platform to produce alternative approaches to (re)search that incorporates Indigenous and decolonized (re)search methodologies:

With this new media platform, she created and disseminated open and public scholarship. Her brief post has been shared nearly 150 times as of 2020 and is accessible, understandable, and informative. She uses a conventional research-referencing format and footnotes to convey her message as an Indigenous scholar to other academics.

Somerville’s post provides confirmation, clarification, and guidance for non-Indigenous scholars. While I have engaged with decolonized and Indigenous approaches to research in a (self)reflective way, her instructions outline areas where this paper and future work can contribute to both academia and the community. Indigenous scholarship is not a perspective and I have intentionally included Indigenous scholars and Pacific practitioners work within my doctoral thesis. I understand Indigenous scholarship is not always about colonization and militarization, although it is through resistance to those processes that I compiled my bibliography.

I also understand that I must look beyond the traditional academic journals and databases to engage with alternative forms of knowledge(s), such as audio-visual material, creative works, and performance arts. New media platforms serve as “less conventional (and yet still scholarly) spaces” and can reach a “vast network globally” (Somerville, 2016, note 7, 8). I used my doctoral thesis and “whatever power [I] have to engage with the work of, draw attention to, and even train Indigenous scholars” (Somerville, 2016, note 10).

As a non-Indigenous scholar, I am inspired by Sommerville’s scholarship, and this project approaches (re)search through an “emancipatory commitment” to “empower resistance” (Brown & Strega, 2005, p. 9). Therefore, my doctoral thesis aims to (re)initiate meaningful self-determination and healing from the legacies of colonial and imperial violence(s) through (re)search (Frain, 2018). A genuine decolonized approach to inquiry “emphasizes reflexivity and privileges Indigenous epistemologies, interests, and perceptions” (Genz et al., 2016, p. ii). My work incorporates Indigenous Pacific Epistemologies and includes their voices, experiences, and knowledge(s).

“Settler Responsibility” as a Nonindigenous (Re)searcher
In line with Indigenous understanding of knowledge(s) as circular and reciprocal, I approached my doctoral thesis and ongoing projects with a “settler’s responsibility” (Garrison, 2019) to not only (re)educate myself, but also create and disseminate public and open, accessible and shareable, informative and understandable resistance (re)search. From 2013 - 2017, the Marianas Archipelago served as the geographical locale for this case study focusing on women’s legal, political, spiritual, and digital resistance to everyday and expanding US militarization on Guå’han and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (hereafter CNMI). As a politically engaged qualitative (re)searcher, it is my aim to make visible and publicize the legal, political, spiritual, and digital strategies of those resisting on Guå’han and the CNMI. Three qualitative research questions which structured my doctoral thesis:

1. How do Indigenous women digitally, legally, politically, and spiritually resist the sexual politics of everyday and expanding militarization in Guå’han? In the CNMI?
2. What are the invisible and visible dimensions of militarization as a gendered process?
3. How can I, through reflective (re)search as resistance, create and disseminate scholarship that is open and public, understandable and informative, accessible and shareable, and
useful and relevant to other academic-activists and others working for decolonization and demilitarization?

While (self)reflective fieldwork provided insights into the everyday and expanding militarization, new media sites provide a platform to investigate how resistance is carried out digitally, legally, politically, and spiritually. Instead of creating a comparative study measuring resistance in Guå’han against the struggle in the CNMI, I approach the archipelago as the “Chamorro Archipelago” and conduct (re)search “thinking like an archipelago” (Pugh, 2013). There is no benefit to contrasting and opposing Indigenous experiences within the archipelago. Instead, it is my intention to foster solidarity and support what residents are creating in the context of contemporary colonization and ongoing militarization. The goal of my doctoral thesis was to disseminate open and public scholarship and to contribute to others resisting militarization globally (Frain, 2018).

Qualitative research views social reality as “subjective” and research is about observing and interpreting meaning, rather than proving or measuring. These methods involve the collection of data and include the gathering of oral stories, visual art, and other forms of expression (Blakeley, 2013; Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Denzin & Lincoln, 2017; Denzin et al., 2008; Gusterson, 2008; Mah, 2014; Trainor & Graue, 2013). Just as for many Māori scholars and practitioners, qualitative methods are seen as more empowering for research participants as they create space to “give voice” and allow Indigenous perspectives to be heard. These methods are also inductive in their approach, as the researcher draws meaning and understanding from the (re)search and is not testing data against pre-existing theories or notions (Denzin & Lincoln, 2017).

My contribution begins with listening and is framed by my settler responsibility to (re)learn history and to challenge from whose perspective it has been written and what is omitted. My scholarship seeks to honor and visualize the contemporary resistance in the Marianas Archipelago and is part of a 500-year-old story of resilience. Through academic publications and scholarly writing, poster and conferences presentations, new media platforms and blogs, and my digital autoethnographical Facebook page, Oceania Resistance, my contribution has been to reach academics and activists, scholars and students, community organizers, and local politicians to share and continue to demand a change in the status quo. This decolonized and gendered analysis privileges Indigenous CHamoru and Refalawasch women’s approaches and perspectives resisting the sexist and environmental politics of militarization in the Marianas Archipelago.

Women-Centred Research in Micronesia

Women’s roles in the Pacific vary greatly compared to those in Western hierarchical systems, such as the US federal government and Department of Defense. Born into agency, this matrilineal heritage informs women’s resistance today. Women continually challenge the paternal and colonial treatment of Oceania by federal agencies and military planners. This (re)search is concerned with their experience of resistance to the visible and invisible sexist and environmental politics of everyday and expanding militarization. Historically, women’s organizations have been at the forefront of resistance activities in the Pacific and have done so non-violently and through the arts (Zohl, 1994; Women’s International, 1998). Therefore, this women-centered research honors the past actions, activities, and strategies of women resisters
and seeks to contribute to the decolonization and demilitarization project lead by Pacific Indigenous scholars (Cruz et al., 2016; Delisle, 2015, 2016). The work of three Indigenous women has directly informed the creation of this research design. First, Teresia Teaiwa’s extensive scholarship on gender and militarization across Oceania has provided a foundation for this project (T. K. Teaiwa, 2008, 2010, 2011; T. Teaiwa & Slatter, 2013; K. Teaiwa, A. Henderson, & T. Wesley-Smith, 2018). Her paper for the 8th Pacific History Association Conference, entitled, “Microwomen: U.S. Colonialism and Micronesian Women Activists” (1992), outlined women’s empowering experience resisting colonization and militarization as well as their roles as Indigenous women and as community organizers. She states, “The perpetrators of colonialism made a grave mistake in failing to recognize the power of women” (p. 126). She describes the US “neo-colonialism and nuclear militarism” as “by far the most dangerous” form of domination (p. 128). Second, CHamoru scholar Laura Marie Torres Souder conducted the first research to focus solely on CHamoru women lived experiences. Her dissertation thesis, “New Perspectives on the Chamorro Female Experience: Case Studies of Nine Contemporary Chamorro Women Organizers” (1985) was revised for publication as the book, Daughters of the Island: Contemporary Chamorro Women Organizers on Guam, (1992). Her ground-breaking research and perspective, which was instrumental in understanding CHamoru feminism(s), continues to influence young Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars interested in women’s experiences and struggles for self-determination today (Souder, 2016). Lastly, the guidelines from the “Women-Centered Research Agenda for Outsider Research in Micronesia” workshop held at the Women in the Pacific Conference at the University of Guam (UOG) in 1989, provides instruction for researchers such as me (Participants, 1992). Although written years ago, the recommendations are just as relevant and useful today. Here are the guidelines with my responses in italics:

1. Local women who assist outside researchers should receive some form of credit. 
   *I included an extensive Acknowledgements section at the beginning of my doctoral thesis. I asked the those who I listed if they would like to be included.*

2. It should be recognised that there are important differences between and among the cultures of Micronesia. 
   *I learned a great deal regarding the complexities of CHamoru and Refalawasch cultures, and honor their differences and similarities relating to Micronesian and Oceanic communities and societies.*

3. Careful consideration should be given to the following two questions: (i) For what purpose is the research begin done? (ii) Who is going to read the results of this research? Answers should be supplied to local women before proposed research is initiated.
   *i) This (re)search seeks to contribute to ongoing resistance to the sexual politics of everyday and expanding US militarization ii) New media platforms and digital spaces enable the resistance (re)search to reach a wider and more diverse audience.*

4. The researchers should provide a list of research questions to local women so they may discuss these questions among themselves in the context of their own community. 
   *A list of questions were provided along with the consent forms, although specific research questions were rarely used to structure the conversation or “talk-story” session(s).*

5. Local women need to be able to consider whether or not the researcher may violate cultural values and norms.
I continue to engage in open and collaborative dialogue, feedback, and discussions. I recognize it is not the community’s responsibility to educate me, so I work to ensure I am not violating cultural values and norms. I also appreciate feedback when I do overstep my boundaries.

6. Some knowledge is private by cultural definition, and researchers are expected to be aware of this and to respect it.
   Yes, I have learned while I may ask a certain question, the response may not be directly in response to that question, and it is not acceptable to purist in questioning or to keep prying.

7. Arrangements should be made for collaboration of local people in the proposed research. The credibility of the research results will be suspect if the research is conducted entirely by an outsider.
   New media platforms, such as Facebook and Instagram, are excellent for ongoing collaboration, editing, and dissemination.

8. Local women want to have the right to review research reports prepared by outsiders prior to the submission of these reports by researchers to outside agencies or for publication.
   Yes, my informants in the Mariana Islands have read all of my writing. I have obtained their permission for use before inclusion into my doctoral thesis or publication in on a blog or journal.

9. Local women would like to prevent unsolicited researchers from just “showing up” in their communities and expecting everyone to cooperate with their research.
   Due to my previous frequent trips beforehand, I had established ongoing relationships with my “academic aunties” and “scholarly sisters,” who invited me to collaborate on this project.

10. Local women would like to discourage the attitude of some outsider researchers that the latter have a great unasked-for benefit to bestow on the community. For example, the outside researcher who comes into the community and asks, “Do you meet the requirements for the (unsolicited) research I am planning to do here?” should be encouraged to adopt a more enlightened attitude and possibly be discouraged from doing research in that community.
   This is what fuels my desire to decolonize resistance studies while addressing my settler responsibility.

11. Local women would like a centralized clearinghouse to be developed for the purpose of registering all women-centred research being planned or conducted in the region, with the additional responsibility of disseminating and applying to the policies for outsider research presented here.
   The Richard Flores Taitano Micronesia Area Research Center (MARC) at Unibetsedåt Guåhan the University of Guam holds copies of my academic publications for those interested on island. I also recognize that it is time consuming reading and reviewing my writing, and do not expect all women to have the (unpaid) time to do so.

12. Local women of Micronesia emphasize the following guideline for outsider researchers:
   “You must earn the right to learn.”
   I love(d) this experience, which taught me patience and appreciation. I also realize that just because a doctoral research project has a deadline and is coming to an “end,” the “right to learn” is an ongoing process.
I incorporated these points into my (re)search design, and they guided my autoethnographical fieldwork, and assisted with the structuring of my doctoral thesis. I encourage educators, (re)searchers, and scholars to review the Participants instructions to assist in understanding women’s experiences and resilience within militarized environments. While the above framework is from 1992, women are continuously demanding their voices be heard, despite imperial and patriarchal systems (Frain, 2017).

The aim of (re)search as resistance is to ensure academic outputs are disseminated as open, public, accessible, shareable, understandable, and informative scholarship. My doctoral thesis incorporates both academic publications and new media outputs to include forty-three images and eight videos (Frain, 2017). Aligned with digital forms of resistance, it was published as a free e-book on the locally hosted website, Guampedia.

Pacific Feminists
In December 2016, the Pacific Feminist Forum created the first “Pacific Feminist Charter for Change.” The document, signed by dozens of organization and individuals, outlines the “collective principles that are key to our work as Pacific Feminists.” When discussing what constitutes “women and girls,” the Charter refers to the specific identities and needs of: women, girls, lesbians, bisexual, trans diverse people, gender non-conforming identities, intersex people, fa’afafine, leiti, and other non-heteronormative Pacific identities, ethnically diverse women and girls, women of Indigenous minorities, women with physical or psychosocial disabilities, sex workers, women living with HIV and aids, women living in rural and remote areas, young women, the girl child, older women, heterosexual women, women in sports, women in non-traditional roles, women in creative industries and women in the informal sector and others (Pacific Feminist Forum, 2016).

For my doctoral thesis, I adopt this newly created and inclusive definition to include the diversity of “women and girls” in Oceania. Categorizing this project as “women-centered” (re)search is open to the LGBT community and others who identify as gender non-conforming. I see this Charter as a public framework in which to use in classrooms, community gatherings, and global discussions. The more inclusive the (re)search as resistance approach, the greater the impact in resisting the sexist and environmental politics of everyday and expanding militarization, not only in the Marianas Islands, but across Oceania, and to the continental United States.

Work by Pacific feminists continues in the Marianas Archipelago within both academic and digital spaces. In 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, women from across Oceania collaborate through new online platforms. The “Challenging Militarised Responses and Militarism in the Time of Corona: An International Feminist Teach-In” was held over Zoom and is available for free on the digital video platform, Vimeo (Okazawa-Rey, 2020). This digital teach-in offered insight into women-centered decolonization and demiliarization efforts across the Asia-Pacific region. The recently formed Indigenous CHamoru Women’s Association of Guåhan, I Hagan Famalao’an Guåhan, addressed the continuing work by women for both the decolonization and demilitarization of Guåhan (I Hagan Famalao’an Guåhan, 2020). The impacts of COVID-19 worsen existing issues, such the inadequate health system and lack of
control over island ports, and but also creates space to embrace food sovereignty. I Hagan Famalao’an Guåhan continues political resistance by pressuring elected officials, as well as grassroots community action by supplying healthy food to families in need. Sharing these forms of Pacific feminist experiences across digital spaces, demonstrates how women continue to evolve their approaches and utilize new media technologies as methods of resistance. Further, these digital collaborations provide opportunities for non-Indigenous scholars to listen, learn, and find the best ways to contribute.

In a time of US political and global uncertainty, women and (re)searchers in the Marianas Archipelago continue to resist in solidarity with others across the globe. This paper is one snapshot of how (re)search can contribute to: “fanohge famalåo’an” and “fan’tachu fama’lauan” “women rising” in the Marianas Archipelago, and across Oceania.

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Si Yu’us Må’åse’ & Olomwaay. I express my gratitude to those working for decolonization and demilitarization in the Marianas Archipelago and who have graciously assisted me in creating my doctoral thesis. I am grateful for their insight, wisdom, and patience as I continue to discover and (re)learn. I hope that my own efforts through scholarly solidarity and academic activism can assist with their struggle. The final revisions of this paper were carried out on Waiheke Island in Aotearoa New Zealand. I recognize Paoa Pukunui as descendants of Ngāti Paoa and as Mana Whenua ki Waiheke who continue to uphold rangatiratanga to Tāmaki Makaurau (Auckland), Tikapa Moana (Hauraki Gulf), and Te Waitematā.
Section Two

Testimonies and Pedagogies
Testimony in Opposition to Legislative Resolution No. 294-34(COR)
November 22, 2017

To: Honorable Senator Michael F.Q. San Nicolas
I Mina’ntrentai Kuattro Na Lihesluran Guahan
Guam Congress Building
Hagatña, Guam

Manana si Yu’os and Good Morning, Senator!

My name is Hope Alvarez Cristobal. I am a former senator of this august body within the government of Guam. I live in Tamuning village. I am here on behalf of my family to formally state my opposition AGAINST Resolution 294-34(COR) expressing the people of Guam’s continuing support for the Guam military relocation (of 5,000 marines and some 1,000 army personnel and the attendant infrastructures) and the U.S. military’s promotion of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

With all due respect, Senator San Nicolas, I read Resolution 294-34(COR) that you crafted—it painted a picture of how United States primacy and control over its colony is used to chart a path/process of continual militarization of Guam—to us, our island home and community—to the U.S., its colonial territory since 1898.

In the past 17 years, we have witnessed the intensified militarization by the United States of our island community NOT because of any expressed social purposes or concepts of social justice motivations and interests or some profound sense of commitment to Guam. And, neither is this militarization plan by the U.S. about defense of the people of Guam from U.S. enemy countries. Nor about U.S. concerns about the social and economic welfare of Guam—through enhancement of business and tourism. Neither is it about protecting the integrity of our natural environment, our natural resources, our northern water lens aquifer, the pristine forest habitats and limestone ecosystem; or about the preservation of our ancestral lands and historic properties. Neither is it because of the U.S.’s good intentions in promoting the human-political-and legal right of a people—advancing the ideals, the principles and practices of democracy in its island territory—upholding its legal obligations as a signatory to the United Nations Charter (a treaty of nations) and the Treaty of Peace (w/Spain) or even, its own Constitution. The militarization of Guam is not about any of these lofty values and aspirations for dignity of a colonial people. None of these were ever a part of any military plans.

A CRS (congressional research service) report indicated the U.S. rationale for its military buildup on Guam as having to do with the fact that, Guam is a U.S. colony (U.S. territory) and because of Guam’s non-self-governing-territory status, the U.S. can negotiate basically anything; that the U.S. has built-in flexibility as a sovereign; and, a shorter distance to access East Asia. These, in fact, are the real reasons why our island home has been run like a ship and our people treated as second-class citizens.

Senator San Nicolas, if you have been paying close attention, we on Guam have a contamination problem. This contamination can be traced to the militarization of our home and our people. You may have learned how the U.S. military uses a variety of highly toxic substances in its bases.

In over 70 years of military activity on Guam, highly toxic substances were buried in the soil, in and around the bases including airfields, naval ports and residential areas as well as the
surrounding civilian communities. These toxics have seeped into our aquifer and groundwater. This history of contamination is shared throughout many military base communities, especially overseas communities, but Guam’s contamination is more severe than at domestic bases within the continental U.S. for a variety of reasons. They include the high concentration of military bases per square mile—28% of our lands are under the control of the Department of Defense! Our non-sovereign status and its effect on attitudes towards ourselves as islanders, our health and well-being; and our having been a battlefield in WWII and a central launching pad for the war in Vietnam in particular, including the fact of Guam’s lack of visibility in the U.S. national press which has helped expose contamination problems in the continental United States.

The chemical footprint of the U.S. military is highly predictable or consistent. It includes:

1. The use of extremely high volumes of petroleum fuels, including jet fuel, diesel, gasoline, benzene, perchlorate, and their combustion by-products, for example, the U.S. military used 86 million barrels of fuel in FY2016 for operational purposes.\(^42\) The Air Force bases are the heaviest consumer of these fuels.
2. Extensive use of herbicides to create perimeters around the bases and training areas and to defoliate areas—including the use of Agent Orange.
3. Extensive use of pesticides in military buildings, particularly because of our tropical environment including, in the past, of DDT and chlordane.
4. Use of strong solvents to wash down jets, ships and hardware. These include trichloroethylene (TCE) and perchloroethylene (PERC), also known as VOCs, their health effects include damage to the nervous system and to the skin especially. These chemicals are easily converted to gas from liquid form and when inhaled, damages the lungs. They cause cancer and birth defects. (Camp LeJeune case of TCE contamination).
5. Engine maintenance products.
6. Heavy metals with high toxicity including such things as the arsenic and lead used in ammunition. Training ranges like the planned live fire training range for Tailalo’ and Litekyan, can use millions of rounds a year, only some of which is or was collected after it is spent.
7. Radioactive materials used in munitions from depleted uranium to nuclear missiles.

Many of these chemicals are used in domestic, civilian contexts as well, but what makes their toxicity and impact on human health often so much more severe in military applications are several things, including:

(a) The idea that national security institutions’ needs trump all other institutional or human needs and that it allows for less democratic openness/more secrecy in its operations.
(b) The related intense investment in military institutions which allows for higher rates of consumption of the toxins than would otherwise be the case in more resource-limited contexts.
(c) The inequality that exists in the places like our island home, where the military has chosen to place its facilities. Just look around at the best spots on this island, who controls these areas? But the most important question is do we have clout in Washington, D.C. to make real changes for ourselves?

\(^42\) This amount does not include fossil fuel use for installation uses, which take an additional 35 million barrels (see, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 2016, p.3).
(d) While military personnel are also exposed to contaminants on the bases (and as “enlisted” or workers using those substances, often more extremely exposed in those short periods of their deployment), presumably creating incentives to control contamination, those personnel have limited time on the island/exposure to the contaminants in comparison with lifetime residents.

Off to the side of virtually any road on this island are sites of military contamination variously categorized:

1. FUDS or Formerly Used Defense Sites. They include sites in use from the U.S. invasion and reoccupation of Guam in 1944 after a brief but brutal Japanese occupation. The FUDS program was instituted in 1986 to deal with protest of the lethal contamination of lands the DOD has owned and operated in the past.

   On FUDS properties in Guam whole tanks and planes, mustard gas canisters, construction debris, household waste, drums of various oil and other chemical contents dropped empty or full are found in areas throughout our island. Some hazardous wastes were buried, others bulldozed over cliffsides; others, simply left on the surface to be eventually swallowed up by vegetation. The DOD lists 17 sites of toxic wastes or possible buried munitions or UXO.43 Many more have not received recognition. Soil and water tests required and funded by the FUDS program have found extremely high levels of each of the chemicals I’ve just mentioned above.

2. Another set of contaminated properties are in areas returned to the Government of Guam or private landowners in the last several decades of BRAC (Base Closure and Realignment) rounds beginning in 1988. These areas of contamination must by law be cleaned (or more commonly and euphemistically, remediated) with BRAC funds. The DOD lists 51 such sites on Guam.

3. Contaminated areas on existing bases fall under the DERP-IRP (Defense Environmental Restoration Program—Installation Restoration Program) program, established in 2001. The DOD lists 157 sites in that category on Guam’s bases as well as 25 base sites requiring response by the MMRP (Military Munitions Response Program). AAFB has so much toxicity that it is a Superfund site, still “unremediated” completely after 25 years.

   A number of areas are considered impossible or too expensive to restore to even limited industrial use, and have been cordoned off, presumably permanently. These dead zones occur here on our tiny island as it does throughout the U.S. Though, here on our island, it is at much higher rates per square mile (DOD controls 28% of Guam).

   What existing DOD programs do not do, however, is require an overview of the entire island’s chemical contamination, require study of the cumulative and interactive effect of exposures to multiple chemicals over both short and long term periods; require biological studies of the accumulation of contaminants in the human body and in the food chain and other biota of the island, and require that the DOD present data on how much additional contamination should be expected as a result of the military buildup including other information/analysis that are found crucial for proper clean-up.

43 This program is extremely limited, both in coverage and funding. It requires the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to do environmental cleanup on “eligible properties that were formerly owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed by DOD. The FUDS program only applies to properties that DOD transferred from its control before October 17, 1986,” https://www.denix.osd.mil/fuds/about/
While there are a set of processes by which the DOD or the military services themselves are supposed to keep affected populations aware of contamination and clean-up, the data are so vast in scale and so complex and the incentives to widely disseminate the contamination status of each of these many sites are so low, that the people of Guam have been barely informed or not at all informed about this contamination or about the status of any clean-up efforts. The result is a widespread sense of insecurity, fear of the environment and particularly of our water and the fish we eat on island.

Our local officials including you as our political leaders, charged with caring for the environment and health of the island and the health of our people, must push for more transparency and more action to deal with Guam’s contamination. We have heard the sentiment that local officials have no power to hold the U.S. accountable so they decide, “Why would I tell the people things that I am powerless to prevent?” I ask, Senator San Nicolas, will you be complicit with this attitude by welcoming more militarization, therefore, more contaminations?

I would like to inform you about another study in collaboration with research institutions off-island that is on-going. It is simply the collation of water testing data for perfluorinated compounds on Guam and Saipan. What we are finding is that the USEPA had set a level of lifetime exposure of this particular toxic emergent chemical at 70ppt (parts per trillion). Data from 2015 to 2016 for GWA’s water wells on Guam are indicating higher or near the USEPA level for PFOS.

In March 2015, water well #NAS-1 indicated 67 for PFOS and in September of that same year, read 110ppt. In August 2016, #NAS-1 was indicated as “ND”. This well is in Tiyan along the Barrigada Heights area. Well #A-23 recorded 88ppt in March 2015; at 160ppt in September and at 120ppt in August 2016. Water well #A-25, was at 220 ppt in March 2015; at 410ppt in September 2015 and at 220ppt in August 2016; and well #A-13 indicated 67ppt. In August 2016, the Agana Heights tank recorded 120ppt, the water well #GIAA-1 indicated 110ppt and #GIAA-2, 160ppt.

Some time ago, Guam Water Authority notified the public that it was shutting down a couple of its wells due to some fire-fighting foam chemical contaminant found in those wells. They had already shut down Well NAS-1. I believe the wells that were being shut down at that time were Wells A-23 and A-25 along Rte 4 in Hagatna/Sinajana. The levels of the contaminants found were 410ppt for Well A-25 and 200ppt for Well A-23 in 2016. Uphill from these two tainted wells is the old, the former Naval Air Station (NAS) at Tiyan that had been closed in 1995. Officials from GWA indicated in the media that there is NO HARM at that time; basically, the public was not to worry. This particular contaminant is a dangerous chemical, PFOS (perflourooctanoic sulfonate). It is considered an emergent chemical but is unregulated. The U.S. EPA had set a lifetime exposure level of 70ppt for PFOA (Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and PFOS Perfluorooctane Sulfonate (PFOS). Because of recent scientific studies on these chemicals, New Jersey and Vermont have lowered their levels to 14ppt and 20ppt respectively.

Health outcomes include immunotoxicity, thyroid effects, kidney disease, liver disease, cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, testicular cancer, neuro-development, postnatal development, etc. 70ppt is equivalent to a drop of water in three and a half Olympic-sized swimming pools. If NAS closed in 1995, and we all know that fire-fighting foam training occurred at that military Navy base, then we have to wonder at what levels was this toxic chemical at the time of NAS’s closure over 2 decades ago, a period of time before its closure last year.
What is important to note is that DOD wells were indicating “ND” (Not Detected) for years 2014 to 2015. There could be 3 possible reasons for these readings: 1) Wells are taken off-line during testing; 2) There is dilution going on; 3) Expensive filters costing in the thousands have been installed in these wells.

With all due respect, Mr. Senator, this is not the Guam we want for the people. Cancer is the second leading cause of death on Guam; water is essential to life. There is a high possibility that the contamination of our water is contributing to this epidemic of cancer on Guam. I ask you as leaders of this island community to take this contamination issue seriously. Even with this incomplete survey/study, what we have here already spells out a Call for Action—to have all coordinated plans address our contaminated bodies, our contaminated soils and our Guam lens aquifer systems.

I ask you on behalf of our people health, on behalf of our community, please take your responsibilities seriously—to protect our people from further military contaminations. We do not need any more militarization; we already have a military that is too big for Guam.

Sincerely,
/s/ HOPE A. CRISTOBAL
Resident of Tamuning, Former Senator and District Director, Northern Guam Soil and Water Conservation District Member, Guahan Coalition for Peace and Justice

References


Poetry as Political Activism and Resistance: Reflections from Guåhan to the United Nations

Melvin Won Pat-Borja

This untitled poem was presented as an official petitioner statement or testimony at the United Nations Special Political and Decolonization Committee (4th Committee) in New York on October 4, 2017. Also included is an excerpt from a collaborative M.A. Thesis project for the Center of Pacific Island Studies at the University of Hawai‘i, Mānoa, co-authored with Jason Mateo. The excerpt from our thesis covers some of our philosophy regarding the teaching of poetry to youth on Guåhan and how it was eventually used as a form of political activism and resistance. The poem was presented to the 4th committee and serves as “practical application” of our pedagogy as it was intended to be used as official (formal) testimony, but it was written using poetic conventions and technique.

Keywords: youth, poetry, pedagogy, United Nations, testimony

Untitled Poem
(submitted as official testimony to the U.N. 4th Committee October 4th, 2017)

duct tape
plastic sheeting
two weeks worth of non-perishable food
and drinking water

I kiss my daughter,
thankful for another day
and consider calling in sick to work
fearful that a bomb could drop
while I’m away
this is not how the average American
starts their morning
but for us, it’s just another painful reminder
that we are someone’s territory
The Office of Civil Defense says that in the event of a nuclear attack,
residents should stay in their homes.
When North Korea first announced that they had a nuclear missile capable of reaching Guam,
officials did their best to contain panic by reassuring residents that Guam is ready.
We have survived the worst kind of natural disasters,
but there is nothing natural about a man-made disaster such as this.
The head of Civil Defense and Homeland Security claims that though a nuclear
missile could reach Guam, it would most likely miss.
My family finds no comfort in this as my heart goes out to our brothers and sisters in the
Marshall Islands who know that radioactive ash, mistaken for snow, can be worse than the blast itself,
because it kills you slow --
it melts your skin and eats at you from within…
and if the explosion and cancer don’t get you, the guilt will.  
It is survivors who bear the burden because mushroom cloud memories kill.

flashlights  
batteries  
rain coat  
mask  
gloves  
two sets of clothes in each car -- just in case we get separated

The Governor says we are safe, that America will protect us -- just like they protected us in WWII when they pulled out every single American just before Japan came through and invaded our shores.  
Like they “liberated” us from that same tragedy only after dropping enough bombs to level the entire island and everyone on it.  
I guess the bombs were more humane because at least they don’t discriminate – they kill everything in their path.  
They can’t differentiate between ally and enemy.  
They don’t check your citizenship papers before sending you to a cemetery.  
Forgive me if I do not find comfort in President Trump’s threats of “fire and furry.”  
There is no solace in the promise of more violence.  
Retaliation will not resurrect our children back from the dead.  
I do not feel safe when he calls our Governor to pay his respects.  
No one has even launched an attack, yet my people are being buried under the rhetoric.  
North Korea doesn’t see the Chamoru people as a threat, but as long as our island is a military asset, Guåhan will always remain a target.  
How easily we forget the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
It seems like only the victims can remember that America is the only country to ever use a nuclear weapon in war, and yet it still remains a member of these United Nations.  
If this body can place strict sanctions on Pyongyang, but the United States still walks around with enough bombs to obliterate the planet, then some of you need to look in the mirror and ask yourselves “what the hell is going on?”  
My people have been making this holy pilgrimage to this place, to seek your grace, since the 1980’s.  We are their babies and yet we are still crossing the ocean to tell this story, to plead our case.  
How many times can you smile in our face and do nothing?  
Please tell me that the idea of peace and human dignity still mean something.  
When you are caught in the middle of nuclear threats, it doesn’t matter who’s bluffing.  
Prove to us that coming here was not a waste of breath.  
Better yet, come to Guam and smell the stench of death.  
Yes, my friends, we are dying.  
In wars that aren’t ours, that earn us stripes, but no stars.  
We are dying behind bars and in the back of cop cars.  
We are dying of cancer from nuclear radiation.
We are dying from the effects of over 500 years of uninterrupted colonization. By the time I finish this testimony, someone back home will die. This body stands for peace and humanity, yet our colonizer’s flag still flies outside this building and ours is missing.

When I kiss my kids before they sleep, I will look them in the eye and they will know, that Daddy did everything to fight for peace and justice in our home. What will you tell your kids when you tuck them in at night? Because you can’t fight the monsters in their closets if you cannot fight for what is right.

**U.N. Poem Reflection**

When I wrote this poem/testimony, I really struggled to finish because whenever I felt like I was making progress, I found myself making it sound like a poem. I kept going back and rewriting to make it sound more formal and academic - the way I imagined an official United Nations testimony should sound. But the more I tried to force it, the more difficult it became. Eventually I had to do some soul searching and I asked myself, “Why are you here?” There were more than enough academics and experts who were capable of relaying facts and important information, so what made me deserving of this opportunity? First and foremost, I am a native Chamoru who has been working hard on the front lines. I am heavily involved the community resistance and education work on Guåhan and I work in a public school, which is predominantly Chamoru. In addition to my experience as a community worker, I am a poet. I am a person who possess “the gift of gab,” a wordsmith who uses language to engage people on a personal level. As I wrote this testimony, I found myself trying (and failing) to shy away from that fact. I was trying to be someone I am not by denying who I really am.

I reminded myself that this gift is a part of me and that I was given this opportunity to speak because I possess a skill that is valuable – something that was revered by my ancestors. I decided that it was only right to use this gift as a tool to engage the members present at the U.N. I finally took the training wheels off and started writing from a place of deep pain, unsettling fear, and unwavering love. I needed to connect with these emotions in order to connect with my audience. I figured that if I could humanize these ideas and reach the hearts and minds of the people listening, then my message would serve its purpose. I knew that it was important for me to use language that made people think and more importantly made them imagine. After all, what we are fighting for is the dream of a better life, a better world - and what are dreams without imagination?

I shared this poem with the hope that people would listen to it and imagine themselves in our position. I wanted them to think of their children and their loved ones. I wanted them to live in our skin – if only for a moment. I believe that this is the only way that we can move from sympathy to empathy. We don’t want people to feel sorry for us, we want them to feel what we feel and understand what it means to be colonized. Did this poem rock the socks off the U.N. and change the world? Nope. Was I disappointed? Maybe a little. But ultimately this wasn’t written to do all that. It was written to offer a perspective and spark dialogue, and that’s exactly what it did. Some people hated it and thought it was inappropriate or that I was grandstanding. Some people loved it and thought it was moving and impactful. Either way, love it or hate it, people were talking about it – even better, they were talking about Guåhan.
In my experience as an educator, having good information is useless if you do not have the proper vehicle to transport it. Students don’t care how much you know, if you bore them into a coma. Over the years I’ve used poetry as my vehicle. It entertains them and engages them in a way that a lecture never could. Even better, it empowers them. I believe that this is powerful and significant. We need to find ways to relate and better communicate with our students if we want to educate more effectively. Poetry has provided me with an avenue to do this, but who would I be if I didn’t use it to fight the bigger fight? A hypocrite. A fake. My students don’t respect me because I can throw a few rhymes together. They respect me because I’m just like them. I come from where they come from, I’ve been through what they’ve been through, and I treat them with dignity and respect. I do all of this while spitting lava when I speak and using that fire to fight for them. They see me out there and it lets them know that I’m a real one because I don’t just talk that talk, I live it.

Pedagogy
The following is an excerpt from “The Cultivator: APacific Tongues Educators Guide,” which was a collaborative M.A. Thesis project with Jason Mateo for the Center for Pacific Island Studies at the University of Hawai‘i, Mānoa. The project covers three critical themes: identity, representation, and empowerment and how spoken arts education can be used in the classroom to create effective and impactful education for Pacific Islander students. This section is focused on representation and how some of my students on Guåhan used poetry to represent themselves and their community. In this particular analysis, they used poetry in a public forum meant to address concerns about the proposed Marine relocation from Okinawa to Guam.

Representation
In 2009, the Department of Defense announced that they were releasing a Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the proposed military build-up in Guåhan. As part of an international agreement between the Japanese Government and the United States’ Federal Government, the two countries proposed to decrease U.S. Military presence in Okinawa and Japan and relocate the vast majority of those soldiers to Guåhan. The plan included (among other things) the transfer of over 7,000 Marines and their dependents to Guåhan, the construction of a firing range, the dredging of Apra Harbor, and an estimated 40% increase in our local population. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) turned out to be a 10,000 page document and the community was given 90 days to read and respond to it. Our community was outraged, but our concerns were not being heard. In an effort to quell the public outcry for justice, the Department of Defense held four DEIS hearings or “Town Hall Meetings” in various parts of the island. The meetings featured an “open house” where they posted display panels manned by DoD officials and staff members of the Matrix group, who was hired to write the DEIS. The meetings were meant to be a public space where our community could learn more about the build-up, the impact it would have on our island, and provide our input and opinions. We were allowed to submit written comments and there was also about an hour set aside for oral testimonies to be heard and recorded. Most people chose to offer oral testimony, especially our elderly who would rather do the culturally respectful thing and talk to each other rather than submit written comments. Oral testimonies were limited to 3 minutes, which many people found to be insufficient. Our elders had difficulty making statements and asking questions in less than 3 minutes, which proved to be frustrating considering the amount of concerns they had about the build-up. How could anyone
expect us to respond to 10,000 pages of material in 3 minutes? Ironically, poetry slam rules also impose a 3-minute time limit for poems and so the stage was set for the poets to be the messengers for our community.

As fate would have it, the first DEIS hearing was held at Southern High School, just hours after we had hosted an in-school poetry slam. Poets stayed on campus after school and attended the town hall meeting, teeming for the chance to finally say something about the build-up. Our workshops focus on things that immediately impact the lives of our youth, making relevant connections between social issues and the poetry they write, so Guåhan’s relationship with the United States Government was a common topic of discussion. Since the build-up had been in the news for some time, the controversy surrounding it wasn’t new to the students and many of them had already written poems about it. The poets signed up to speak and delivered articulate, charismatic testimonies which illustrated their displeasure with the federal government and the way that our people and our island have been treated since our first encounter with America. It was incredibly refreshing to hear poetry delivered as testimony in a public hearing setting where our people so often sound angry and struggle to find the right words to paint our frustrations.

The federal government always has plans to ‘improve’ or ‘develop’ or ‘modernize’ Guåhan, and since we are an unincorporated territory, our voices are rarely heard. Public hearings like the ones held for the Military Build-up DEIS are not uncommon; federal officials often use them as their primary means of reaching out to the community to gather input from our residents. This practice results in our people being severely underrepresented in their findings. For something like the build-up, their DEIS made it seem as though there weren’t many residents who opposed the Military Build-up because there weren’t many people who submitted comments during their “scoping hearings,” where they gathered input and opinions from the local public. However, this time things would be different, because this time our young people came out with something to say. There were definitely a few people who spoke out in support of the build-up, but the vast majority of people who spoke were critical of the proposed plan and the administrative government. The meetings weren’t very well attended in the beginning, but as they progressed the numbers continued to grow. People were actually paying attention and taking time out of their day to show up at forums that normally didn’t attract many people. We like to think that the poetry had a lot to do with it. Poet-testimonies were featured in the local newspapers and television programs and YouTube videos began to get hundreds, then thousands of views. Young people were spreading the word using social media and working with local organizations like We Are Guåhan, Guåhan NAPU, The Guam Fisherman’s Co-op, and the Guam Preservation Trust to raise awareness in our community. Youth were taking direct action to address community concerns and they were using poetry as their vehicle. Our people were finally representing themselves in a critical forum where we are normally left out.

The creativity, energy, and spontaneity of the young people who presented testimony during this series of DEIS hearings, were a breath of fresh air for activism on the island. The youth really took charge of these hearings and were able to show how poetry is more than just pretty words strung together using rhyme or metaphor. Poetry was the voice of the younger generation, who were tired of being underrepresented or even misrepresented. They wanted to speak for themselves and they were using poetry to do just that. So, if these young people had such a strong desire to speak for themselves, then why have these forums been so sparsely attended in
the past? We believe it is because our young people didn’t have a proper vehicle to transport their words and feelings. We believe that poetry serves as this vehicle because it allows them to speak and write in a way that fits their critical and creative sensibilities. Poetry provided these Chamoru kids with the opportunity to be charismatic and articulate. It allowed them to put their words and ideas into well-crafted and clever statements, which ultimately boosts their confidence and gives them the motivation to speak publicly. With this newfound confidence in their messaging, our youth no longer felt like they would be ridiculed or embarrassed about speaking up. In previous scenarios, many of our young people have shied away from these types of public speaking events because they didn’t feel like they had anything worth contributing or they didn’t know how to say the things they felt. Even among youth who have strong opinions about issues of social justice, many of them will chose to say nothing even when asked because they fear that their words will not be accepted. We are convinced that this pedagogy puts those fears to rest because we provide students with a platform to grow and succeed.

We begin our process by creating a safe space that is dialogical in nature, one in which students feel as though they are actively participating in the administering of their education. Next, we work on writing freely without boundaries, and then we revise and edit. We work together in groups to figure out what we like and don’t like about the poem and strategize ways to improve it. Then we practice, practice, and practice more, learning the real character and emotion behind our words and what we have written. Once the poem has gone through this rigorous revision and editing process, it is time for the slam! In this scenario, the poetry slam plays a vital role because it serves as a training ground for our young people. The poetry slam offers a live audience and creates a dynamic that requires our young people to take ownership of their words and ideas. Slams are so significant to direct action because they allow our young people a chance to discover their poetry in a new light and they offer a stimulating environment where poetry and critical thinking are celebrated. In a slam, people come to hear poems, but in a DEIS hearing, people come to hear information. For us, the hearings provided the perfect venue for our young people to engage their community using poetry they had written, listen to the thoughts of others, share their opinions, and get involved with government decisions that would impact all of our lives. The practical applications for using spoken word poetry as a means for direct action in your community are endless. Once you have poets engaged in the writing and performance aspects of the process, all you need is a venue for the youth to speak at. In this particular case, we used the DEIS hearings as our venue, but any town hall meeting, public hearing, protest rally, PTA meeting, or community gathering will do. You might even consider using the poems in their written form and have students submit them to the newspaper as letters to the editor or have them submit to a local journal or literary review; you may even consider pressing chapbooks, which are very affordable and can be pressed at your local photocopy shop. You will find that once poets have something to say, all you need to do is create a space where people will listen.
When you pick up Keith L. Camacho’s *Sacred Men: Law, Torture, and Retribution in Guam*, the cover shares an image of Japanese prisoners at a prisoner-of-war camp in Guam. Instead of evoking sympathy, I immediately felt disconnected from the cover image—as if it was taken at a place that I had no connection to after a war that had no impact on me. I paused and reflected about how my reactions to these kinds of images are telling of the affect of Chamorro experiences under Japanese occupation during World War II in Guam. The themes throughout the book reveal how some WWII experiences are privileged over others relative to larger narratives and practices of American colonization throughout the Mariana Islands. The rebuilding of—or the power the United States had to build—Guam following WWII is thought to have a foundation concreted by commemorative war narratives comprised of loyalty to the U.S. for “liberating” Guam from Japan. Unfortunately, this narrative has been told and retold without an emphasis on how Japanese occupation came to be in the first place. The immediate Post-WWII period in Guam changed many aspects of life as well as the landscape of the island not only due to physical destruction from the war, but also in relation to implementing more aspects of American style colonialism such as political, economic, and societal frameworks and norms, while constituting enough distance in the allotment of political power to keep Guam a “loyal” colony—as it politically remains in 2021.

*Sacred Men* adds to the various forms of understanding how WWII experiences were documented as well as the impact and implications of this period in the present day. This text, however, is one that joins the critical efforts of various groups, other scholarly works, and everyday acts and memories from survivors that diverge from the dominant narratives of Japanese occupation. These alternative narratives provide challenges to the constructed stories of liberation. They tend to honor war survivors for their various painful experiences and resilience while perhaps revealing that instead of a foundation, the U.S. just built a scaffold in the making of its governance and influence in Guam. Thus, *Sacred Men* is another addition to a complex genealogy that exemplifies the messiness and need for nuance that often gets reduced to a mere temporal period in our island’s history.

Following WWII, Camacho focuses on how U.S. military tribunals in Guam were used to implement U.S. legal frameworks that were crucial to shaping how U.S. empire would operate in Guam and the islands throughout the entirety of Micronesia that were previously administrated by Japan. Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s understandings of biopower, homo sacer, state of exception, and the camp are all employed in Camacho’s theoretical framing for this book. As Camacho argues, Agamben’s works such as *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (1998) and *State of Exception* (2005) are necessary to analyze connections between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical in implementing and maintaining power over a people/s. I read Camacho’s utilization of homo sacer as an Agambenian notion of homo sacer as an ontic. This idea is seen in how Agamben’s topological notion of the camp is utilized to show of the making of the camp can be present more in relation to power versus physical demarcations of
space. For example, Guam was still explicitly under American military rule in its governance. While Chamorro bodies were being made and placed in space, Chamorro testimonies which utilized gossip and rumor were used in military tribunals for the benefit of U.S. makings to solidify political power over and in Guam.

Camacho’s methodology includes an impressive breadth and depth throughout the text, which is comprised of an introduction, six chapters, and a conclusion. Chamorro epistemologies, or ways Chamorro knowledge has developed are also privileged. *Sacred Men* includes archival research from Guam and U.S.-based source materials (Micronesian Area Research Center (MARC), U.S. National Archives, War Crimes Studies Center, etc.) that provided court transmissions, speeches, as well as a wide variety of primary and secondary sources. The use of Chamorro values and proverbs are framed as not simply being metaphors for contextualizing non-Chamorro theories, but are the employed epistemological and ontological realities seen in the scope of the book that reflect what has *been* and what continues to *be* the realities in Guam. Chamorros are distinguished according to their respective islands of the archipelago both to reflect the utility for the U.S. to label them as such, but also for clarity for the reader, and perhaps unintentionally provides a way to present some of the tensions between Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. Camacho navigates the historical record in such a way that different experiences are expressed while cautiously but unapologetically discussing the topics regarding political status and relations between the created separated political entities in the Mariana Islands at all. Perhaps this is indicative of how a privileged Chamorro epistemological framework would inherently be able to navigate these tensions.

The book is divided into three parts. In part I, “The State of Exception,” Camacho details the origins of what constituted war criminality in the U.S. as well as internationally. He focuses on how the U.S. military government intentionally shaped an understanding of what “security” is by immediately normalizing and employing both police, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps units for the alleged Japanese and Chamorro war criminals as well as throughout Guam. Part II, “The Bird and the Lizard” expands on Camacho’s ko’ko’-hilitai relation by tracing some of the antagonisms between Chamorros of different islands. The U.S. accepted forms of Chamorro communication and behavior (i.e., Chamorro understandings of gossip and retribution) were used as testimony for the Chamorro bodies used during the tribunals, especially in how they set up the approach to how Japanese nationals would be prosecuted. The ko’ko’-hilitai relation allows us to see how both internal (Chamorro) actors and external (U.S.) actors can both operate in distinct ways depending on particular conditions and suggests how many “truths” operate simultaneously and its perceived contradictions are not contested. Part III, “The Military Colony,” focuses on the form of biopower that Camacho argues is manifested in Guam. The ostensibly non-violent practices perceived in the military tribunals are a justified form of violence through the determination of which bodies are used and made to be not just perceived, but in effect *made to be*. This is evident in the flexibility a U.S. military government had, especially since none of the Chamorros at the time had the perceived protections of U.S. citizenship or an organized political status under U.S. rule. In this section of the book, Camacho’s use of Agamben builds on the notion of how law and those with political power have the ability to define who is considered human under the law and how their bodies and/or assigned “humanness” is to be perceived and treated.
As noted above, some Chamorro epistemologies are conceptualized in terms of ko’ko’-hilitai relations. Camacho discusses how the ko’ko’ and hilitai are used to analyze and demonstrate both how Chamorro perceived and used gossip in their relations. This understanding of gossip was approved behavior for the purposes of testimonies in the tribunals. This aspect of gossip aided in the U.S. creation of political life, although it was contextualized as often under situations of duress. I am interested in how we can apply this particular framing from Camacho’s work to other instances that do not have the same conditions but still operate under U.S. colonization. As Camacho asserts, “Lest I be misunderstood as romanticizing native life, let me be clear that my analysis of gossip is by no means trivial. It is ontological” (p. 20). Additionally, Camacho asks, “In this respect, we can ask, what happened to the knowledge system of inafa’maolek when the tribunal utilized gossip to condemn or vindicate war criminals under Japan’s empire?” (Camacho, p. 18). The particular framing of inafa’maolek privileges what is a more contemporary usage that is striving to ensure reciprocity and positive relations through other cultural values. Although, an alternative understanding of inafa’maolek as “making good” between people can imply that there is a perceived wrong or negative experience that can be made “right,” which raises potential implications for what retribution should be in this case. I am not sure how those involved in this post-WWII period conceived and employed inafa’maolek and to what extent the compounding colonial logics at play manifested into the type of testimony produced in the tribunals. This additional understanding of inafa’maolek could perhaps facilitate our sense of the many conditions at play in Guam and allow us to consider if this additional understanding of inafa’maolek is useful in further contextualizing Camacho’s foundational arguments or answering his overarching question about the knowledge system in relation to the tribunals against Japanese empire. The usefulness of Agamben is evident in this for the level of abstraction it provides in articulating these tensions between colonial logics and agendas with and against Chamorro ways of knowing and being.

The labor that went into this book is clear, as evidenced by the numerous amount of archival research used, engaging with Agamben’s work within the context of the Mariana Islands, and developing ways to conceptualize Chamorro ways of knowing and being in written scholarship. Sacred Men provides a part of our history that does not always get fleshed out. Although Camacho explains his decision not to employ Agamben’s usage of forms-of-life for this book, there seems to be potential for engaging beyond Agamben’s limited understanding of forms-of-life—often considered static and rigid—to expand into a more comprehensive Chamorro understanding of the concept Sacred Men forces us to confront the uncomfortable with respect and dignity. It challenges us to not just have a superficial understanding of a time “in the past,” but rather the book deeply analyzes how the particular situation of governance under military rule has had implications on the creation and perpetuation of the implemented civilian government that persists in Guam today. Additionally, this book gives readers particular experiences that allow us to reflect on how Chamorros throughout the Mariana Islands have been made to see each other as well as ourselves.
In August 2017, Guam was thrust into international headlines after a war of words between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un. As an American territory and heavily militarized island, Guam was singled out as the site for a possible missile attack by North Korea. As tensions rose between the two nations, Chamoru and locals alike took advantage of the media attention to organize “People for Peace” rally in the heart of Hagåtña. This act of resistance asserted an island voice that disassociated from American rhetoric of war and highlighted a movement towards self-governance. In 2020, Chamorus continue to strategize against the United States’ military agendas with the approval of the $78 million live-firing training range complex in Litekyan, an ancient Chamoru village and site of the Guam National Wildlife Refuge. Conversations around Guam’s sovereignty also heightened this year when the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt arrived in Guam with over 4,500 crewmembers facing an outbreak of COVID-19. Due to the territoriality of Guam’s political status, the government of Guam had no authority to stop the ship from coming to the island and putting a strain on local resources. Guam, along with the wider Pacific, is no stranger to bearing the brunt of various empires vying for political and economic control of Oceania. Sasha Davis’ *The Empires’ Edge: Militarization, Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific* (2015) remains a timely text that engages in the longer history of competing global powers in the region and the many Oceanic responses to these colonial agendas.

Sasha Davis, a geographer at Keene State College, conceived of *The Empires’ Edge* through his research on the nuclear contamination in the Marshall Islands and over a decades worth of fieldwork around military bases in Oceania. Davis’ book brings his extensive research to life through an interdisciplinary approach, interweaving postcolonial theory, social movement studies, feminist geopolitics, political ecology, and ethnographic experiences.

*The Empires’ Edge* is organized into six chapters, which include: “Hegemony and Affinity in the Islands of Empire”; “Surveying the Baseworld”; “Seeing like an Empire: Islands as Wastelands”; “Local Resistances and Imperial Reactions”; “Colonialism, Militarization, Tourism, and Environment as Nexus”; and “Networks of Affinity and Myths of the Postcolonial Pacific.” Rather than structure the book by site-specific cases, Davis examines militarization thematically. This approach highlights the fluidity of American imperialism and enables him to tell this complex story, “more effectively by foregrounding the process of hegemony- and affinity-seeking political action and then ground the analysis of those processes in the places I examine” (p. 30). At times this arrangement of the book breaks up island specific stories, however it allows for a broader view of the contexts in which these communities experience militarization.

The strength of Davis’ work comes from his case studies in United States’ military bases in Hawai’i, Okinawa, Guam, the Northern Marianas, the Marshall Islands, and the Philippines. These specific spaces highlight the environmental degradation and on-the-ground consequences
local populations face due to their close proximity to the military. The U.S., China, and Japan are a few examples of hegemony-seeking countries that believe domination (mainly through the military) is the only means to political power. Rather than leaving the conversation seemingly hopeless, Davis shows the ways in which island groups have successfully freed their communities of militaristic endeavors through affinity-seeking power. For Davis it is important to not only explore how outside empires impose themselves on the Pacific, but more importantly, how these claims to the region are contested within the islands. Davis argues that, “it is impossible to understand the politics of empire without understanding the places where it touches the ground and the bodies of people that reproduce and contest it” (16). These contestations dismantle outsiders’ narratives of the Pacific as an empty, unimportant, utopian, militarized borderland. Davis discusses how this resistance is a political project, and it allows island groups to reimagine their futures.

*The Empires’ Edge: Militarization, Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific* is a poignant text for a multitude of audiences, especially those concerned with the current politics of Oceania and rethinking the costs of militarization in the region. This book also offers something valuable to academics (across disciplines) and activists that are interested in exploring issues concerning militarization, environmental degradation, acts of resistance, politics, and critical geography.

Sasha Davis’ *The Empires’ Edge* examines how the Pacific is seen as the edge for numerous global powers. He sheds light on how, “the Pacific has been and continues to be a place where the realms of *multiple* powers have met and pushed against each other” (p. 11). Simultaneously this book serves as a reminder of the importance of Pacific Islander lead anti-imperialist movements. This critical work drives home the idea that affinity-seeking power enables Oceanic communities to reimagine their futures where they are the center of their own political desires. Sasha Davis builds off of these vital conversations in his newly published, *Islands and Oceans: Reimaging Sovereignty and Social Change* (2020), available through the University of Georgia Press.

**References**


Heiwa: Heiwa is the pushing of the canoe on the unfolded mat to demonstrate how a canoe will actually sail in the ocean from the departure island to the destination island. The navigator uses one or more stars or constellations and uses the faunan etak (primary reference island) and possibly a fauan yatil (secondary reference island) in tracking the course. Heiwa is also used to explain the feeling of the canoe’s movement caused by the waves and swells hitting the canoe.

Image Design:
Lawrence J. Cunningham and Manny Sikau